Board composition, board activity and ownership concentration, the impact on firm performance

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest levels of only a single concentration.

Ownership structure and collateral requirements: Evidence from China’s listed firms

This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on collateral requirements using a sample of China's listed firms from 2007 to 2009. We find that compared to privately controlled companies, state-controlled companies are less likely to be required to pledge collateral, and such a difference is more pronounced for firms in troubled industries. The empirical results also show that the effect of state control on collateral requirements is weaker in companies with more foreign ownership. Moreover, the effect of state control on collateral requirements is weaker in companies with more third party guarantees. Finally, we find that the effect of state control on collateral requirements is more pronounced for firms operating in regions with more government intervention.

Does control-ownership divergence impair market liquidity in an emerging market? Evidence from China

This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated with liquidity and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency problems and information asymmetry. We argue that in an emerging market, the negative effect of the divergence on liquidity is worsened by state ownership and poorer shareholder protection, both of which result in more severe agency conflicts; we also find, however, that this effect is alleviated by the NTS reform, which aligns the interest of different shareholders.

Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: evidence from China’s listed firms

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value: Evidence from China’s civilian-run firms

This paper examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through capital-structure choices, using a sample of China’s civilian-run firms listed on the Chinese stock market between 2002 and 2007. The empirical results demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial ownership drives the capital structure into a nonlinear shape, but in an opposite direction to the effect of managerial ownership on firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Our findings imply that the “interest convergence” and “entrenchment” effects of managers’ behaviour in terms of managerial ownership can also explain the agency-relevant situation of China’s civilian-run firms.

The effect of ownership structure on leverage decision: new evidence from Chinese listed firms

This paper examines the effect of state control and ownership structure on the leverage decision of firms listed in the Chinese stock market. Our results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have higher leverage ratios than non-SOEs, and SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have higher leverage ratios than SOEs in better regions. We also show that the largest shareholding (the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder) in the SOEs has a negative relationship with the leverage ratio, while the largest shareholding in non-SOEs has a non-linear relationship with the short-term and long-term debt ratios. Finally, this study also shows that the share split reform and the improvement of institutional environment both weaken the negative relationship and strengthen the positive relationship between largest shareholding and leverage of SOEs and non-SOEs to some extent. This paper documents how the financing behaviour of SOEs is more influenced by government intervention, while the financing behaviour of non-SOEs is more market oriented.

The ownership and ownership concentration? The impact on the performance of China’s firms

This paper investigates the impact if ownership and ownership concentration on the performance of China's listed firms. By recognizing the differences between ownership and ownership concentration, and between total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration, we find that ownership concentration is more powerful than any category of ownership in determining firm performance and that it has approximately positive linear relations with firm value. The tradable ownership concentration has a more significant and positive influence on firm performance than total ownership cocncentration. The highest level of firm performance is approached when a firm is characterized with both total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration. Thus, we conclude that it is a rule that ownership concentration enhances firm performance regardless of who the concentrated owners are.

Ownership and ownership concentration: which is important in determining the performance of China’s listed firms?

This article investigates the impact if ownership and ownership concentration on the performance of China's listed firms. By recognizing the differences between ownership and ownership concentration, and between total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration, we find that ownership concentration is more powerful than any category of ownership in determining firm performance and that it has approximately positive linear relations with firm value. The tradable ownership concentration has a more significant and positive influence on firm performance than total ownership cocncentration. The highest level of firm performance is approached when a firm is characterized with both total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration. Thus, we conclude that it is a rule that ownership concentration enhances firm performance regardless of who the concentrated owners are.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value

This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm performance through the choices of capital structures by using a new sample of S& P 500 firm in 2005. The empirical results of OLS regressions replicate the nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. However, we found that the turning points had moved up in our sample compared with previous papers, which implies that the managerial control for pursuing self-interst, and the alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders can only be achieved now by management holding more ownership in a firm than that found in previous studies. Managerial ownership also drives the capital structure as a nonlinear shape, but with a direction opposite to the shape of firm value. the results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Capital structure is endogenously determined by bith firm value and managerial ownership; while managerial ownership is not endogenously determined by the other two variables.

Does ownership affect a firm’s performance and default risk in Jordan?

This paper seeks to examine the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and the default risk of a sample of publicly listed firms.

Ownership concentration and product innovation in Chinese private SMEs

Product innovation is extremely important to the growth, success, and ultimate survival of firms. Although its unique features in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have gained growing attention in the literature, there is limited knowledge as to how ownership concentration moderates the relationship between product innovation and its determinants. Based upon insights from agency and institutional theories, we examine the moderating effects of ownership concentration on the relationship between product innovation and its key determinants in Chinese SMEs, utilizing a large dataset of 43,728 Chinese firms over the period 2005-2006. We focus on examining the differences between single-owner SMEs, where there is dominant control of one family member, and multiple-owner SMEs, where principal-agent conflicts and principal-principal conflicts are more likely to occur. Our findings indicate that single-owned firms tend to convert research and development into product innovation more efficiently than firms with multiple owners, who are typically better at utilizing external sources of knowledge and human capital.

Non-wage benefits, corporate ownership and firm performance in post-communist economies: evidence from Ukraine

The economic reforms in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe have fundamentally reshaped ownership and governance of economic production, notably through the privatization of former state-owned enterprises. These reforms were expected to transform management practices by displacing ‘cradle-to-grave’ welfare arrangements administered by state-owned enterprises. Using data drawn from two large samples of Ukrainian establishments, we investigate, in two different time points, the relationship between non-wage benefits and firm performance during the period of transition to a market economy (1994–2004). We found that non-wage benefits continued to be a critical feature of HRM practices in Ukraine during this period, and were positively associated with firm performance.

Secure ownership transfer for multi-tag multi-owner passive RFID environment with individual-owner-privacy

In this paper we propose a secure ownership transfer protocol for a multi-tag multi-owner RFID environment that provides individual-owner-privacy. To our knowledge, the existing schemes do not provide individual-owner-privacy and most of the existing schemes do not comply with the EPC Global Class-1 Gen-2 (C1G2) standard since the protocols use expensive hash operations or sophisticated encryption schemes that cannot be implemented on low-cost passive tags that are highly resource constrained. Our work aims to fill these gaps by proposing a protocol that provides individual-owner-privacy, based on simple XOR and 128-bit pseudo-random number generators (PRNG), operations that are easily implemented on low-cost RFID tags while meeting the necessary security requirements thus making it a viable option for large scale implementations. Our protocol also provides additional protection by hiding the pseudo-random numbers during all transmissions using a blind-factor to prevent tracking attacks.

Barriers to entry in monopoly markets: automobile distribution in Brazil

O Objetivo deste Trabalho é Analisar os Efeitos da Entrada de uma Segunda Concessionária de Automóveis em Mercados Previamente Monopolizados. para Tanto, Construiu-Se um Banco de Dados com a Localização de Concessionárias de Automóveis em Microrregiões e Características Demográficas e Econômicas Destas Microrregiões. a Partir Desse Banco de Dados e de Modelos de Escolha Binária, Foram Identificadas Variáveis que Condicionam a Existência e o Número de Concessionárias em Microrregiões. Utilizando-Se de um Modelo Adaptado de Bresnahan e Reiss (1990), Foram Estimados os Custos Fixos de Entrada de Concessionárias em Mercados Monopolizados. os Resultados Obtidos Sugerem que as Barreiras À Entrada não são Significativas, o que Aumenta a Probabilidade de que a Cláusula de Exclusividade nos Contratos de Concessão não Cause Danos À Concorrência no Mercado Brasileiro de Distribuição de Automóveis

The value of local partners in Brazil: the effects of ownership clusters and business group membership on firm value in emerging markets

Este estudo analisa como a classe de acionistas afeta o valor das empresas brasileiras listadas na bolsa de valores no ponto de vista da governança corporativa. O trabalho examina a interação entre o valor das empresas e cinco tipos de concentrações acionárias comumente presente em mercados emergentes: famílias, agentes públicos, investidores estrangeiros, executivos e investidores financeiros nacionais. A análise empírica demonstra que o mix e a concentração de participação acionária afeta significativamente o valor das empresas. Utilizando uma compilação única de dados em painel de 2004 a 2008, a presente pesquisa também desenvolve hipóteses sobre o efeito da participação em grupos econômicos para o valor das empresas. A investigação encontra evidências de que, apesar de sua importância para o desenvolvimento de empresas brasileiras, o capital familiar, instituições públicas, e investidores estrangeiros estão cedendo lugar a monitores mais especializados e menos concentrados, como executivos e instituições financeiras nacionais. Estes resultados indicam que a governança corporativa no Brasil pode estar alcançando níveis de maturidade mais elevados. Adicionalmente, apesar de não haver indicação da existência de correlação entre a participação em grupos econômicos e o valor das empresas, os resultados indicam que a presença de um tipo específico de acionista em uma empresa do grupo facilita investimentos futuros desta classe de acionista em outras empresas do mesmo grupo, sinalizando que os interesses acionários são provavelmente perpetuados dentro de uma mesma rede de empresas. Finalmente, a pesquisa demonstra que enquanto o capital familiar prefere investir em empresas com ativa mobilidade do capital, investidores internacionais e instituições públicas procuram investimentos em equity com menor mobilidade de capital, o que lhes garante mais transparência com relação ao uso dos recursos e fundos das empresas.