Auctioning versus grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction. At the auction, each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market, either as a leader or a follower. This role affects each firms’ valuation of the permits (which are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it occurs in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms’ abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough.

Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria

Matching theory and matching markets are a core component of modern economic theory and market design. This dissertation presents three original contributions to this area. The first essay constructs a matching mechanism in an incomplete information matching market in which the positive assortative match is the unique efficient and unique stable match. The mechanism asks each agent in the matching market to reveal her privately known type. Through its novel payment rule, truthful revelation forms an ex post Nash equilibrium in this setting. This mechanism works in one-, two- and many-sided matching markets, thus offering the first mechanism to unify these matching markets under a single mechanism design framework. The second essay confronts a problem of matching in an environment in which no efficient and incentive compatible matching mechanism exists due to matching externalities. I develop a two-stage matching game in which a contracting stage facilitates subsequent conditionally efficient and incentive compatible Vickrey auction stage. Infinite repetition of this two-stage matching game enforces the contract in every period. This mechanism produces inequitably distributed social improvement: parties to the contract receive all of the gains and then some. The final essay demonstrates the existence of prices which stably and efficiently partition a single set of agents into firms and workers, and match those two sets to each other. This pricing system extends Kelso and Crawford's general equilibrium results in a labor market matching model and links one- and two-sided matching markets as well.

EXISTENCE OF UNUSED MANAGED CAPACITY ON DEDICATED LANES AND AN ALTERNATIVE ON HOW TO SELL IT VIA AUCTIONS

This dissertation verifies whether the following two hypotheses are true: (1) High-occupancy/toll lanes (and therefore other dedicated lanes) have capacity that could still be used; (2) such unused capacity (or more precisely, “unused managed capacity”) can be sold successfully through a real-time auction. To show that the second statement is true, this dissertation proposes an auction-based metering (ABM) system, that is, a mechanism that regulates traffic that enters the dedicated lanes. Participation in the auction is voluntary and can be skipped by paying the toll or by not registering to the new system. This dissertation comprises the following four components: a measurement of unused managed capacity on an existing HOT facility, a game-theoretic model of an ABM system, an operational description of the ABM system, and a simulation-based evaluation of the system. Some other and more specific contributions of this dissertation include the following: (1) It provides a definition and a methodology for measuring unused managed capacity and another important variable referred as “potential volume increase”. (2) It proves that the game-theoretic model has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (3) And it provides a specific road design that can be applied or extended to other facilities. The results provide evidence that the hypotheses are true and suggest that the ABM system would benefit a public operator interested in reducing traffic congestion significantly, would benefit drivers when making low-reliability trips (such as work-to-home trips), and would potentially benefit a private operator interested in raising revenue.

Economicidade e eficiência temporal estudo de caso no Instituto Federal de Goiás

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade UnB Planaltina, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Gestão Pública, Mestrado Profissional em Gestão Pública, 2016.

Livestock newsletter

This weekly publication gives the auction prices for cattle, pigs and grain in South Carolina markets.

Livestock newsletter

This weekly publication gives the auction prices for cattle, pigs and grain in South Carolina markets.

Livestock newsletter

This weekly publication gives the auction prices for cattle, pigs and grain in South Carolina markets.

Livestock newsletter

This weekly publication gives the auction prices for cattle, pigs and grain in South Carolina markets.

Livestock newsletter

This weekly publication gives the auction prices for cattle, pigs and grain in South Carolina markets.

Livestock newsletter

This weekly publication gives the auction prices for cattle, pigs and grain in South Carolina markets.

Livestock newsletter

This weekly publication gives the auction prices for cattle, pigs and grain in South Carolina markets.

Livestock newsletter

This weekly publication gives the auction prices for cattle, pigs and grain in South Carolina markets.

Livestock newsletter

This weekly publication gives the auction prices for cattle, pigs and grain in South Carolina markets.

Livestock newsletter

This weekly publication gives the auction prices for cattle, pigs and grain in South Carolina markets.

Synthetic portfolio for event studies: Estimating the effects of volatility call auctions

We propose a method denoted as synthetic portfolio for event studies in market microstructure that is particularly interesting to use with high frequency data and thinly traded markets. The method is based on Synthetic Control Method and provides a robust data driven method to build a counterfactual for evaluating the effects of the volatility call auctions. We find that SMC could be used if the loss function is defined as the difference between the returns of the asset and the returns of a synthetic portfolio. We apply SCM to test the performance of the volatility call auction as a circuit breaker in the context of an event study. We find that for Colombian Stock Market securities, the asynchronicity of intraday data reduces the analysis to a selected group of stocks, however it is possible to build a tracking portfolio. The realized volatility increases after the auction, indicating that the mechanism is not enhancing the price discovery process.