Report to Government Oversight Committee Regrading Soil and Water Conservation Districts Competition with Small Business, 2006

At the request of the Government Oversight Committee, the Ombudsman gathered information regarding competition by county Soil and Water Conservation Districts (SWCD) with small business through the sale of products and services. The goal of the Ombudsman’s review was to assist the Government Oversight Committee (Committee) in gaining an objective understanding of the issues so the Committee can ascertain whether there is a problem that requires legislation this legislative session. The Ombudsman focused on gathering specific information from four SWCD offices in central Iowa; Dallas, Greene, Guthrie and Jasper. These offices were specifically identified in documentation presented to the Government Oversight Committee by affected small business owners (contractors), Jon Judson of Diversity Farms and Dan Brouse of Iowa Restorations. However, with 100 SWCDs in Iowa,1 each with their own elected commissioners and each with different practices, priorities and fundraising activities, what the Ombudsman learned about these four counties may not be applicable to all the SWCDs in Iowa. The Ombudsman assigned the case to the Assistant Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman for Small Business, Kristie Hirschman. For reference purposes in this report, actions taken by Ms. Hirschman will be ascribed to the Ombudsman.

RsmY, a small regulatory RNA, is required in concert with RsmZ for GacA-dependent expression of biocontrol traits in Pseudomonas fluorescens CHA0.

In the plant-beneficial soil bacterium and biocontrol model organism Pseudomonas fluorescens CHA0, the GacS/GacA two-component system upregulates the production of biocontrol factors, i.e. antifungal secondary metabolites and extracellular enzymes, under conditions of slow, non-exponential growth. When activated, the GacS/GacA system promotes the transcription of a small regulatory RNA (RsmZ), which sequesters the small RNA-binding protein RsmA, a translational regulator of genes involved in biocontrol. The gene for a second GacA-regulated small RNA (RsmY) was detected in silico in various pseudomonads, and was cloned from strain CHA0. RsmY, like RsmZ, contains several characteristic GGA motifs. The rsmY gene was expressed in strain CHA0 as a 118 nt transcript which was most abundant in stationary phase, as revealed by Northern blot and transcriptional fusion analysis. Transcription of rsmY was enhanced by the addition of the strain's own supernatant extract containing a quorum-sensing signal and was abolished in gacS or gacA mutants. An rsmA mutation led to reduced rsmY expression, via a gacA-independent mechanism. Overexpression of rsmY restored the expression of target genes (hcnA, aprA) to gacS or gacA mutants. Whereas mutants deleted for either the rsmY or the rsmZ structural gene were not significantly altered in the synthesis of extracellular products (hydrogen cyanide, 2,4-diacetylphloroglucinol, exoprotease), an rsmY rsmZ double mutant was strongly impaired in this production and in its biocontrol properties in a cucumber-Pythium ultimum microcosm. Mobility shift assays demonstrated that multiple molecules of RsmA bound specifically to RsmY and RsmZ RNAs. In conclusion, two small, untranslated RNAs, RsmY and RsmZ, are key factors that relieve RsmA-mediated regulation of secondary metabolism and biocontrol traits in the GacS/GacA cascade of strain CHA0.

The Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition, February 2007

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.

Oxidized LDL modulates apoptosis of regulatory T cells in patients with ESRD.

Increased levels of oxidized low-density lipoproteins (oxLDL) contribute to the increased risk for atherosclerosis, which persists even after adjusting for traditional risk factors, among patients with ESRD. Regulatory T cells (CD4+/CD25+ Tregs), which down-regulate T cell responses to foreign and self-antigens, are protective in murine atherogenesis, but whether similar immunoregulation occurs in humans with ESRD is unknown. Because cellular defense systems against oxLDL involve proteolytic degradation, the authors investigated the role of oxLDL on proteasome activity of CD4+/CD25+ Tregs in patients with ESRD. CD4+/CD25+ Tregs isolated from uremic patients' peripheral blood, especially that of chronically hemodialyzed patients, failed to suppress cell proliferation, exhibited cell-cycle arrest, and entered apoptosis by altering proteasome activity. Treating CD4+/CD25+ Tregs with oxLDL or uremic serum ex vivo decreased the number and suppressive capacity of CD4+/CD25+ Tregs. In vitro, oxLDL promoted the accumulation of p27Kip1, the cyclin-dependent kinase inhibitor responsible for G1 cell cycle arrest, and increased apoptosis in a time- and concentration-dependent manner. In summary, proteasome inhibition by oxLDL leads to cell cycle arrest and apoptosis, dramatically affecting the number and suppressive capacity of CD4+/CD25+ Tregs in chronically hemodialyzed patients. This response may contribute to the immune dysfunction, microinflammation, and atherogenesis observed in patients with ESRD.

Bundling and competition for slots: Sequential pricing

In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellerswhen each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limitedslots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing.First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibriumoften does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast,equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it inthis paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots heoccupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason thatthis leads to an efficient allocation of slots.Second, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there alwaysexists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to purebundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing,we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slottingcontracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequentialpricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling thansimultaneous pricing.

Iowa Utilities Board Fiscal Year 2006 Regulatory Plan Pursuant to Executive Order Nine

Regulatory Plan for Fiscal Year 2005

Iowa Utilities Board Fiscal Year 2007 Regulatory Plan Pursuant to Executive Order Nine

Regulatory Plan for Fiscal Year 2007

Iowa Utilities Board Fiscal Year 2008 Regulatory Plan Pursuant to Executive Order Nine

Regulatory Plan for Fiscal Year 2008

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

Let's (not) talk about sex: The effect of information provision on gender differences in performance under competition

We study how gender differences in performance under competition areaffected by the provision of information regarding rival s gender and/ordifferences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks thatdiffer regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. Weobserve women s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks areperceived as favoring men and 2) rivals gender is explicitly mentioned. Thisresult can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitlymentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior.Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women sunderperformance in competition.