901 resultados para onshore AC grid


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Line converters have become an attractive AC/DC power conversion solution in industrial applications. Line converters are based on controllable semiconductor switches, typically insulated gate bipolar transistors. Compared to the traditional diode bridge-based power converters line converters have many advantageous characteristics, including bidirectional power flow, controllable de-link voltage and power factor and sinusoidal line current. This thesis considers the control of the lineconverter and its application to power quality improving. The line converter control system studied is based on the virtual flux linkage orientation and the direct torque control (DTC) principle. A new DTC-based current control scheme is introduced and analyzed. The overmodulation characteristics of the DTC converter are considered and an analytical equation for the maximum modulation index is derived. The integration of the active filtering features to the line converter isconsidered. Three different active filtering methods are implemented. A frequency-domain method, which is based on selective harmonic sequence elimination, anda time-domain method, which is effective in a wider frequency band, are used inharmonic current compensation. Also, a voltage feedback active filtering method, which mitigates harmonic sequences of the grid voltage, is implemented. The frequency-domain and the voltage feedback active filtering control systems are analyzed and controllers are designed. The designs are verified with practical measurements. The performance and the characteristics of the implemented active filtering methods are compared and the effect of the L- and the LCL-type line filteris discussed. The importance of the correct grid impedance estimate in the voltage feedback active filter control system is discussed and a new measurement-based method to obtain it is proposed. Also, a power conditioning system (PCS) application of the line converter is considered. A new method for correcting the voltage unbalance of the PCS-fed island network is proposed and experimentally validated.

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Cooperation and coordination are desirable behaviors that are fundamental for the harmonious development of society. People need to rely on cooperation with other individuals in many aspects of everyday life, such as teamwork and economic exchange in anonymous markets. However, cooperation may easily fall prey to exploitation by selfish individuals who only care about short- term gain. For cooperation to evolve, specific conditions and mechanisms are required, such as kinship, direct and indirect reciprocity through repeated interactions, or external interventions such as punishment. In this dissertation we investigate the effect of the network structure of the population on the evolution of cooperation and coordination. We consider several kinds of static and dynamical network topologies, such as Baraba´si-Albert, social network models and spatial networks. We perform numerical simulations and laboratory experiments using the Prisoner's Dilemma and co- ordination games in order to contrast human behavior with theoretical results. We show by numerical simulations that even a moderate amount of random noise on the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation almost vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is high enough. Moreover, when we consider fixed social-like networks we find that current models of social networks may allow cooperation to emerge and to be robust at least as much as in scale-free networks. In the framework of spatial networks, we investigate whether cooperation can evolve and be stable when agents move randomly or performing Le´vy flights in a continuous space. We also consider discrete space adopting purposeful mobility and binary birth-death process to dis- cover emergent cooperative patterns. The fundamental result is that cooperation may be enhanced when this migration is opportunistic or even when agents follow very simple heuristics. In the experimental laboratory, we investigate the issue of social coordination between indi- viduals located on networks of contacts. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in a social-like network than in a random network. In another experiment, we study the behavior of people who play a pure co- ordination game in a spatial environment in which they can move around and when changing convention is costly. We find that each convention forms homogeneous clusters and is adopted by approximately half of the individuals. When we provide them with global information, i.e., the number of subjects currently adopting one of the conventions, global consensus is reached in most, but not all, cases. Our results allow us to extract the heuristics used by the participants and to build a numerical simulation model that agrees very well with the experiments. Our findings have important implications for policymakers intending to promote specific, desired behaviors in a mobile population. Furthermore, we carry out an experiment with human subjects playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in a diluted grid where people are able to move around. In contrast to previous results on purposeful rewiring in relational networks, we find no noticeable effect of mobility in space on the level of cooperation. Clusters of cooperators form momentarily but in a few rounds they dissolve as cooperators at the boundaries stop tolerating being cheated upon. Our results highlight the difficulties that mobile agents have to establish a cooperative environment in a spatial setting without a device such as reputation or the possibility of retaliation. i.e. punishment. Finally, we test experimentally the evolution of cooperation in social networks taking into ac- count a setting where we allow people to make or break links at their will. In this work we give particular attention to whether information on an individual's actions is freely available to poten- tial partners or not. Studying the role of information is relevant as information on other people's actions is often not available for free: a recruiting firm may need to call a job candidate's refer- ences, a bank may need to find out about the credit history of a new client, etc. We find that people cooperate almost fully when information on their actions is freely available to their potential part- ners. Cooperation is less likely, however, if people have to pay about half of what they gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Cooperation declines even further if people have to pay a cost that is almost equivalent to the gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Thus, costly information on potential neighbors' actions can undermine the incentive to cooperate in dynamical networks.