Accounting for the economic risk, caused by variation in disease severity, in fungicide dose decisions: exemplified for Mycosphaerella graminicola on winter wheat

A method is presented to calculate economic optimum fungicide doses accounting for the risk-aversion of growers responding to variability in disease severity between crops. Simple dose-response and disease-yield loss functions are used to estimate net disease-related costs (fungicide cost, plus disease-induced yield loss) as a function of dose and untreated severity. With fairly general assumptions about the shapes of the probability distribution of disease severity and the other functions involved, we show that a choice of fungicide dose which minimises net costs on average across seasons results in occasional large net costs caused by inadequate control in high disease seasons. This may be unacceptable to a grower with limited capital. A risk-averse grower can choose to reduce the size and frequency of such losses by applying a higher dose as insurance. For example, a grower may decide to accept ‘high loss’ years one year in ten or one year in twenty (i.e. specifying a proportion of years in which disease severity and net costs will be above a specified level). Our analysis shows that taking into account disease severity variation and risk-aversion will usually increase the dose applied by an economically rational grower. The analysis is illustrated with data on septoria tritici leaf blotch of wheat caused by Mycosphaerella graminicola. Observations from untreated field plots at sites across England over three years were used to estimate the probability distribution of disease severities at mid-grain filling. In the absence of a fully reliable disease forecasting scheme, reducing the frequency of ‘high loss’ years requires substantially higher doses to be applied to all crops. Disease resistant cultivars reduce both the optimal dose at all levels of risk and the disease-related costs at all doses.

Social and environmental report assurance: some interview evidence

The steady growth of social and environmental reporting (SER) is being accompanied by an increase in social and environmental reporting assurance (SERA). The existing literature on SERA suggests that it is necessary to build credibility and trust among corporate stakeholders. Prior work has also found evidence of managerial and professional capture of SERA. In this paper, we present empirical evidence from interviews with corporate social responsibility representatives from 20 UK listed companies on whether they consider SERA to be necessary. We believe this to be the first research into SERA that uses an interview method. Our interviews revealed mixed feelings. Half of the respondents believed that external SERA would enhance credibility and trust which confirmed the prior literature. However, the other half believed that external SERA was not necessary, believing that internal assurance was sufficient. This was because they saw SERA as predominantly a managerial tool, useful for checking the efficiency of internal management control systems, rather than as a mechanism for enhancing corporate accountability to stakeholders and building credibility and trust. The potential for SERA to be a mechanism whereby greater dialogue is created between companies and their stakeholders on social and environmental issues is not being harnessed. This paper thus demonstrates a fundamental difference between the external prior normative literature and the managerial motivation in the SERA area.