Order without law? An anatomy of Hamas security: The Executive Force (Tanfithya)

In the struggle to assert and consolidate its power, the Hamas movement of the Palestinian territories has devised several strategies for control. In recognition that control of security remains a key goal for any power-seeker, following its election victory in January 2006, Hamas entered into a fierce and ultimately successful conflict with Fatah for control of the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Interior and Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) in the Gaza Strip. One way in which Hamas was able to achieve this objective was through the creation of its own internal ‘police’ force called the Tanfithya (Executive Force or EF). This article details an anatomy of the EF and the implications of this force in terms of Hamas' confrontation with opponents and its attempts at governance. It also examines the extent to which the EF can be considered to be a model of Islamic policing and its impact on secular rivals in the Gaza Strip.

Netwar Geopolitics: Security, Failed States and Illicit Flows

Recent and emerging security policies and practices claim a mutual vulnerability that closely links human insecurity in failed states with the threat to powerful states from illicit flows. This article first examines this ‘emerging orthodoxy’ of transnational security issues that reinforces the securitisation of poverty and the poor. It then subjects this orthodoxy to theoretical and empirical critique. Theoretically it shows that this orthodoxy is formed as a ‘geopolitical imagination’ that associates and stabilises particular views of weak states and illicit flows in a ‘netwar imagination’ by reasserting and reconfiguring traditional assumptions of the spatiality and nature of threats. A final empirical section, focusing on drug production and nuclear smuggling, argues that those assumptions and their assemblage are a partial, incomplete and often self-referential reading of illicit flows.

Millimeter-wave and submillimeter-wave imaging for security and surveillance

Passive equipments operating in the 30-300 GHZ (millimeter wave) band are compared to those in the 300 GHz-3 THz (submillimeter band). Equipments operating in the submillimeter band can measure distance and also spectral information and have been used to address new opportunities in security. Solid state spectral information is available in the submillimeter region making it possible to identify materials, whereas in millimeter region bulk optical properties determine the image contrast. The optical properties in the region from 30 GHz to 3 THz are discussed for some typical inorganic and organic solids. in the millimeter-wave region of the spectrum, obscurants such as poor weather, dust, and smoke can be penetrated and useful imagery generated for surveillance. in the 30 GHZ-3 THZ region dielectrics such as plastic and cloth are also transparent and the detection of contraband hidden under clothing is possible. A passive millimeter-wave imaging concept based on a folded Schmidt camera has been developed and applied to poor weather navigation and security. The optical design uses a rotating mirror and is folded using polarization techniques. The design is very well corrected over a wide field of view making it ideal for surveillance, and security. This produces a relatively compact imager which minimizes the receiver count.

Man-in-the-Middle Attack Test-bed Investigating Cyber-security Vulnerabilities in Smart Grid SCADA Systems

The increased complexity and interconnectivity of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in the Smart Grid has exposed them to a wide range of cyber-security issues, and there are a multitude of potential access points for cyber attackers. This paper presents a SCADA-specific cyber-security test-bed which contains SCADA software and communication infrastructure. This test-bed is used to investigate an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing based man-in-the-middle attack. Finally, the paper proposes a future work plan which focuses on applying intrusion detection and prevention technology to address cyber-security issues in SCADA systems.

Impact of Cyber-Security Issues on Smart Grid

Greater complexity and interconnectivity across systems embracing Smart Grid technologies has meant that cyber-security issues have attracted significant attention. This paper describes pertinent cyber-security requirements, in particular cyber attacks and countermeasures which are critical for reliable Smart Grid operation. Relevant published literature is presented for critical aspects of Smart Grid cyber-security, such as vulnerability, interdependency, simulation, and standards. Furthermore, a preliminary study case is given which demonstrates the impact of a cyber attack which violates the integrity of data on the load management of real power system. Finally, the paper proposes future work plan which focuses on applying intrusion detection and prevention technology to address cyber-security issues. This paper also provides an overview of Smart Grid cyber-security with reference to related cross-disciplinary research topics.

Intrusion Detection System for Network Security in Synchrophasor Systems

Synchrophasor systems will play a crucial role in next generation Smart Grid monitoring, protection and control. However these systems also introduce a multitude of potential vulnerabilities from malicious and inadvertent attacks, which may render erroneous operation or severe damage. This paper proposes a Synchrophasor Specific Intrusion Detection System (SSIDS) for malicious cyber attack and unintended misuse. The SSIDS comprises a heterogeneous whitelist and behavior-based approach to detect known attack types and unknown and so-called ‘zero-day’ vulnerabilities and attacks. The paper describes reconnaissance, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack types executed against a practical synchrophasor system which are used to validate the real-time effectiveness of the proposed SSIDS cyber detection method.