Historic pottery of the Kotzebue Sound Iänupiat / Charles V. Lucier, James W. VanStone.

n.s. no.18(1992)

Historic Massachusetts, a travel map to help you feel at home in the Bay State

designed and drawn by Ernest Dudley Chase.

Boston proper, Massachusetts, 1895, showing historic shorelines (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Plan of Boston proper : showing changes in street and wharf lines, 1795 to 1895, by Charles C. Perkins, Jan. 31st, 1895. It was printed by Geo. H. Walker, lith., for the Boston (Mass.). Engineering Dept. Annual report of the City Engineer, 1895. Scale [ca. 1:4,800]. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the Massachusetts State Plane Coordinate System, Mainland Zone (in Feet) (Fipszone 2001). All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows Boston proper's original shoreline and changes in wharf line for years 1795, 1850 and 1895. It also shows early streets with later changes and discontinued streets. It includes features such as roads, railroads, drainage, wharves, some public buildings, parks, and more. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps of Massachusetts from the Harvard Map Collection. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features. The selection represents a range of regions, originators, ground condition dates (1755-1922), scales, and purposes. The digitized selection includes maps of: the state, Massachusetts counties, town surveys, coastal features, real property, parks, cemeteries, railroads, roads, public works projects, etc.

Historic Letter Collection, 1796-1940 (inclusive). 1844-1872. Joseph Dalton Hooker letters, 1844-1872

Historic Letter Collection, 1796-1940; Joseph Dalton Hooker letters, 1844-1872. HL Hook 1-3. Gray Herbarium Archives, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Standard-setting abuse: the case for antitrust control. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/01, February 2013

Standards reduce production costs and increase the value of products to consumers; ultimately they significantly contribute to economic development. Standards however entail risks of anti-competitive abuse. After the adoption of a standard, the elimination of competition between technologies can lead to consumer harm. Fair, reasonable, nondiscriminatory (FRAND) commitments made by patent holders have been used to mitigate that risk. The European Commission recognises the importance of standards, but European Union competition policy is still seeking to identify well-targeted and efficient enforcement rules.

Reviewing the EU's market abuse rules. ECMI Policy Brief No. 19, 27 February 2012

Updated May 2012 and reposted: In 2011, an EU legislative package on market abuse was proposed, which comprises two sets of documents: 1) a draft Regulation that will largely replace the existing Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and the level 2 measures; and a new Directive dealing with criminal sanctions. Market abuse rules are needed to ensure market integrity and investor confidence, and to allow companies to raise capital and contribute to economic growth, thereby increasing employment. This ECMI Policy Brief argues that rules on market abuse should be technically well designed, proportionate and crystal clear, but also subject to more efficient and harmonised supervision than before. The paper focuses particularly on the draft Regulation. The use of a regulation is welcome, as (in integrated financial markets) abuses should be regulated in a harmonised manner by member states, which has not always been the case, as the 2007 report from the European Securities Markets Expert (ESME) Group extensively demonstrated. At the same time, this paper criticises some of the provisions contained in the draft Regulation, notably the new notion of inside information not to abuse (Art. 6(e)) and the unchanged definition of inside information for listed companies to disclose, and it proposes new definitions. The extension of disclosure obligations to issuers whose shares are traded on demand only on ‘listing’ multilateral trading facilities is also widely criticised. Other comments deal with the proposed rules on managers’ transactions, insiders’ lists and accepted market practices.

Meeting Competition: Why it is not an Abuse under Article 82. Research Papers in Law, 3/2004.

Introduction. Meeting competition occurs when an undertaking lowers its prices in response to the entry of a competitor. Despite accepting that meeting competition can be compatible with Article 82, the Commission2 and the Court of justice3 have repeatedly condemned the practice due to the modalities of implementation or “particular circumstances”.4 However, existing precedent on the subject remains obscurely reasoned and contradictory, such that it is at the present time impossible to give clear advice to undertakings on the circumstances in which meeting competition is compatible with Article 82. Not only is such legal uncertainty in itself damaging but, in so far as it discourages meeting competition, it appears to us to be harmful to competition. As concerns the latter point, it will be seen that some of the most powerful arguments against prohibiting meeting competition are based on the counterproductive nature of the remedies. The present article does not, however, aim to propose a simple solution to distinguish abusive and non-abusive meeting competition.5 Nor does the article aim to give a comprehensive overview of the existing case law in this area.6 Instead, it takes a more economic approach and aims to lay out in a (brief but) systematic fashion the competitive concerns that might potentially be raised by the practice of meeting competition and in doing so to try to identify the main flaws in the Court and Commission’s approach.

The Impact of a Substance Abuse Treatment for Offenders in Relation to the Time Spent in Treatment

The objective of this research is to evaluate the outcomes of a treatment for addicts. 123 subjects were tested before treatment and at 5, 8 and 11 months follow-up periods with a French version of the Addiction Severity Index (ASI). Exposure to treatment was based on the number of clients’ contact-hours with a therapist. The sample was divided into three groups according to the number of hours spent in treatment. The data was analysed using MANOVA on the seven scales of the ASI for the three groups and the four time periods. Results showed that all groups improved significantly but that this improvement was not related to the number of hours spent in treatment.