Moody choice

If choices depend on the decision maker's mood, is the attempt to derive any consistency in choice doomed? In this paper we argue that, even with full unpredictability of mood, the way choices from a menu relate to choices from another menu exhibits some structure. We present two alternative models of 'moody choice' and show that, in either of them, not all choice patterns are possible. Indeed, we characterise both models in terms of consistency requirements of the observed choice data.

The Stagnation Regime of the New Keynesian Model and Current US Policy

In Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) the intended steady state is locally but not globally stable under adaptive learning, and unstable deflationary paths can arise after large pessimistic shocks to expectations. In the current paper a modified model is presented that includes a locally stable stagnation regime as a possible outcome arising from large expectation shocks. Policy implications are examined. Sufficiently large temporary increases in government spending can dislodge the economy from the stagnation regime and restore the natural stabilizing dynamics. More specific policy proposals are presented and discussed.

Ordering Policy Rules with an Unconditional Welfare Measure

The unconditional expectation of social welfare is often used to assess alternative macroeconomic policy rules in applied quantitative research. It is shown that it is generally possible to derive a linear - quadratic problem that approximates the exact non-linear problem where the unconditional expectation of the objective is maximised and the steady-state is distorted. Thus, the measure of pol icy performance is a linear combinat ion of second moments of economic variables which is relatively easy to compute numerically, and can be used to rank alternative policy rules. The approach is applied to a simple Calvo-type model under various monetary policy rules.

On Identification of Bayesian DSGE Models

In recent years there has been increasing concern about the identification of parameters in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Given the structure of DSGE models it may be difficult to determine whether a parameter is identified. For the researcher using Bayesian methods, a lack of identification may not be evident since the posterior of a parameter of interest may differ from its prior even if the parameter is unidentified. We show that this can even be the case even if the priors assumed on the structural parameters are independent. We suggest two Bayesian identification indicators that do not suffer from this difficulty and are relatively easy to compute. The first applies to DSGE models where the parameters can be partitioned into those that are known to be identified and the rest where it is not known whether they are identified. In such cases the marginal posterior of an unidentified parameter will equal the posterior expectation of the prior for that parameter conditional on the identified parameters. The second indicator is more generally applicable and considers the rate at which the posterior precision gets updated as the sample size (T) is increased. For identified parameters the posterior precision rises with T, whilst for an unidentified parameter its posterior precision may be updated but its rate of update will be slower than T. This result assumes that the identified parameters are pT-consistent, but similar differential rates of updates for identified and unidentified parameters can be established in the case of super consistent estimators. These results are illustrated by means of simple DSGE models.

Infrequent Fiscal Stabilization

This paper studies discretionary non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy stabilization in a New Keynesian model, where the fiscal policymaker uses a distortionary taxe as the policy instrument and operates with long periods between optimal time-consistent adjustments of the instrument. We demonstrate that longer fiscal cycles result in stronger complementarities between the optimal actions of the monetary and fiscal policymakers. When the fiscal cycle is not very long, the complementarities lead to expectation traps. However, with a sufficiently long fiscal cycle — one year in our model — no learnable time-consistent equilibrium exists. Constraining the fiscal policymaker in its actions may help to avoid these adverse effects.

Who is the fairest of them all? The independent effect of attractive features and self-perceived attractiveness on cooperation among women

The present paper analyzes the extent to which attractiveness-related variables affect cooperative behavior in women. Cooperativeness is evaluated through a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). We consider several morphometric variables related to attractiveness: Fluctuating Asymmetry (FA), Waist-Hip Ratio (WHR, Body Mass Index (BMI) and Facial Femininity (FF). These variables have been shown to predict human behavior. We also include as a control variable a score for Self-Perceived Attractiveness (SPA). We test differences in these variables according to behavior in the PDG. Our results reveal that low FA women cooperate less frequently in the PDG. We also find that women with lower WHR are more cooperative. This result contradicts the expected relation between WHR and behavior in the PDG. We show that this effect of WHR on cooperation operates through its influence on the expectation that participants hold on the cooperative intent of their counterpart. In addition, we show that the effect of attractive features on cooperation occurs independently of the participants' perception of their own appeal. Finally, we discuss our results in the context of the evolution of cooperative behavior and under the hypothesis that attractiveness is a reliable indicator of phenotypic quality.

Choice, Deferral and Consistency

In this paper we study decision making in situations where the individual’s preferences are not assumed to be complete. First, we identify conditions that are necessary and sufficient for choice behavior in general domains to be consistent with maximization of a possibly incomplete preference relation. In this model of maximally dominant choice, the agent defers/avoids choosing at those and only those menus where a most preferred option does not exist. This allows for simple explanations of conflict-induced deferral and choice overload. It also suggests a criterion for distinguishing between indifference and incomparability based on observable data. A simple extension of this model also incorporates decision costs and provides a theoretical framework that is compatible with the experimental design that we propose to elicit possibly incomplete preferences in the lab. The design builds on the introduction of monetary costs that induce choice of a most preferred feasible option if one exists and deferral otherwise. Based on this design we found evidence suggesting that a quarter of the subjects in our study had incomplete preferences, and that these made significantly more consistent choices than a group of subjects who were forced to choose. The latter effect, however, is mitigated once data on indifferences are accounted for.

Tractable valuations under uncertainty

I put forward a concise and intuitive formula for the calculation of the valuation for a good in the presence of the expectation that further, related, goods will soon become available. This valuation is tractable in the sense that it does not require the explicit resolution of the consumerís life-time problem.

Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk neutral and are subject to limited liability constraints and (ii) where agents are risk averse, have quasi-linear preferences in consumption and actions but where limited liability constraints do not bind. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. In the risk-neutral case, there may be an initial phase in which one agent overinvests and the other underinvests. However, both actions and surplus converge monotonically to a stationary state in which there is no overinvestment and surplus is at its maximum subject to the constraints. In the risk-averse case, there is no overinvestment. For this case, we establish that dynamics may or may not be monotonic depending on whether or not it is possible to sustain a first-best allocation. If the first-best allocation is not sustainable, then there is a trade-off between risk sharing and surplus maximization. In general, surplus will not be at its constrained maximum even in the long run.

Choosing on Influence

Interaction, the act of mutual influence between two or more individuals, is an essential part of daily life and economic decisions. Yet, micro-foundations of interaction are unexplored. This paper presents a first attempt to this purpose. We study a decision procedure for interacting agents. According to our model, interaction occurs since individuals seek influence for those issues that they cannot solve on their own. Following a choice-theoretic approach, we provide simple properties that aid to detect interacting individuals. In this case, revealed preference analysis not only grants the underlying preferences but also the influence acquired. Our baseline model is based on two interacting individuals, though we extend the analysis to multi-individual environments.

How family caregivers' medical and moral assumptions influence decision making for patients in the vegetative state: a qualitative interview study.

Background Decisions on limiting life-sustaining treatment for patients in the vegetative state (VS) are emotionally and morally challenging. In Germany, doctors have to discuss, together with the legal surrogate (often a family member), whether the proposed treatment is in accordance with the patient's will. However, it is unknown whether family members of the patient in the VS actually base their decisions on the patient's wishes. Objective To examine the role of advance directives, orally expressed wishes, or the presumed will of patients in a VS for family caregivers' decisions on life-sustaining treatment. Methods and sample A qualitative interview study with 14 next of kin of patients in a VS in a long-term care setting was conducted; 13 participants were the patient's legal surrogates. Interviews were analysed according to qualitative content analysis. Results The majority of family caregivers said that they were aware of aforementioned wishes of the patient that could be applied to the VS condition, but did not base their decisions primarily on these wishes. They gave three reasons for this: (a) the expectation of clinical improvement, (b) the caregivers' definition of life-sustaining treatments and (c) the moral obligation not to harm the patient. If the patient's wishes were not known or not revealed, the caregivers interpreted a will to live into the patient's survival and non-verbal behaviour. Conclusions Whether or not prior treatment wishes of patients in a VS are respected depends on their applicability, and also on the medical assumptions and moral attitudes of the surrogates. We recommend repeated communication, support for the caregivers and advance care planning.

A corneal dystrophy associated with transforming growth factor beta-induced Gly623Asp mutation an amyloidogenic phenotype.

PURPOSE: To present the light and electron microscopic findings of a unique corneal dystrophy never before described in a German family carrying the Gly623Asp Mutation of the TGFBI gene with late clinical onset. DESIGN: Experimental study. PARTICIPANTS: Four affected and 6 nonaffected family members. METHODS: Slit-lamp examination, photographic documentation, and isolation of genomic DNA from peripheral blood leucocytes obtained from each family member examined. Exons 3, 4, 5, and 11 to 14 of the TGFBI gene were amplified and sequenced in these family members. Five corneal buttons of 3 affected siblings were excised at the time of penetrating keratoplasty. Light and electron microscopic examination were performed including immunohistochemistry with antibodies against keratoepithelin (KE) 2 and 15. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Clinical and histologic characteristics of corneal opacification in affected patients and presence of coding region changes in the TGFBI gene. RESULTS: The specimens showed destructive changes in Bowman's layer and the adjacent stroma. Patchy Congo red-positive amyloid deposits were found within the epithelium in 1 cornea, in Bowman's layer and in the anterior stroma of all specimens also showing KE2, but not KE15, immunostaining. Electron microscopy revealed deposits mainly located in the anterior stroma and Bowman's layer and in small amounts in the basal area of some epithelial cells. The destroyed areas were strongly Alcian blue-positive, the Masson Trichrome stain proved mainly negative for the deposits. All affected but none of the unaffected family members had a heterozygous missense mutation in exon 14 of the TGFBI gene (G-->A transition at nucleotide 1915) replacing glycin by aspartic acid amino acid (Gly623Asp) at position 623 of the KE protein. CONCLUSIONS: In contrast with the patient carrying the Gly623Asp mutation of the TGFBI gene described by Afshari et al, our cases presented with Salzmann's nodular degeneration-like clinical features and their specimens contained KE2-positive amyloid. The reason for this now "meeting the expectation histologic phenotype" is unclear. The histologic findings emphasize that this is a unique corneal dystrophy, which shares no clinical characteristics with Reis-Bücklers' dystrophy and should be treated as a distinct entity. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE(S): The authors have no proprietary or commercial interest in any materials discussed in this article.

Transmission factors in malaria epidemiology and control in Africa

Genetic and environmental components of factors contributing in malaria transmission are reviewed. Particular attention is given to density dependent regulation of vector populations in relation to the survival rate anophelines. The expectation of vector activities are different according to the epidemiological characteristics of malaria, mainly its stability. In areas with perennial and high transmission (stable malaria) vector control could reduce malaria related morbidity and mortality, whithout any effect on the endemicity. However this need further investigations. In areas where the transmission period is very short (unstable malaria), vector control will have an important impact on the disease and the endemicity. Control projects using indoor spraying with insecticide and impregnated bed nets are discussed.

The Impact of democratization: a preliminary investigation on social policies and political violence in Latin America

The recent strides of democracy in Latin America have been associated to conflicting outcomes. The expectation that democracy would bring about peace and prosperity have been only partly satisfied. While political violence has been by and large eradicated from the sub-continent, poverty and social injustice still prevail and hold sway. Our study argues that democracy matters for inequality through the growing strength of center left and left parties and by making political leaders in general more responsive to the underprivileged. Furthermore, although the pension reforms recently enacted in the region generated overall regressive outcomes on income distribution, democratic countries still benefit from their political past: where democratic tradition was stronger, such outcomes have been milder. Democratic tradition and the specific ideological connotations of the parties in power, on the other hand, did not play an equally crucial role in securing lower levels of political violence: during the last wave of democratizations in Latin America, domestic peace was rather an outcome of political and social concessions to those in distress. In sum, together with other factors and especially economic ones, the reason why recent democratizations have provided domestic peace in most cases, but have been unable so far to solve the problem of poverty and inequality, is that democratic traditions in the subcontinent have been relatively weak and, more specifically, that this weakness has undermined the growth of left and progressive parties, acting as an obstacle to redistribution. Such weakness, on the other hand, has not prevented the drastic reduction of domestic political violence, since what mattered in this case was a combination of symbolic or material concessions and political agreements among powerful élites and counter-élites.

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.