What Fidelidade group should do to convey its human centric brand identity values to millennial insurance consumers

Companies are concerned in attracting and retaining Millennial consumers, especially if their relation with this target audience is weak. This happens in the insurance industry in Portugal and in Fidelidade group specifically. The aim of this study is to recommend a strategy for the insurance group to improve its relationship with these consumers, by conveying its human centric values. In order to address this goal, we developed a qualitative research. The main insight is that Millennials may perceive those values in the industry but do not associate them with insurance brands.

Evaluación de fondos de inversión garantizados por medio de portfolio insurance

La elaboración de un índice de performance para la evaluación de carteras de inversión tiene como base la correcta definición de la medida de riesgo a emplear. Este trabajo tiene como objetivo proponer una medida de performance adecuada a la evaluación de carteras de fondos de inversión garantizados. Las particularidades de este tipo de fondos hacen necesario definir una medida explicativa de las características especificas de riesgo de este tipo de carteras. Partiendo de la estrategia de porfolio insurance se define una nueva medida de riesgo basada en el downside risk. Proponemos como medida de downside risk aquella parte del riesgo total de una cartera de títulos que se elimina con la estrategia de portfolio insurance. Por contraposición, proponemos como medida de upside risk aquella otra parte del riesgo total de la cartera que no desaparece con la estrategia de portfolio insurance. De este modo, la suma del upside risk y del downside risk es el riesgo total. Partiendo de la medida de riesgo upside risk y del modelo de valoración de activos C.A.P.M. se propone una medida de performance específica para evaluar los fondos de inversión garantizados.

Capitalism, unemployment and the transition to the contemporary pattern of growth

A new model of unemployment based on an idea of Marx is presented and used to interpret the development of the British economy from the beginning of capitalism to the present. It is shown that unemployment may be created purposely by capitalists in order to weaken the bargaining position of the workers. This mechanism leads to complex temporal pattern of unemployment and can explain why wages took almost a century and a half to react to the growing capital to labour ratio that characterised early British capitalism.

Unemployment and wage formation in a growth model with public capital

We study the relation between public capital, employment and growth under different assumptions concerning wage formation. We show that public capital increases economic growth, and that, if there is wage inertia, employment positively depends on both economic growth and public capital.

Long-run Inflation-Unemployment Dynamics: The Spanish Phillips Curve and Economic Policy

This paper takes a new look at the long-run dynamics of inflation and unemployment in response to permanent changes in the growth rate of the money supply. We examine the Phillips curve from the perspective of what we call "frictional growth", i.e. the interaction between money growth and nominal frictions. After presenting theoretical models of this phenomenon, we construct an empirical model of the Spanish economy and, in this context, we evaluate the long-run inflation-unemployment trade for Spain and examine how recent policy changes have afected it.

Unemployment, growth and fiscal policy: new insights on the hysteresis hypothesis

We develop a growth model with unemployment due to imperfections in the labor market. In this model, wage inertia and balanced budget rules cause a complementarity between capital and employment capable of explaining the existence of multiple equilibrium paths. Hysteresis is viewed as the result of a selection between these diferent equilibrium paths. We use this model to argue that, in contrast to the US, those fiscal policies followed by most of the European countries after the shocks of the 1970’s may have played a central role in generating hysteresis.

Fiscal insurance and debt management in OECD economies

Assuming the role of debt management is to provide hedging against fiscal shocks we consider three questions: i) what indicators can be used to assess the performance of debt management? ii) how well have historical debt management policies performed? and iii) how is that performance affected by variations in debt issuance? We consider these questions using OECD data on the market value of government debt between 1970 and 2000. Motivated by both the optimal taxation literature and broad considerations of debt stability we propose a range of performance indicators for debt management. We evaluate these using Monte Carlo analysis and find that those based on the relative persistence of debt perform best. Calculating these measures for OECD data provides only limited evidence that debt management has helped insulate policy against unexpected fiscal shocks. We also find that the degree of fiscal insurance achieved is not well connected to cross country variations in debt issuance patterns. Given the limited volatility observed in the yield curve the relatively small dispersion of debt management practices across countries makes little difference to the realised degree of fiscal insurance.

How Effective are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions? Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit

This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of benefit sanctions on post-unemployment outcomes such as post-unemployment employment stability and earnings. We use rich register data which allow us to distinguish between a warning that a benefit reduction may take place in the near future and the actual withdrawal of unemployment benefits. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives

The 1998 Spanish reform of the Personal Income Tax eliminated the 15% deduction for private medical expenditures including payments on private health insurance (PHI) policies. To avoid an undesirable increase in the demand for publicly funded health care, tax incentives to buy PHI were not completely removed but basically shifted from individual to group employer-paid policies. In a unique fiscal experiment, at the same time that the tax relief for individually purchased policies was abolished, the government provided for tax allowances on policies taken out through employment. Using a bivariate probit model on data from National Health Surveys, we estimate the impact of said reform on the demand for PHI and the changes occurred within it. Our findings suggest that the total probability of buying PHI was not significantly affected. Indeed, the fall in the demand for individual policies (by 10% between 1997 and 2001) was offset by an increase in the demand for group employer-paid ones, so that the overall size of the market remained virtually unchanged. We also briefly discuss the welfare effects on the state budget, the industry and society at large.

Shocks, Monetary Policy and Institutions: Explaining Unemployment Persistence in Persistence in “Europe” and the United States

This paper examines the rise in European unemployment since the 1970s by introducing endogenous growth into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and unemployment. We subject the model to an uncorrelated cost push shock, in order to mimic a scenario akin to the one faced by central banks at the end of the 1970s. Monetary policy implements a disinfl ation by following an interest feedback rule calibrated to an estimate of a Bundesbank reaction function. 40 quarters after the shock has vanished, unemployment is still about 1.8 percentage points above its steady state. Our model also broadly reproduces cross country differences in unemployment by drawing on cross country differences in the size of cost push shock and the associated disinfl ation, the monetary policy reaction function and the wage setting structure.

Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

Minu, Startu and all that:- Pitfalls in estimating the sensitivity of a worker’s wage to aggregate unemployment

In this paper we show that the inclusion of unemployment-tenure interaction variates in Mincer wage equations is subject to serious pitfalls. These variates were designed to test whether or not the sensitivity to the business cycle of a worker’s wage varies according to her tenure. We show that three canonical variates used in the literature - the minimum unemployment rate during a worker’s time at the firm(min u), the unemployment rate at the start of her tenure(Su) and the current unemployment rate interacted with a new hire dummy(δu) - can all be significant and "correctly" signed even when each worker in the firm receives the same wage, regardless of tenure (equal treatment). In matched data the problem can be resolved by the inclusion in the panel of firm-year interaction dummies. In unmatched data where this is not possible, we propose a solution for min u and Su based on Solon, Barsky and Parker’s(1994) two step method. This method is sub-optimal because it ignores a large amount of cross tenure variation in average wages and is only valid when the scaled covariances of firm wages and firm employment are acyclical. Unfortunately δu cannot be identified in unmatched data because a differential wage response to unemployment of new hires and incumbents will appear under both equal treatment and unequal treatment.