Allocating ideas: Horizontal competition in tournaments

We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition intournaments with two competing firms. The sponsor cares about the qualityof the design but also about the design location. A priori not even thesponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discoveredonce he has seen the actual proposals. We show that the more efficientfirm is more likely to be conservative when choosing the design location.Also, to get some differentiation in design locations, the cost differencebetween contestants can neither be too small nor too big. Therefore, ifthe sponsor mainly cares about the design location, participation in thetournaments by the two lowest cost contestants cannot be optimal for thesponsor.

Competition amongst contests

This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players aggregate effort will award their entire prize budget to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the winner increases in the contests randomness. We also provide empirical evidence for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of differing ability.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Within tree distribution of a gall-inducing Eurytoma (Hymenoptera, Eurytomidae) on Caryocar brasiliense (Caryocaraceae)

For the first time, we identified the insect herbivore that induces one of the most conspicuous galls on the leaves of Caryocar brasiliense Camb. (Caryocaraceae), a widespread, typical cerrado woody plant of large economic importance. The gall inducing organism is a new and undescribed species of Eurytoma sp. (Hymenoptera, Eurytomidae). Furthermore, we recorded its spatial distribution within C. brasiliense trees. More Eurytoma galls were found on the eastern tree slope, followed the southern and northern slopes. More galls were found in the interior of the tree crown, i.e., on the proximal portion of the stems compared to the terminal portion. At the leaf level, more galls were found on the median region compared to the distal or proximal, perhaps due to the lower trichome density found in there. Leaf colonization by Eurytoma sp. may initiate at the leaf margin but after colonization reaches 50% the central portion starts to be colonized.

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.

Biological cycle of Tenuipalpus heveae Baker (Acari, Tenuipalpidae) on leaflets of three rubber tree clones

Life cycle of Tenuipalpus heveae Baker (Acari, Tenuipalpidae) on leaflets from three rubber tree clones. The biological cycle of Tenuipalpus heveae Baker, 1945 (Tenuipalpidae), a potential rubber tree pest mite, was studied by the observation of individuals reared on leaflets of the clones GT 1, PB 235 and RRIM 600, in controlled environmental conditions. Three daily observations were done of 60 eggs on leaflets from each clone in order to verify the development of immature stages and the female oviposition. The fertility life table was constructed based in the collected data. Mites reared on PB 235 had faster rate of development, requiring less time in days, to double its population in number (TD), and had the highest values for egg production, female longevity, net reproductive rate (Ro), intrinsic rate of natural increase (r m) and finite rate of increase (λ). Lower reproductive values and the longest time necessary to reach adult stage were recorded for the mites on GT 1. In all studied clones, the deutonymphal phase had the highest viability, while the larval phase had the lowest, highlighted by the survivorship curve that indicated high mortality during this life stage. The clone PB 235 allowed the most suitable conditions for the development of T. heveae, followed by RRIM 600, while GT 1 was the less suitable substratum to rear this mite species.

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.