Safety, Security And safeguards In GEN IV sodium fast reactors

This work presents first a study of the national and international laws in the fields of safety, security and safeguards. The international treaties and the recommendations issued by the IAEA as well as the national regulations in force in France, the United States and Italy are analyzed. As a result of this, a comparison among them is presented. Given the interest of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency for the aspects of criminal penalties and monetary, also the Japanese case is analyzed. The main part of this work was held at the JAEA in the field of proliferation resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP) of a GEN IV sodium fast reactor. For this purpose the design of the system is completed and the PR & PP methodology is applied to obtain data usable by designers for the improvement of the system itself. Due to the presence of sensitive data, not all the details can be disclosed. The reactor site of a hypothetical and commercial sodium-cooled fast neutron nuclear reactor system (SFR) is used as the target NES for the application of the methodology. The methodology is applied to all the PR and PP scenarios: diversion, misuse and breakout; theft and sabotage. The methodology is applied to the SFR to check if this system meets the target of PR and PP as described in the GIF goal; secondly, a comparison between the SFR and a LWR is performed to evaluate if and how it would be possible to improve the PR&PP of the SFR. The comparison is implemented according to the example development target: achieving PR&PP similar or superior to domestic and international ALWR. Three main actions were performed: implement the evaluation methodology; characterize the PR&PP for the nuclear energy system; identify recommendations for system designers through the comparison.

Premio "Capitale verde europea". Studio di una politica dell'Unione europea in tema di sostenibilità ambientale con approfondimento terminologico sul minieolico.

This dissertation is divided into four chapters and combines the study of the European Green Capital Award with a terminology research on small wind turbines, a technical subject in the macro-area of sustainable cities. Chapter I aims at giving an overview of the development of environmental policies and treaties both at the international and European level. Then, after highlighting the crucial role of cities for the global environment, the chapter outlines the urban dimension of the EU environmental policies and defines the vision of a sustainable city promoted by the European Union. Chapter II contains an in-depth analysis of the European Green Capital Award and illustrates its aims, the entire designation process, its communication campaign and its evolution. Chapter III focuses on applicant, finalist and winning cities in order to study the aspect of participation in the competition. It also contains a detailed analysis of two European Green Capitals, i.e. Nantes and Bristol, who respectively won the title in 2013 and 2015. Based on a variety of sources, this chapter examines the successful aspects of their bids and communication campaigns during their year as Green Capitals. Chapter IV presents the terminology research in the field of small wind turbines and the resulting bilingual glossary in English and Italian. The research was carried out using two terminology tools: TranslatorBank and InterpretBank. The former is composed by two software programmes, CorpusCreator and MiniConcordancer DB, which were used to semi-automatically create specialized corpora from the Web and then extract terminology and occurrences of terms from the collected texts. The latter is a software which has been specifically designed for interpreters in order to help them optimize their professional workflow, from gathering information and creating glossaries on a specific subject to the actual interpreting task at a conference. InterpretBank’s tool TermMode was used to create a glossary with term equivalents and additional information such as definitions and the contexts of use.

Tempering the EU? NGO Advocacy in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice

The European Union’s (EU) area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) portfolio comprises policy areas such as immigration and asylum, and police and judicial cooperation. Steps were taken to bring this field into the mandate of the EU first by the Maastricht Treaty, followed by changes implemented by the Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties, the last one ‘normalizing’ the EU’s erstwhile Third Pillar. As the emergent EU regime continues to consolidate in this field, NGOs of various kinds continue to seek to influence policy-making and implementation, with varying success. This article seeks to establish the context in which NGOs carry out their work and argues that the EU-NGO interface is impacted both by the institutional realities of the European Union and the capacities of EU-oriented NGOs to seize and expand opportunities for access and input into the policy cycle. Using EU instruments representing three different policy bundles in AFSJ (immigration, asylum and judicial cooperation in criminal matters), the article seeks to map out NGO strategies in engaging and oftentimes resisting European Union policy instruments.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

The Ingrian Question as a Historical and Political Phenomenon

The project dealt with the political history of the Finnish-speaking minorities of the Russian northwest, mainly in the 20th century. The first part looks at the development of the national movement of the Ingrian Finns and other related ethnic groups (Izhoras, Votes) from the turn of the century to 1920, when Estonia and Finland signed peace treaties with Soviet Russia and the national rights of the Finnish minority in Russia were to some extent guaranteed. In the second section, on the history of the Ingrians during Soviet and post-Soviet times, areas covered include Ingrian national-cultural autonomy in the 1920s, the activities of Ingrian "ingri" organizations in Finland during the inter-war period, social and national repression and the end of autonomy in the 1930s, the dispersal of the Ingrians during the second world war, their first attempts to return home in the immediate post-war period, trends in the development of the social and cultural life of Ingrians during the last 40 years, and the prospects for their existence as an ethnic unity in the future. The research is based on documentary sources from 15 Russian archives, many of which have not previously been used.

Die Europäische Union auf dem Weg zur Verfassungsrechtsgemeinschaft

Obwohl der Ursprung der europäischen Einigungsgeschichte im wirtschaftlichen Bereich lag, hatte die Integration von Beginn an auch politischen Charakter. Schon die römischen Verträge enthielten Ansätze einer Konstitutionalisierung und auch die Bezeichnung der Verträge als Verfassung wurde seit den 60er-Jahren unter Rechtswissenschaftlern immer gebräuchlicher, auch wenn dies stets umstritten war. Unabhängig vom Streit über den Verfassungsbegriff hat die von den Verträgen gebildete Rechtsordnung jedenfalls inhaltlich Verfassungscharakter. Sie enthält Regelungen, die man gemeinhin mit einer Staatsverfassung verbindet. Die europäische Integration war stets von verfassungsrechtlichen Idealen getragen, weshalb man die Mitgliedstaaten auch als eine Verfassungsrechtsgemeinschaft bezeichnen kann. Bedeutende Weiterentwicklungen erfuhr der Konstitutionalisierungsprozess mit der Konventsmethode und der Erarbeitung der Grundrechte-Charta. Fortgesetzt wurde dieser Prozess mit dem Entwurf über den Verfassungsvertrag für Europa. Da in ihm typische Gehalte einer Verfassung verkörpert sind, verdient er durchaus auch diese Bezeichnung. Auf seiner Basis sollte ein schlanker, übersichtlicher und verständlicher Verfassungstext geschaffen werden, der die Reform und Integration Europas weiter führt und ein Instrument der Identitätsstiftung sein kann.

Plurilingual Interpretation in WTO Panel and Appellate Body Reports

This article analyzes the extent to which the Appellate Body and WTO panels compare the authentic texts in their examination of the WTO Agreements and the extent to which the parties themselves do so in their arguments. The texts of the WTO Agreements are authentic in English, French and Spanish. Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties governs the interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages. WTO practice diverges significantly from the rules set out in Article 33 and the travaux préparatoires of the International Law Commission. The terms of a plurilingual treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text, which means that a treaty interpreter need not compare the authentic texts as a routine matter as a matter of law. Nevertheless, routine comparison of authentic texts would be good practice in the WTO context, since there are several discrepancies that could affect the interpretation of WTO provisions.

Is there a ‚Depth versus Participation‘ Dilemma in International Cooperation?

Much of the International Relations literature assumes that there is a “depth versus participation” dilemma in international politics: shallower international agreements attract more countries and greater depth is associated with less participation. We argue that this conjecture is too simple and probably misleading because the depth of any given cooperative effort is in fact multidimensional. This multidimensionality manifests itself in the design characteristics of international agreements: in particular, the specificity of obligations, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, positive incentives (assistance), and organizational structures (secretariats). We theorize that the first three of these design characteristics have negative and the latter three have positive effects on participation in international cooperative efforts. Our empirical testing of these claims relies on a dataset that covers more than 200 global environmental treaties. We find a participation-limiting effect for the specificity of obligations, but not for monitoring and enforcement. In contrast, we observe that assistance provisions in treaties have a significant and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, dispute settlement mechanisms tend to promote treaty participation. The main implication of our study is that countries do not appear to stay away from agreements with monitoring and enforcement provisions, but that the inclusion of positive incentives and dispute settlement mechanisms can promote international cooperation. In other words, our findings suggest that policymakers do not necessarily need to water down global treaties in order to obtain more participation.

Internationale Kontrolle lokaler Verwaltung in einer Konfliktregion. Das Experiment „Freie Stadt Danzig“ (1920-1939)

The Free City of Danzig was founded by the Allies after World War One to settle the conflict between Poles and Germans as to which territory the town belonged. The League of Nations was designated to be the guarantor of its status. British and American experts and policy advisors saw it as an experiment on the way to new forms of statehood, by means of which nationalism as the founding principle of territorial entities could be overcome. However, the „Free City“ status was rejected by both the city’s inhabitants and German and Polish government agencies, with the result that the League and its local representative, the High Commissioner, were constantly confronted with difficulties in the interpretation of the international treaties and conventions relating to Danzig. In addition, hardly anyone in Danzig, Germany or Poland was interested in the economic and financial situation of the Free City, but were more interested in winning political battles than in the well-being of the city and its inhabitants. As a result, the situation in Danzig became more and more hopeless. The city became increasingly dependent on (illegal) German subsidies, while the High Commissioners generally cared more about their own prestige and that of their home countries than about the interests of the League of Nations. But as no political means of modifying the city’s status had been provided for, nothing changed formally in Danzig until Germany started the Second World War and annexed the city in September 1939. In retrospect, the international control of local government could not contribute to a long-term solution for Danzig. It merely postponed its violent solution for twenty years.

Who Is in Love with Multilateralism? Treaty Commitment in the Post-Cold War Era

Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral treaties have again become a central vehicle for international cooperation. In this article, we study states’ commitment to 76 multilateral treaties concluded between 1990 and 2005. The article offers a systematic account of present-day multilateral treaty-making efforts and asks what explains variation in states’ participation as witnessed in the act of treaty ratification.We test existing explanations and provide a novel argument that accounts for the strong participation of new European democracies in multilateral treaties. We find that regime type and being part of the European Union (EU) strongly affect treaty ratification. New EU democracies, in particular, are much more likely to ratify multilateral treaties than are other new democracies.

The Hidden World of Multilateralism? Treaty Commitments of Newly Democratized States in Europe

Why do new EU democracies engage in multilateralism? The dominant explanation proposes that new democracies use international treaties to lock in domestic reforms. This article offers a novel explanation as to why new EU democracies participate in multilateral treaties. We argue that ratifying a treaty serves three external signaling purposes (addressing recognition concerns; increasing strategic autonomy, and pleasing the EU). We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, we apply event history analysis. Drawing on a new ratification data set comprising 76 multilateral treaties, we illustrate the prominent role of new EU democracies in multilateralism as compared to other new democracies. Second, to assess the importance of external signaling in the decision to ratify multilateral treaties, we examine parliamentary ratification debates in selected Central and Eastern European countries. Third, we compare parliamentary discussions across European and non-European new democracies to demonstrate the different motives driving their approaches toward multilateralism.

God, the WTO – and hunger

Considering that endemic hunger is a consequence of poverty, and that food is arguably the most basic of all human needs, this book chapter shows one of the more prominent examples of rules and policy fragmentation but also one of the most blatant global governance problems. The three monotheistic religions Judaism, Christians and Islam are surprisingly unanimous about God’s prescriptions on hunger or, put theologically, on what can be said, or should be said, about the interpretations and traditions which, taken together, form the respective and differentiated traditions, identities and views of these beliefs on how to deal with poverty and hunger. A clear social ethos, in the form of global needs satisfaction, runs through both Jewish and Christian texts, and the Qur’an (Zakat). It confirms the value inversion between the world of the mighty and that of the hungry. The message is clear: because salvation is available only through the grace of God, those who have must give to those who have not. This is not charity: it is an inversion of values which can not be addressed by spending 0.7% of your GDP on ODA, and the implication of this sense of redistributive justice is that social offenders will be subject to the Last Judgement. Interestingly, these religious scriptures found their way directly into the human rights treaties adopted by the United Nations and ratified by the parliaments, as a legal base for the duty to protect, to respect and to remedy. On the other side the contradiction with international trade law is all the more flagrant, and it has a direct bearing on poverty: systematic surplus food dumping is still allowed under WTO rules, despite the declared objective ‘to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system’. A way forward would be a kind of ‘bottom up’ approach by focusing on extreme cases of food insecurity caused by food dumping, or by export restrictions where a direct effect of food insecurity in other countries can be established. Also, international financing institutions need to review their policies and lending priorities. The same goes for the bilateral investment treaties and a possible ‘public interest’ clause, at least in respect of agricultural land acquisitions in vulnerable countries. The bottom line is this: WTO rules cannot entail a right to violate other, equally binding treaty obligations when its membership as a whole claims to contribute to the Millennium Development Goals and pledges to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.

The WTO and Food Security: What’s Wrong with the Rules?

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is the predominant multilateral legal framework governing agricultural trade. The objective of the AoA is to liberalise trade in agriculture through reductions in tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies. The AoA has not, however, ‘levelled the playing field’ and has not resulted in the equitable distribution of food, particularly for the poorer developing countries. On the other hand, support for small farmers does not ensure food security for the poor. While food security has no simple solutions such as “free trade is good for you”, reform proposals for trade rules which only address agricultural policy instruments fail to account for consumer and other interests: neither tariff reductions and subsidy disciplines, nor safeguards and other measures of producer protection can automatically increase food security. Rather, what is needed is the full and proper implementation of a number of commitments which the international community has already entered into in various human rights treaties, but which even the envisaged results of the now failed Doha Round negotiations could not ensure without revisiting relevant multilateral trade and investment rules.

Seals and the Need for more Deference to Vienna by WTO Adjudicators

This paper asks how World Trade Organization (WTO) panels and the Appellate Body (AB) take public international law (PIL) into account when interpreting WTO rules as a part of international economic law (IEL). Splendid isolation of the latter is not new; indeed it is intended by the negotiators of the Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). At the same time, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is quite clear when it provides the general rules and the supplementary means of treaty interpretation. Despite such mandatory guidance, WTO adjudicators (when given a choice and assuming they see the conflict) prefer deference to WTO law over deference to Vienna and take a dogmatic way out of interpretation quandaries. The AB and panels make abundant reference to Vienna, though less so to substantive PIL. Often times, however, they do so simply in order to buttress their findings of violations of WTO rules. Perhaps tellingly, however, none of the reports in EC – Seals contains even a single mention of VCLT, despite numerous references to international standards addressing indigenous rights and animal welfare. In the longer term, and absent a breakthrough on the negotiation front, this pattern of carefully eschewing international treaty law and using PIL just for the sake of convenience could have serious consequences for the credibility and acceptance of the multilateral trading system. Following the adage ‘negotiate or litigate’ recourse to WTO dispute settlement increases when governments are less ready to make treaty commitments commensurate with the challenges of globalisation. This is true even for ‘societal choice’ cases on the margins of classic trade disputes. We will argue here that it is precisely for cases such as these that VCLT and PIL should be used more systematically by panels and the AB. Failing that, instead of building bridges for more coherent international regulation, WTO adjudicators could burn those same bridges which the DSU interpretation margin leaves open for accomplishing their job which is to find a ‘positive solution’. Worse, judicial incoherence could return to WTO dispute settlement like a boomerang and damage the credibility and thus the level of acceptance of the multilateral trading system per se.

Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?