Reflections on conducting research on the ‘war on terror’: religious identity, subjectivity and emotions

In recent years there has been an increase in literature which has explored the insider/outsider position through ethnic identities. However, there remains a neglect of religious identities, even though it could be argued that religious identities have become increasingly important through being prominent in international issues such as the ‘war on terror’ and the Middle East conflict. Through drawing on the concept of subjectivity, I reflect on research I conducted on the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on British Muslims. I explore the space between the insider/outsider position demonstrating how my various subjectivities – the ‘non-Islamic appearance I’, the ‘Muslim I’, the ‘personal I’, the ‘exploring I’, the ‘Kashmiri I’ or the ‘Pakistani I’, the ‘status I’ and the ‘outsider I’ – assisted in establishing trust, openness and commonality. I conclude by demonstrating how the ‘emotional I’ allowed me to manage my own emotions and participants emotions.

A Mixed Blessing: Market-mediated Religious Authority in Neopaganism

This is a study of the interplay of market-mediated and religious authority in the context of new religious movements. Specifically, we explore the ambivalent relationship followers of Wicca have with the marketplace. Our main argument is that in this context marketplace success can be a source of religious legitimacy and validation. At the same time, however, excessive engagement with the market can act as a powerful delegitimizing mechanism, leading religious leaders to continually monitor their practices. Market success is thus a mixed blessing that can increase religious authority and influence, but is just as likely to decrease authority and credibility. Based on an ethnographic study, we explore the boundary work carried out by religious marketers and consumers in order to establish themselves in a “safety area” where engagement with the market brings its positive effects without causing a loss of credibility.

The Course of Conflict. A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur

Esta tese leva a cabo uma clarificação conceptual e uma reconstrução histórica da noção de conflito, tal como ela aparece na filosofia. Num primeiro momento, analisa-se o fenómeno do conflito na fonte Grega (em Homero, Heraclito, Platão, nas tragédias gregas e nas formas de interação agonística no espaço público) e na filosofia moderna (principalmente em Kant, Hegel e Marx). Num segundo momento, estabelece-se, nos seus traços gerais, uma cartografia da recuperação desta noção na contemporaneidade através da discussão das contribuições provenientes da teoria crítica (Habermas, Honneth, Hunyadi), da sociologia pragmática (Boltanski, Thévenot) e da filosofia política anglo-saxónica (Rawls, Walzer, Taylor), entre outras. Estas partes iniciais da tese desembocam numa análise aprofundada da obra do filósofo francês Paul Ricoeur e das muitas instanciações do conflito nessa obra, naquilo a que chamo o “percurso do conflito” no pensamento de Ricoeur. Neste “percurso do conflito” o objetivo é duplo: por um lado, provar que o conflito é a pedra de toque não só da filosofia de Ricoeur, mas também de um grande conjunto de outros autores; por outro lado, que é necessário reavaliar o papel desta noção no debate contemporâneo e que nesse contexto a filosofia de Ricoeur e as suas análises finas e plurais podem ser de uma grande utilidade. Assim sendo, este “percurso do conflito” divide-se em três partes, as quais lidam com diferentes tipos de conflito: conflitos “existenciais”, “hermenêuticos” e “práticos”. Ao longo destas partes, várias disciplinas são chamadas à colação, como a hermenêutica, a psicanálise e a filosofia prática (ética, filosofia política e filosofia social), numa tentativa de esclarecer os diferentes fenómenos em causa. Em última instância, chega-se à conclusão que o conflito é inevitável em filosofia, tal como na vida, mas que este não é (pelo menos não em todas as suas formas e instanciações) um fenómeno estritamente negativo; por vezes, os conflitos podem ser criativos e positivos. Porém, aceitar este facto implica igualmente consentir que o reconhecimento dos conflitos está intrinsecamente ligado à busca de soluções para eles, formas de lidar com eles e torná-los criativos e positivos. Para que possa ser compreendido, em traços gerais, como é que estes procedimentos funcionam, esta tese elabora uma tipologia de diferentes tipos de conflito e respetivas formas de lidar com eles, mediando-os, conciliando-os ou, nalguns casos, apenas aceitando a sua existência e mesmo multiplicando-os. A busca da melhor solução tem sempre de ser operada caso a caso. Nas partes finais da tese, e partindo das análises de Ricoeur e dos outro autores apresentadas ao longo da mesma, delineia-se o projeto de uma filosofia social hermenêutica e argumenta-se que aquilo de que precisamos hoje em dia é de uma nova crítica da razão, uma “crítica da razão miserável” que possa repensar o mundo social em novos termos e que, ao fazê-lo, possa evitar os perigos do reducionismo nas suas múltiplas formas.

I have faith in my thing, you know what I mean? Mixed method elements on individual investments on religious markets.

In contemporary society, religious signification and secular systems mix and influence each other. Holistic conceptions of a world in which man is integrated harmoniously with nature meet representations of a world run by an immanent God. On the market of the various systems, the individual goes from one system to another, following his immediate needs and expectations without necessarily leaving any marks in a meaningful long term system. This article presents the first results of an ongoing research in Switzerland on contemporary religion focusing on (new) paths of socialization of modern that individuals and the various (non-) belief systems that they simultaneously develop

An analysis of Ibn al-'Arabi's al-Insan al-Kamil, the Perfect Individual, with a brief comparison to the thought of Sir Muhammad Iqbal

This thesis analyzes four philosophical questions surrounding Ibn al-'Arabi's concept of the al-iman al-kamil, the Perfect Individual. The Introduction provides a definition of Sufism, and it situates Ibn al-'Arabi's thought within the broader context of the philosophy of perfection. Chapter One discusses the transformative knowledge of the Perfect Individual. It analyzes the relationship between reason, revelation, and intuition, and the different roles they play within Islam, Islamic philosophy, and Sufism. Chapter Two discusses the ontological and metaphysical importance of the Perfect Individual, exploring the importance of perfection within existence by looking at the relationship the Perfect Individual has with God and the world, the eternal and non-eternal. In Chapter Three the physical manifestations of the Perfect Individual and their relationship to the Prophet Muhammad are analyzed. It explores the Perfect Individual's roles as Prophet, Saint, and Seal. The final chapter compares Ibn al-'Arabi's Perfect Individual to Sir Muhammad Iqbal's in order to analyze the different ways perfect action can be conceptualized. It analyzes the relationship between freedom and action.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

The nature of avidyÄ in Buddhism and VedÄ nta

This thesis deals with the nature of ignorance as it was interpreted in the Upani~adic tradition, specifically in Advaita Vedanta, and in early and Mahayana Buddhism , e specially in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The approach i s a historical and comparative one. It examines the early thoughts of both the upanis.a ds and Buddhism abou t avidya (ignorance), shows how the notion was treated by the more speculative and philosphically oriented schools which base d themselves on the e arly works, and sees how their views differ. The thesis will show that the Vedinta tended to treat avidya as a topic for metaphysical s peculation as t he s chool developed, drifting from its initial e xistential concerns, while the Madhyamika remained in contact with the e xistential concerns evident in the first discourses of the Buddha. The word "notion" has been chosen for use in referring t o avidya, even though it may have non-intellectual and emotional connotations, to avoid more popular a lternatives such as "concept" or "idea". In neither the Upani,ads, Advaita Vedanta, or Buddhism is ignorance merely a concept or an idea. Only in a secondary sense, in texts and speech , does it become one. Avidya has more to do with the lived situation in which man finds himself, with the subjectobject separation in which he f eels he exists, than with i i i intel lect ual constr ucts . Western thought has begun to r ealize the same with concerns such as being in modern ontology, and has chosen to speak about i t i n terms of the question of being . Avidya, however, i s not a 'question' . If q ue stions we r e to be put regarding the nature of a vidya , they would be more of t he sort "What is not avidya?", though e ven here l anguage bestows a status t o i t which avidya does not have. In considering a work of the Eastern tradition, we f ace t he danger of imposing Western concepts on it. Granted t hat avidya is customari ly r endered i n English as ignorance, the ways i n which the East and West view i gno rance di f f er. Pedagogically , the European cultures, grounded in the ancient Greek culture, view ignorance as a l ack or an emptiness. A child is i gnorant o f certain t hings and the purpose o f f ormal education , in f act if not in theory, is to fill him with enough knowledge so that he can cope wit h t he complexities and the e xpectations of s ociety. On another level, we feel t hat study and research will l ead t o the discovery o f solutions, which we now lack , for problems now defying solut i on . The East, on the o t her hand, sees avidya in a d i fferent light.Ignorance isn't a lack, but a presence. Religious and philosophical l iterature directs its efforts not towards acquiring something new, but at removing t.he ideas and opinions that individuals have formed about themselves and the world. When that is fully accomplished, say the sages , t hen Wisdom, which has been obscured by those opinions, will present itself. Nothing new has to be learned, t hough we do have t o 'learn' that much. The growing interest in t he West with Eastern religions and philosophies may, in time, influence our theoretical and practical approaches to education and learning, not only in the established educati onal institutions, but in religious , p sychological, and spiritual activities as well. However, the requirements o f this thesis do no t permit a formulation of revolutionary method or a call to action. It focuses instead on the textual arguments which attempt to convince readers that t he world in which they take themselves to exist is not, in essence, real, on the ways i n which the l imitations of language are disclosed, and on the provisional and limited schemes that are built up to help students see through their ignorance. The metaphysic s are provisional because they act only as spurs and guides. Both the Upanisadic and Buddhist traditions that will be dealt with here stress that language constantly fails to encompass the Real. So even terms s uch as 'the Real', 'Absolute', etc., serve only to lead to a transcendent experience . The sections dealing with the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta show some of the historical evolution of the notion of avidya, how it was dealt with as maya , and the q uestions that arose as t o its locus. With Gau?apada we see the beginnings of a more abstract treatment of the topic, and , the influence of Buddhism. Though Sankhara' S interest was primarily directed towards constructing a philosophy to help others attain mok~a ( l iberation), he too introduced t echnica l t e rminology not found in the works of his predecessors. His work is impressive , but areas of it are incomplete. Numbers of his followers tried to complete the systematic presentation of his insi ghts . Their work focuses on expl anat i ons of adhyasa (superimposition ) , t he locus and object of ignorance , and the means by which Brahman takes itself to be the jiva and the world. The section on early Buddhism examines avidya in the context o f the four truths, together with dubkha (suffering), the r ole it p l ays in t he chain of dependent c ausation , a nd t he p r oblems that arise with t he doctrine of anatman. With t he doct rines of e arly Buddhism as a base, the Madhyamika elaborated questions that the Buddha had said t e nded not t o edi f ication. One of these had to do with own - being or svabhava. Thi s serves a s a centr e around which a discussion o f i gnorance unfolds, both i ndividual and coll ective ignorance. There follows a treatment of the cessation of ignorance as it is discussed within this school . The final secti on tries to present t he similarities and differences i n the natures o f ignorance i n t he two traditions and discusses the factors responsible for t hem . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Sinha for the time spent II and suggestions made on the section dealing with Sankara and the Advait.a Vedanta oommentators, and Dr. Sprung, who supervised, direoted, corrected and encouraged the thesis as a whole, but especially the section on Madhyamika, and the final comparison.

Buddhism and the earth : environmental thought in early Buddhist philosophy

Introduction Fundamental to the philosophy of Buddhism, is the insight that there is "unsatisfactohness" (dukkha) in the world and that it can be eliminated through the practice of the Noble Eight Fold Path. Buddhism also maintains that the world as we experience and entities that exist are bereft of any substantiality. Instead existence is manifest through dependent origination. All things are conditional; nothing is permanent. However, inherent in this dependent existence is the interconnectedness of all beings and their subjection to the cosmic law of karma. Part of cultivating the Eight Fold path includes a deep compassion for all other living things, 'trapped' within this cycle of dependent origination. This compassion or empathy (karuna) is crucial to the Buddhist path to enlightenment. It is this emphasis on karuna that shows itself in Mahayana Buddhism with respect to the theory of the boddhisatva (or Buddha-to-be) since the boddhisatva willingly postpones his/her own enlightenment to help others on the same path. One of the ramifications of the theory of dependent origination is that there is no anthropocentric bias placed on humans over the natural world. Paradoxically the doctrine of non-self becomes an ontology within Buddhism, culminating in the Mayahana realization that a common boundary exists between samsara and nirvana. Essential to this ontology is the life of dharma or a moral life. Ethics is not separated from ontology. As my thesis will show, this basic outlook of Buddhism has implications toward our understanding of the Buddhist world-view with respect to the current human predicament concerning the environment. While humans are the only ones who can 4 attain "Buddhahood", it is because of our ability to understand what it means to follow the Eight fold path and act accordingly. Because of the interconnectedness of all entities {dharmas), there is an ontological necessity to eliminate suffering and 'save the earth' because if we allow the earth to suffer, we ALL suffer. This can be understood as an ethical outlook which can be applied to our interaction with and treatment of the natural environment or environment in the broadest sense, not just trees plants rocks etc. It is an approach to samsara and all within it. It has been argued that there is no ontology in Buddhism due to its doctrine of "non-self". However, it is a goal of this thesis to argue that there does exist an original ontology in Buddhism; that according to it, the nature of Being is essentially neither "Being nor non-being nor not non-being" as illustrated by Nagarjuna. Within this ontology is engrained an ethic or 'right path' (samma marga) that is fundamental to our being and this includes a compassionate relationship to our environment. In this dissertation I endeavour to trace the implications that the Buddhist worldview has for the environmental issues that assail us in our age of technology. I will explore questions such as: can the Buddhist way of thinking help us comprehend and possibly resolve the environmental problems of our day and age? Are there any current environmental theories which are comparable to or share common ground with the classical Buddhist doctrines? I will elucidate some fundamental doctrines of early Buddhism from an environmental perspective as well as identify some comparable modern environmental theories such as deep ecology and general systems theory, that seem to share in the wisdom of classical Buddhism and have much to gain from a deeper appreciation of Buddhism.

Critical Connections: Teachers Writing for Social Justice

This qualitative research study explores how teachers who write social justicefocused curriculum support resources conceptualize curriculum and social justice. Curriculum used in schools reflects underlying assumptions and choices about what knowledge is valuable. Class-based, cultural, racial, and religious stereotypes are reinforced in schooling contexts. Are the resources teachers create, select, and use to promote social justice reproducing and reinforcing forms of oppression? Why do teachers pursue social justice through curriculum writing? What are their hopes for this work? Exploring how Teachers' beliefs and values influence cy.rriculum writing engages the teachers writing and using curriculum support resources in critical reflective thought about their experiences and efforts to promote social justice. Individual and focus group interviews were conducted with four teacher-curriculum writers from Ontario schools. In theorizing my experiences as a teacher-curriculum writer, I reversed roles and participated in individual interviews. I employed a critical feminist lens to analyze the qualitati ve data. The participants' identities influenced how they understand social justice and write curriculum. Their understandings of injustices, either personal or gathered through students, family members, or oth.e. r teachers, influenced their curriculum writing . The teacher-curriculum writers in the study believed all teachers need critical understandings of curriculum and social justice. The participants made a case for representation from historically disadvantaged and underrepresented groups on curriculum writing teams. In an optimistic conclusion, the possibility of a considerate curriculum is proposed as a way to engage the public in working with teachers for social justice.