Monetary policy in a systemic crisis

This paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisisfrom the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort. It is argued that standardmonetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through whichmonetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbankmarket. As the crisis developed, liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed,central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted bystandard monetary policy models. At the same time, as the interbank market did notallow for the redistribution of liquidity among banks, central banks had to design newchannels for liquidity injection.

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).

Pharmaceutical generics, vertical product differentiation and public policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceuticalmarkets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model canexplain the observation that countries with stronger regulations havesmaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences inobserved regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higherproportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closelyrelated model can account for the observed increase in prices by patentowners after entry of generic producers.

Product market deregulation and the U.S. employment miracle

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matchingmodel with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual wage bargaining.Product market competition affects unemployment by two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect due to a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. We calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980 s and 1990 s could be attributed to product market deregulation. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individual bargaining, a decrease of less than two tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

Post crisis challenges to bank regulation

The current crisis has swept aside not only the whole of the US investment banking industry butalso the consensual perception of banking risks, contagion and their implication for bankingregulation. As everyone agrees now, risks where mispriced, they accumulated in neuralgic pointsof the financial system, and where amplified by procyclical regulation as well as by the instabilityand fragility of financial institutions.The use of ratings as carved in stone and lack of adequate procedure to swiftly deal withsystemic institutions bankruptcy (whether too-big-to-fail, too complex to fail or too-many to fail).The current paper will not deal with the description and analysis of the crisis, already covered inother contributions to this issue will address the critical choice regulatory authorities will face. Inthe future regulation has to change, but it is not clear that it will change in the right direction. Thismay occur if regulatory authorities, possibly influenced by public opinion and political pressure,adopt an incorrect view of financial crisis prevention and management. Indeed, there are twoapproaches to post-crisis regulation. One is the rare event approach, whereby financial crises willoccur infrequently, but are inescapable.

Entomofauna associated to fruits and seeds of two species of Enterolobium Mart. (Leguminosae): harm or benefit?

Entomofauna associated to fruits and seeds of two species of Enterolobium Mart. (Leguminosae): Harm or benefit? The aims of the present study were to identify the entomofauna associated to the fruits and seeds of Enterolobium contortisiliquum (Vell.) Morong and Enterolobium timbouva Mart. (Leguminosae), as well as to determine relationships among insects and the possible harm and/or benefit stemming from these associations. Fruit infestation was evaluated and the insects were identified. Seed consumption (%) and the germination of predated seeds (%) were determined. The fruits of E. contortisiliquum exhibited a high percentage of infestation (91%). The most representative species in the fruits were Lophopoeum timbouvae Lameere, 1884, Merobruchus bicoloripes (Pic, 1930) and Stator limbatus (Horn, 1873). In the fruits of E. timbouva, only one species was found (S. limbatus). E. contortisiliquum seed consumption was proportionately higher (55.2%) to that of E. timbouva (15%). The germination of predated seeds from E. contortisiliquum was null, whereas 40% of predated seeds from E. timbouva germinated.

Cambios en las condiciones de empleo y de salud durante la crisis económica en trabajadores inmigrantes en España

Objetivo: Evaluar la influencia de los cambios en las condiciones de empleo en la saludautopercibida y mental de trabajadores inmigrantes en España, tras un período de tresaños, en un contexto de crisis económica.

La LAU ante la crisis inmobiliaria

El present Treball de Fi de Carrera du a terme un anàlisi de l’evolució del mercat de la vivenda de lloguer a Espanya. Degut a la crisi immobiliària iniciada a l’any 2008, es posa en evidència la necessitat de potenciar l’arrendament al nostre país, opció que històricament es presentava en clar desavantatge enfront a la compra d’un immoble, però que en l’actualitat s’erigeix com una solució realista al problema d’accés a un habitatge digne. Per aquest motiu, s’analitza l’ampli ventall de normatives adoptades a través del temps, profunditzant en el problema de la vivenda i les dades rellevants a tenir en compte. Es fa menció especial al registre de morosos, un instrument que pretén pal·liar la manca de voluntat per part dels propietaris d’arrendar els seus immobles, de manera que es garanteixin els drets d’ambdues parts implicades, tenint en consideració el període de crisis en el que estem immersos en l’actualitat.

Relationship and transaction lending in a crisis

We study how relationship lending and transaction lending varyover the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationshipbanks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them toprovide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the servicesthey provide, operating costs of relationship-banks are higher thanthose of transaction-banks. In our model, where relationship-bankscompete with transaction-banks, a key result is that relationship-banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, butoffer continuation-lending at more favorable terms than transactionbanks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using detailed credit registerinformation for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers'default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banksresponded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationshipbanking. Our empirical analysis confirms the basic prediction of themodel that relationship banks charged a higher spread before the crisis, offered more favorable continuation-lending terms in response tothe crisis, and suffered fewer defaults, thus confirming the informational advantage of relationship banking.