431 resultados para Priest spouses
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Includes bibliographical references.
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Variant issue: series title on half title; errata slip inserted at p. [ix].
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"Compiled and arranged by a devoted Priest of the American Church."--Commendatory, p. [4], signed by Isaac Lea Nicholson, Bishop of Milwaukee.
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Partly reprinted from various periodicals.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Includes index.
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On verso: Mrs. (G.S.) Morris, Mrs. (W.H.) Pettee, Mrs. I.N. Demmon, Mrs James B. Angell, Louise Pond, Mrs. Waldron (sister of E.L. Walter), Mrs. Harry Hutchins, Mrs. M.L. D'Ooge, Mrs. Elisha Jones, Mrs. Warren P. Lombard, Mrs. B.A. Hinsdale, Mrs. Palmer
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On verso: Photograph of the "Browning Club." This meeting is at Mrs. James B. Angel's about 1895-1900. (Mrs. Angell at left of pillar, seated; Mrs. I.N. Demmon directly behind. Mrs. Martin Dodge standing holding a book.) Also on verso: attached list of names. Handwritten on mat: Randall
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Translation and notes by Alexis de St.-Priest.
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At head of title: Margot Asquith.
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Optimal tax theory in the Mirrlees’ (1971) tradition implicitly relies on the assumption that all agents are single or that couples may be treated as individuals, despite accumulating evidence against this view of household behavior. We consider an economy where agents may either be single or married, in which case choices result from Nash bargaining between spouses. In such an environment, tax schedules must play the double role of: i) defining households’ objective functions through their impact on threat points, and; ii) inducing the desired allocations as optimal choices for households given these objectives. We find that the taxation principle, which asserts that there is no loss in relying on tax schedules is not valid here: there are constrained efficient allocations which cannot be implemented via taxes. More sophisticated mechanisms expand the set of implementable allocations by: i) aligning the households’ and planner’s objectives; ii) manipulating taxable income elasticities, and; iii) freeing the design of singles’ tax schedules from its consequences on households’ objectives.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06