Representing Afghanistan: The United States and Democracy's Imposition

There is an ongoing mission in Afghanistan; a mission driven by external political forces. At its core this mission hopes to establish peace, to protect the populace, and to install democracy. Each of these goals has remained just that, a goal, for the past eight years as the American and international mission in Afghanistan has enjoyed varied levels of commitment. Currently, the stagnant progress in Afghanistan has led the international community to become increasingly concerned about the viability of a future Afghan state. Most of these questions take root in the question over whether or not an Afghan state can function without the auspices of international terrorism. Inevitably, the normative question of what exactly that government should be arises from this base concern. In formulating a response to this question, the consensus of western society has been to install representative democracy. This answer has been a recurring theme in the post Cold War era as states such as Bosnia and Somalia bear witness to the ill effects of external democratic imposition. I hypothesize that the current mold of externally driven state-building is unlikely to result in what western actors seek it to establish: representative democracy. By primarily examining the current situation in Afghanistan, I claim that external installation of representative democracy is modally flawed in that its process mandates choice. Representative democracy by definition constitutes a government reflective of its people, or electorate. Thus, freedom of choice is necessary for a functional representative democracy. From this, one can deduce that because an essential function of democracy is choice, its implementation lies with the presence of choice. State-building is an imposition that eliminates that necessary ingredient. The two stand as polar opposites that cannot effectively collaborate. Security, governing capacity, and development have all been targeted as measurements of success in Afghanistan. The three factors are generally seen as mutually constitutive; so improved security is seen as improving governing capacity. Thus, the recent resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and a deteriorating security environment moving forward has demonstrated the inability of the Afghan government to govern. The primary reason for the Afghan government’s deficiencies is its lack of legitimacy among its constituency. Even the use of the term ‘constituency’ must be qualified because the Afghan government has often oscillated between serving the people within its territorial borders and the international community. The existence of the Afghan state is so dependent on foreign aid and intervention that it has lost policy-making and enforcing power. This is evident by the inability of Afghanistan to engage in basic sovereign state activities as maintaining a national budget, conducting elections, providing for its own national security, and deterring criminality. The Afghan state is nothing more than a shell of a government, and indicative of the failings that external state-building has with establishing democracy.

Features of Land Conflicts in Post Civil War Rwanda

Land conflicts in Rwanda have attracted particular attention because they have both environmental and political causes. This paper attempts to shed light on the nature of land conflicts in present-day Rwanda based on popular justice records and interviews collected in two rural areas. From the analyses of these data, two types of land confl ict can be distinguished. The first type consists of those among family members. Given that land is the most important asset for ordinary rural households, its inheritance often brings about conflicts between right-holders. Those of the second type are triggered by political change. Impacts of the two national-level violent conflicts in Rwanda, the “social revolution” just before independence and the civil war in the 1990s, are of tremendous significance in this context. The military victory of the former rebels in 1994 caused a massive return of Tutsi refugees, who were officially permitted to acquire land from the original inhabitants. Although no serious protestation against this policy has occurred thus far, it has produced various land conflicts. Dealing with potential grievances among original inhabitants is an important challenge for the present government.

Research review : searching for a new framework for Thailand's foreign policy in the post-cold war era

Thai foreign policy in the 1990s has been said to be contingent on the government in power, which changes between (or within) these groups and vacillates between pro-democratic reformists/principle-pursuers and the conservatives/profit-seekers. In these studies, Thailand’s Indochinese policy has often been referred to as a typical consequence of politics between the pragmatists and the reformists. However, whether or not domestic oppositional politics is the key determinant of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era still requires further examination, precisely because the model is now facing serious challenges between theory and reality. In this paper, I review the existing arguments concerning Thailand’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War Era and point out their limitations and questions for future study.

Will Crimea herald a new post-Cold War era world? EPC Commentary, 7 April 2014

The end of the Cold War twenty-five years ago brought about a difficult but manageable world in which Russia, the US, and European countries cooperated to manage common problems. There have been difficult times, with the break up of former Yugoslavia, the NATO intervention for Kosovo, and in 2008 when Russia’s intervention in Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkahzia nearly led to a head to head with the West. On the whole, the cooperation between old foes which framed the end of the Cold War, resisted these tests. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the agreement not to redraw the map of Europe was never so evidently ignored as today.

The European Union and Post-Cold War Defence Policies in South America. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 10, May 2014

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The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

Post cold war challenges to U.S. military : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, second session, January 29, March 19, 25, and June 4, 1998.

Shipping list no.: 99-0081-P.

Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? : explaining the decline in support for the war in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany /

Analyses of the War in Afghanistan frequently mention the declining or shaky domestic support for the conflict in the United States and among several U.S. allies. This paper dates the beginning of this decline back to the resurgence of the Taliban in 2005-06 and suggests that the deteriorating course of the war on the ground in Afghanistan itself along with mounting casualties is the key reason behind this drop in domestic support for the war.

Is Crimea Kosovo? Fundamental Misunderstandings and Failed Diplomacy Between Russia and the West in the Post-Cold War International System

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Are Media ‘Watchdogs’ of Illegal State Practices in Post-Cold War Liberal Democracies?: A Case-Study of the Coke Extradition

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Ethnic conflict and war crimes in the Balkans:the narratives of denial in post-conflict Serbia

In the years following the fall of Slobodan Milo evic, Serbian social, cultural and political responses to the wars of the 1990s have fallen under intense international scrutiny. But is this scrutiny justfied, and how can these responses be better understood? Jelena Obradovic engages with ideas about post-conflict societies, memory, cultural trauma, and national myths of victimhood and justified war to shed light upon Serbian denial and justification of war crimes - for example, Serbia's reluctant cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Rather than treating denial as a failure to come to terms with the past or as resurgent nationalism, Obradovic argues that the justification of atrocities are often the result of a societal need to understand and incorporate violent events within culturally acceptable boundaries.

EU-ASEAN relations in the post-Cold War era:an analysis of the impact of normative factors on interregionalism

This thesis examines the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with a focus on why their normative elements, e.g. values and norms, affect their ties in the post-Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold War, policy-makers and academics have become interested in region-to-region interaction, termed interregionalism. Though interregionalism is considered to have become an indelible feature of post-Cold War international politics, there are question marks over its importance. It is often argued that interregionalism reinforces the collective identity of the regional organisations involved. It is also maintained that its overall relevance to the international system depends on the level of actorness, which is primarily measured in institutional and material terms, of the participant regional organisations. This thesis contends that the normative components of the EU and ASEAN are also fundamental constituents of their actorness and, consequently, define significantly their interregionalism. This is based on a crucial observation that normative factors are of importance to the regional and international relations of the EU and ASEAN. Yet, while they strongly espouse norms and values to guide their internal and external activities, their normative premises radically differ from each other. Furthermore, these normative differences jeopardise their cooperation. Building on this observation the inquiry takes the normative components of the EU and ASEAN as the criterion as well as the focus for investigating their interregionalism. In doing so, it hypothesises that the EU and ASEAN are two different regional actors that adopt two dissimilar sets of norms to conduct their regional and international affairs and that such normative differences hinder their relations. Within this hypothesis, it seeks to address three central questions. First, what are the normative features that constitute the EU and ASEAN as actors in world politics and that make them different from each other? Second, what are the main sources of their normative differences? Finally, why do their normative differences become an obstructive factor in their relationship? To address these issues, the inquiry adopts a constructivist interpretation (of International Relations) and opts for a narrative and empirical inquiry, which is based on information and data acquired from official documents, scholarly works and interviews and questionnaires. In doing so, it finds that as they were born and evolved in two dissimilar temporal and spatial settings, the EU and ASEAN are two different norm entrepreneurs and normative powers. The former advocates a set of liberal cosmopolitan norms whereas the latter champions a set of traditional communitarian principles. Their normative differences become a major obstacle to their cooperation, especially when one regional organisation’s norms are refused or violated by the other. Thus, a key lesson drawn from these findings is that in order to explain more fully EU-ASEAN interregionalism, it is essential to consider their norms, the reasons behind their normative differences and the implication of those differences to their relations

Turkish-American relations in the post-Cold War era, 1990-2005

This study examines the contours of Turkish-American foreign relations in the post-Cold War era from 1990 to 2005. While providing an interpretive analysis, the study highlights elements of continuity and change and of convergence and divergence in the relationship between Ankara and Washington. Turkey’s encounter with its Kurdish problem at home intertwined with the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish authority in northern Iraq after the Gulf War that left a political vacuum in the region. The main argument of this dissertation is that the Kurdish question has been the central element in shaping and redefining the nature and scope of Turkish-American relations since 1991. This study finds that systemic factors primarily prevail in the early years of the post-Cold War Turkish-American relations, as had been the case during the Cold War era. However, the Turkish parliament’s rejection of the deployment of the U.S. troops in Turkey for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 could not be explained by the primacy of distribution of capabilities in the system. Instead, the role of identity, ideology, norms, and the socialization of agency through interaction and language must be considered. The Justice and Development Party’s ascension to power in 2002 magnified a wider transformation in domestic and foreign politics and reflected changes in Turkey’s own self-perception and the definition of its core interests towards the United States.