Civil conflict and human capital accumulation: The long-term effects of political violence in Perú

This paper provides empirical evidence of the persistent effect of exposure to political violence on humancapital accumulation. I exploit the variation in conflict location and birth cohorts to identify the longandshort-term effects of the civil war on educational attainment. Conditional on being exposed toviolence, the average person accumulates 0.31 less years of education as an adult. In the short-term,the effects are stronger than in the long-run; these results hold when comparing children within thesame household. Further, exposure to violence during early childhood leads to permanent losses. I alsoexplore the potential causal mechanisms.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Inflation, political instability and stockmarket volatility in interwar Germany

What determined the volatility of asset prices in Germany between thewars? This paper argues that the influence of political factors has beenoverstated. The majority of events increasing political uncertainty hadlittle or no effect on the value of German assets and the volatility ofreturns on them. Instead, it was inflation (and the fear of it) that islargely responsible for most of the variability in asset returns.

A PRIMEIRA ELITE COLONIAL ATLÂNTICA Dos «homens honrados brancos» de Santiago à «nobreza da terra» (Finais do séc. XV – início do séc. XVII)

Na tese, que agora se apresenta, ocupamo-nos da formação e desenvolvimento da elite, que, desde o século XV até ao século XVII, evoluiu num processo em que se evidencia uma vincada mudança social. Durante o primeiro século da História do arquipélago, os “homens brancos honrados” de Santiago ocuparam a cimeira da sociedade da ilha. Estes homens, - brancos/reinóis, muitas vezes nobres, armadores, comerciantes e funcionários da administração central - formaram a primeira elite do arquipélago que estruturou a sociedade cabo-verdiana conforme os seus interesses económicos, as suas práticas culturais, políticas e ideológicas. Acontece que esta elite se organiza, se fortalece, e desaparece, não propriamente porque é desalojada numa ruptura abrupta, mas porque é substituída num processo pacífico. É este processo que consideramos específico da sociedade cabo-verdiana e procurámos esclarecer na tese apresentada. Os filhos ilegítimos mulatos dos “homens brancos honrados” serão devedores de seus progenitores e viriam a ocupar o lugar cimeiro na economia e no poder local santiaguense como membros da elite endógena cabo-verdiana, mas sem as facilidades que o comércio lucrativo com a Costa da Guiné propiciava. É essa herança que leva a que os homens dessa elite sejam conhecidos por “brancos da terra” e, não sendo nobres reinóis, façam parte do grupo restrito da “nobreza da terra”. É esta elite que vai evoluir até à Independência de Cabo Verde, sem grandes rupturas que a transforme de forma semelhante ao que sucedeu no período de que nos ocupamos. Daí a importância desta tese para o conhecimento da sociedade cabo-verdiana ao longo dos tempos.

The 'new political economy': Two recent books

This paper reviews two recent books on Political Economy by Allan Drazen and Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. It discusses some problems of the recent Political Economy literature.

How political parties, rather than member-states, are building the European Union

Political party formation and coalition building in the European Parliament is being a driving force for making governance of the highly pluralistic European Union relatively effective and consensual. In spite of successive enlargements and the very high number of electoral partiesobtaining representation in the European Union institutions, the number of effective European Political Groups in the European Parliament has decreased from the first direct election in 1979 to the fifth in 1999. The formal analysis of national party¹s voting power in different Europeanparty configurations can explain the incentives for national parties to join large European Political Groups instead of forming smaller nationalistic groupings. Empirical evidence shows increasing cohesion of European Political Groups and an increasing role of the European Parliament in EU inter-institutional decision making. As a consequence of this evolution, intergovernmentalism is being replaced with federalizing relations. The analysis can support positive expectations regarding the governability of the European Union after further enlargements provided that new member states have party systems fitting the European PoliticalGroups.

Nationalisme économique et réalisme mercantile : la politique énergétique russe sous Poutine (2000-2008)

Mon travail met en évidence la restructuration de l'industrie énergétique russe sous les deux mandats Poutine (2000-2008) via le rôle prédominant de l'État dans une perspective historique. Une nouvelle élite politique russe (les Silovikis) issue des structures de force de l'Etat favorise le nationalisme économique axé sur le rétablissement de l'autorité du gouvernement central au sein de l'industrie énergétique nationale au détriment des pouvoirs régionaux, des sociétés privées étrangères et des oligarques indépendants. Dans cette perspective, on peut citer "l'affaire Youkos" en 2003 caractérisée par l'arrestation de l'oligarque Mikhaïl Khodorkhovsky; les tentatives silovikiennes de reprendre l'ascendant sur les compagnies pétrolières régionales Tatneft et Bachneft gérées par les gouvernements tatar et bachkir, la pression fiscale envers les majors pétrolières étrangères à l'instar du conflit russo- britannique relatif à la joint-venture TNK-BP. Quant à la politique énergétique étrangère russe, elle est inspirée par line vision réaliste mercantile; le gouvernement silovikien vise à défendre l'intérêt national, le prestige et la puissance de la Russie via ses "champions" énergétiques Rosneft et Gazprom utilisés comme levier politique, notamment à l'égard des pays de la CEI considéré par Moscou comme sa sphère d'influence historique. Dans cette perspective, nous pouvons mentionner l'interruption des approvisionnements pétroliers et gaziers russes à l'Ukraine, aux Etats baltes ou encore à la Géorgie; la concurrence entre les majors russes et étrangères en Asie centrale / Caucase pour les champs pétrolifères et les tracés de pipelines (nouveau «Grand Jeu»); la diversification des marchés russes à l'exportation à travers la promotion de nouveaux pipelines partant des champs pétrolifères sibériens vers la Chine et l'océan Pacifique.¦My work highlights the restructuration of the Russian energy industry under the 2 Putin madates (2000-2008) by the predominant role of the state in a historical perspective. A new Russian politic elite (Siloviki) from state structure forces promotes the economic nationalism focused on the reestablishment of the central governmental authority in the national energy industry against regional powers, private foreign companies and independent oligarchs. In this perspective, we can mention the "Yukos Affair" in 2003 with the arrest of the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkhovsky; the silovikian attempts to take over the regional oil companies Tatneft and Bachneft handled by the Tatar and Bashkir governments; the fiscal silovikian pressure against foreign companies such as the Russo-Britannic joint- venture TNK-BP. As for the Russian energy Foreign policy, it is inspired by a mercantile realism vision; the silovikian government aims to defend the national interest, the prestige and the power of Russia through its energy companies Rosneft and Gazprom as a political leverage especially toward the CEI Countries considered by Moscow as it historical sphere of influence. In this perspective, we can mention the interruption of Russian oil&gas supply toward Ukraine, Baltic states or Georgia; the competition between Russian and foreign companies in Central Asia/Caucasus for oil and gas fields and pipeline routes (new "Great Game"); the diversification of Russian export markets through the promotion ο new pipelines from Siberian oil&gas fields to China and the Pacific Ocean.

Partisan competition, growth and the franchise

We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests use the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: When (1) there exist an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of 11 countries.

Political representation in Switzerland : democratic or plutocratic ?

Les inégalités économiques se traduisent-elles dans des inégalités politiques à travers le processus de représentation électorale? Telle est la question centrale de cette thèse qui s'attache, par ailleurs, à investiguer les mécanismes qui tendent à produire une représentation biaisée des préférences politiques des citoyens en fonction de leur statut économique. Focalisé sur le cas de la Suisse et faisant usage des données de l'enquête postélectorale Selects de 2007, ce travail démontre que sur les rares sujets qui divisent les citoyens selon des clivages économiques - la redistribution des richesses et la sécurité sociale en particulier - les élus à l'Assemblée fédérale ont des préférences qui reflètent mieux les opinions des citoyens les plus riches. Cette sous-représentation des opinions des citoyens modestes et de ceux faisant partie du centre de la distribution des revenus peut en partie être attribuée à des différences dans les taux de participation et de connaissance politiques entre ces groupes de citoyens. La thèse met également en évidence le rôle joué par la représentation descriptive - autrement dit, la similitude en termes de statut économique entre les représentants et les représentés - dans la représentation des opinions et intérêts des citoyens. Par ailleurs, la structure du système partisan en Suisse ne reflétant pas la multidimensionnalité des préférences politiques des citoyens, les électeurs ne parviennent pas à traduire la complexité de leurs préférences politiques dans un choix de vote, ce qui, dans la configuration actuelle des forces politiques, tend à favoriser l'élection de représentants aux opinions proches de la droite sur les questions économiques. Enfin, une analyse de la représentation politique au niveau cantonal tend à soutenir la thèse selon laquelle le manque de régulation en matière de financement des partis en Suisse pourrait partiellement expliquer les inégalités dans la représentation des opinions politiques des citoyens aux revenus distincts. - Do economic inequalities translate into political inequalities through electoral representation? This is the central research question of this thesis, which also investigates the mechanisms that lead to potential economically based inequalities in the representation of citizens' policy preferences. Focusing on the case of Switzerland and making use of data provided by the post- electoral survey Selects 2007, this research demonstrates that regarding the rare policy domains in which the preferences of citizens are clearly linked to economic cleavages - redistribution and social security in particular - members of the Federal Assembly have policy preferences that best reflect the policy preferences of richer citizens. The under-representation of the opinions of relatively poor citizens and of those being the in the middle of the income distribution can be to some extent be explained by differences in political participation and political information across income groups. The thesis also puts forward the role played by descriptive representation - the similarity between representatives and represented in terms of their socioeconomic status - for the representation of citizens' preferences and interests. In addition, the structure of the party system in Switzerland does not reflect the multidimensionality of policy preferences among citizens who, as a result, have a hard time translating their complex preferences into a vote choice. Given the configuration of political actors, this tends to favour the election of representatives from the right who do not represent the preferences of their voters on economic issues. Finally, an analysis of representation at the cantonal level tends to confirm that the lack of party finance regulations in Switzerland may partially explain inequalities in the representation of citizens with different levels of income.

On the origins of electoral systems and political parties. The role of elections in multi-member districts

The old, understudied electoral system composed of multi-member districts, open ballot and plurality rule is presented as the most remote scene of the origin of both political parties and new electoral systems. A survey of the uses of this set of electoral rules in different parts of the world during remote and recent periods shows its wide spread. A model of voting by this electoral system demonstrates that, while it can produce varied and pluralistic representation, it also provides incentives to form factional or partisan candidacies. Famous negative reactions to the emergence of factions and political parties during the 18th and 19th centuries are reinterpreted in this context. Many electoral rules and procedures invented since the second half of the 19th century, including the Australian ballot, single-member districts, limited and cumulative ballots, and proportional representation rules, derived from the search to reduce the effects of the originating multi-member district system in favor of a single party sweep. The general relations between political parties and electoral systems are restated to account for the foundational stage here discussed.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.