Local exchange in the southern levant during the early bronze age: a political economy viewpoint

Trade and relations between the southern Levant and other regions of the Near East (mainly Egypt) during the Early Bronze Age (ca. 3,600–2,300 BC) have been the subject of many studies. Research concerning the exchange of local commodities was almost ignored or was discussed in parochial studies, focusing on specific archaeological finds. It is the intention of this paper to present the results of recent research of the exchange of commodities provided by archaeological data from excavations in the Southern Levant with regard to economic theories on the exchange-value of goods and exchange networks. Conclusions regarding the type of society and the forms of government in the Southern Levant during the Early Bronze Age are also presented.

Methods for Measuring Aggregate Costs of Conflict

This paper reviews the methods for measuring the economic cost of conflict. Estimating the economic costs of conflict requires a counterfactual calculation, which makes this a very difficult task. Social researchers have resorted to different estimation methods depending on the particular effect in question. The method used in each case depends on the units being analyzed (firms, sectors, regions or countries), the outcome variable under study (aggregate output, market valuation of firms, market shares, etc.) and data availability (a single cross-section, time series or panel data). This paper reviews existing methods used in the literature to assess the economic impact of conflict: cost accounting, cross-section methods, time series methods, panel data methods, gravity models, event studies, natural experiments and comparative case studies. The paper ends with a discussion of cost estimates and directions for further research.

Dynamic Inefficiency in an Overlapping Generation Economy with Pollution and Health Costs

Revised 2008-08.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Public Economic Theory (2008), 10(4), 563-594.

U.S. Caribbean fish trap fishery costs and earnings study

Executive Summary: This study describes the socio-economic characteristics of the U.S. Caribbean trap fishery that encompasses the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Territory of the U.S. Virgin Islands. In-person interviews were administered to one hundred randomly selected trap fishermen, constituting nearly 25% of the estimated population. The sample was stratified by geographic area and trap tier. The number of traps owned or fished to qualify for a given tier varied by island. In Puerto Rico, tier I consisted of fishermen who had between 1-40 fish traps, tier II was made up of fishermen who possessed between 41 and 100 fish traps, and tier III consisted of fishermen who held in excess of 100 fish traps. In St. Thomas and St. John, tier I was composed of fishermen who held between 1 and 50 fish traps, tier II consisted of fishermen who had between 51-150 fish traps and tier III was made up of fishermen who had in excess of 150 fish traps. Lastly, in St. Croix, tier I was made up of fishermen who had less than 20 fish traps and tier II consisted of fishermen who had 20 or more fish traps. The survey elicited information on household demographics, annual catch and revenue, trap usage, capital investment on vessels and equipment, fixed and variable costs, behavioral response to a hypothetical trap reduction program and the spatial distribution of traps. The study found that 79% of the sampled population was 40 years or older. The typical Crucian trap fisherman was older than their Puerto Rican and St. Thomian and St. Johnian counterparts. Crucian fishermen’s average age was 57 years whereas Puerto Rican fishermen’s average age was 51 years, and St. Thomian and St. Johnian fishermen’s average age was 48 years. As a group, St. Thomian and St. Johnian fishermen had 25 years of fishing experience, and Puerto Rican and Crucian fishermen had 30, and 29 years, respectively. Overall, 90% of the households had at least one dependent. The average number of dependents across islands was even, ranging between 2.8 in the district of St. Thomas and St. John and 3.4 in the district of St. Croix. The percentage utilization of catch for personal or family use was relatively low. Regionally, percentage use of catch for personal or family uses ranged from 2.5% in St. Croix to 3.8% in the St. Thomas and St. John. About 47% of the respondents had a high school degree. The majority of the respondents were highly dependent on commercial fishing for their household income. In St. Croix, commercial fishing made up 83% of the fishermen’s total household income, whereas in St. Thomas and St. John and Puerto Rico it contributed 74% and 68%, respectively. The contribution of fish traps to commercial fishing income ranged from 51% in the lowest trap tier in St. Thomas and St. John to 99% in the highest trap tier in St. Croix. On an island basis, the contribution of fish traps to fishing income was 75% in St. Croix, 61% in St. Thomas and St. John, and 59% in Puerto Rico. The value of fully rigged vessels ranged from $400 to $250,000. Over half of the fleet was worth $10,000 or less. The St. Thomas and St. John fleet reported the highest mean value, averaging $58,518. The Crucian and Puerto Rican fleets were considerably less valuable, averaging $19,831 and $8,652, respectively. The length of the vessels ranged from 14 to 40 feet. Fifty-nine percent of the sampled vessels were at least 23 feet in length. The average length of the St. Thomas and St. John fleet was 28 feet, whereas the fleets based in St. Croix and Puerto Rico averaged 21 feet. The engine’s propulsion ranged from 8 to 400 horsepower (hp). The mean engine power was 208 hp in St. Thomas and St. John, 108 hp in St. Croix, and 77 hp in Puerto Rico. Mechanical trap haulers and depth recorders were the most commonly used on-board equipment. About 55% of the sampled population reported owning mechanical trap haulers. In St. Thomas and St. John, 100% of the respondents had trap haulers compared to 52% in Puerto Rico and 20% in St. Croix. Forty-seven percent of the fishermen surveyed stated having depth recorders. Depth recorders were most common in the St. Thomas and St. John fleet (80%) and least common in the Puerto Rican fleet (37%). The limited presence of emergency position indication radio beacons (EPIRBS) and radar was the norm among the fish trap fleet. Only 8% of the respondents had EPIRBS and only 1% had radar. Interviewees stated that they fished between 1 and 350 fish traps. Puerto Rican respondents fished on average 39 fish traps, in contrast to St. Thomian and St. Johnian and Crucian respondents, who fished 94 and 27 fish traps, respectively. On average, Puerto Rican respondents fished 11 lobster traps, and St. Thomian and St. Johnian respondents fished 46 lobster traps. None of the Crucian respondents fished lobster traps. The number of fish traps built or purchased ranged between 0 and 175, and the number of lobster traps built or bought ranged between 0 and 200. Puerto Rican fishermen on average built or purchased 30 fish traps and 14 lobster traps, and St. Thomian and St. Johnian fishermen built or bought 30 fish traps and 11 lobster traps. Crucian fishermen built or bought 25 fish traps and no lobster traps. As a group, fish trap average life ranged between 1.3 and 5 years, and lobster traps lasted slightly longer, between 1.5 and 6 years. The study found that the chevron or arrowhead style was the most common trap design. Puerto Rican fishermen owned an average of 20 arrowhead traps. St. Thomian and St. Johnian and Crucian fishermen owned an average of 44 and 15 arrowhead fish traps, respectively. The second most popular trap design was the square trap style. Puerto Rican fishermen had an average of 9 square traps, whereas St. Thomian and St. Johnian fishermen had 33 traps and Crucian fishermen had 2 traps. Antillean Z (or S) -traps, rectangular and star traps were also used. Although Z (or S) -traps are considered the most productive trap design, fishermen prefer the smaller-sized arrowhead and square traps because they are easier and less expensive to build, and larger numbers of them can be safely deployed. The cost of a fish trap, complete with rope and buoys, varied significantly due to the wide range of construction materials utilized. On average, arrowhead traps commanded $94 in Puerto Rico, $251 in St. Thomas and St. John, and $119 in St. Croix. The number of trips per week ranged between 1 and 6. However, 72% of the respondents mentioned that they took two trips per week. On average, Puerto Rican fishermen took 2.1 trips per week, St. Thomian and St. Johnian fishermen took 1.4 trips per week, and Crucian fishermen took 2.5 trips per week. Most fishing trips started at dawn and finished early in the afternoon. Over 82% of the trips lasted 8 hours or less. On average, Puerto Rican fishermen hauled 27 fish traps per trip whereas St. Thomian and St. Johnian fishermen and Crucian fishermen hauled 68 and 26 fish traps per trip, respectively. The number of traps per string and soak time varied considerably across islands. In St. Croix, 84% of the respondents had a single trap per line, whereas in St. Thomas and St. John only 10% of the respondents had a single trap per line. Approximately, 43% of Puerto Rican fishermen used a single trap line. St. Thomian and St. Johnian fishermen soaked their traps for 6.9 days while Puerto Rican and Crucian fishermen soaked their traps for 5.7 and 3.6 days, respectively. The heterogeneity of the industry was also evidenced by the various economic surpluses generated. The survey illustrated that higher gross revenues did not necessarily translate into higher net revenues. Our analysis also showed that, on average, vessels in the trap fishery were able to cover their cash outlays, resulting in positive vessel income (i.e., financial profits). In Puerto Rico, annual financial profits ranged from $4,760 in the lowest trap tier to $32,467 in the highest tier, whereas in St. Thomas and St. John annual financial profits ranged from $3,744 in the lowest tier to $13,652 in the highest tier. In St. Croix, annual financial profits ranged between $9,229 and $15,781. The survey also showed that economic profits varied significantly across tiers. Economic profits measure residual income after deducting the remuneration required to keep the various factors of production in their existing employment. In Puerto Rico, annual economic profits ranged from ($9,339) in the lowest trap tier to $ 8,711 in the highest trap tier. In St. Thomas and St. John, annual economic profits ranged from ($7,920) in the highest tier to ($18,486) in the second highest tier. In St. Croix, annual economic profits ranged between ($7,453) to $10,674. The presence of positive financial profits and negative economic profits suggests that higher economic returns could be earned from a societal perspective by redirecting some of these scarce capital and human resources elsewhere in the economy. Furthermore, the presence of negative economic earnings is evidence that the fishery is overcapitalized and that steps need to be taken to ensure the long-run economic viability of the industry. The presence of positive financial returns provides managers with a window of opportunity to adopt policies that will strengthen the biological and economic performance of the fishery while minimizing any adverse impacts on local fishing communities. Finally, the document concludes by detailing how the costs and earnings information could be used to develop economic models that evaluate management proposals. (PDF contains 147 pages)

Incorporating American Dreams into Australian Stories: Political Erasure and cultural transference in film adaptations of Australian Literary Classics

Eterio Pajares, Raquel Merino y José Miguel Santamaría (eds.)

The political econmoy of state government debt : an analysis of constitutional limitations (1961-1990)

Over the past decade, scholarly interest concerning the use of limitations to constrain government spending and taxing has noticeably increased. The call for constitutional restrictions can be credited, in part, to Washington's apparent inability to legislate any significant reductions in government expenditures or in the size of the national debt. At the present time, the federal government is far from instituting any constitutional limitations on spending or borrowing; however, the states have incorporated many controls on revenues and expenditures, the oldest being strictures on full faith and credit borrowing. This dissertations examines the efficacy of these restrictions on borrowing across the states (excluding Alaska) for the period dating from 1961 to 1990 and also studies the limitations on taxing and spending synonymous with the Tax Revolt.

We include socio-economic information in our calculations to control for factors other than the institutional variables that affect state borrowing levels. Our results show that certain constitutional restrictions (in particular, the referendum requirement and the dollar debt limit) are more effective than others. The apparent ineffectiveness of other limitations, such as the flexible debt limit, seem related to the bindingness of the limitations in at least half of the cases. Other variables, such as crime rates, number of schoolage children, and state personal income do affect the levels of full faith and credit debt, but not as strongly as the limitations. While some degree of circumvention can be detected (the amount of full faith and credit debt does inversely affect the levels of nonguaranteed debt), it is so small when compared to the effectiveness of the constitutional restrictions that it is almost negligible. The examination of the tax revolt era limitations yielded quite similar conclusions, with the additional fact that constitutional restrictions appear more binding than statutory ones. Our research demonstrates that constitutional limitations on borrowing can be applied effectively to constrain excessive borrowing, but caution must be used. The efficacy of these restrictions decrease dramatically as the number of loopholes increase.

Four essays on the empirical analysis of political ideology

This thesis examines four distinct facets and methods for understanding political ideology, and so it includes four distinct chapters with only moderate connections between them. Chapter 2 examines how reactions to emotional stimuli vary with political opinion, and how the stimuli can produce changes in an individuals political preferences. Chapter 3 examines the connection between self-reported fear and item nonresponse on surveys. Chapter 4 examines the connection between political and moral consistency with low-dimensional ideology, and Chapter 5 develops a technique for estimating ideal points and salience in a low-dimensional ideological space.

Linking Reduced Deforestation and a Global Carbon Market: Impacts on Costs, Financial Flows, and Technological Innovation

25 p.

The Costs of Ecosystem Adaptation: Methodology and Estimates for Indian Forests

34 p.

Awakening a sleeping giant: The riddle of Latino political participation

For some time now, the Latino voice has been gradually gaining strength in American politics, particularly in such states as California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas, where large numbers of Latino immigrants have settled and large numbers of electoral votes are at stake. Yet the issues public officials in these states espouse and the laws they enact often do not coincide with the interests and preferences of Latinos. The fact that Latinos in California and elsewhere have not been able to influence the political agenda in a way that is commensurate with their numbers may reflect their failure to participate fully in the political process by first registering to vote and then consistently turning out on election day to cast their ballots.

To understand Latino voting behavior, I first examine Latino political participation in California during the ten general elections of the 1980s and 1990s, seeking to understand what percentage of the eligible Latino population registers to vote, with what political party they register, how many registered Latinos to go the polls on election day, and what factors might increase their participation in politics. To ensure that my findings are not unique to California, I also consider Latino voter registration and turnout in Texas for the five general elections of the 1990s and compare these results with my California findings.

I offer a new approach to studying Latino political participation in which I rely on county-level aggregate data, rather than on individual survey data, and employ the ecological inference method of generalized bounds. I calculate and compare Latino and white voting-age populations, registration rates, turnout rates, and party affiliation rates for California's fifty-eight counties. Then, in a secondary grouped logit analysis, I consider the factors that influence these Latino and white registration, turnout, and party affiliation rates.

I find that California Latinos register and turn out at substantially lower rates than do whites and that these rates are more volatile than those of whites. I find that Latino registration is motivated predominantly by age and education, with older and more educated Latinos being more likely to register. Motor voter legislation, which was passed to ease and simplify the registration process, has not encouraged Latino registration . I find that turnout among California's Latino voters is influenced primarily by issues, income, educational attainment, and the size of the Spanish-speaking communities in which they reside. Although language skills may be an obstacle to political participation for an individual, the number of Spanish-speaking households in a community does not encourage or discourage registration but may encourage turnout, suggesting that cultural and linguistic assimilation may not be the entire answer.

With regard to party identification, I find that Democrats can expect a steady Latino political identification rate between 50 and 60 percent, while Republicans attract 20 to 30 percent of Latino registrants. I find that education and income are the dominant factors in determining Latino political party identification, which appears to be no more volatile than that of the larger electorate.

Next, when I consider registration and turnout in Texas, I find that Latino registration rates are nearly equal to those of whites but that Texas Latino turnout rates are volatile and substantially lower than those of whites.

Low turnout rates among Latinos and the volatility of these rates may explain why Latinos in California and Texas have had little influence on the political agenda even though their numbers are large and increasing. Simply put, the voices of Latinos are little heard in the halls of government because they do not turn out consistently to cast their votes on election day.

While these findings suggest that there may not be any short-term or quick fixes to Latino participation, they also suggest that Latinos should be encouraged to participate more fully in the political process and that additional education may be one means of achieving this goal. Candidates should speak more directly to the issues that concern Latinos. Political parties should view Latinos as crossover voters rather than as potential converts. In other words, if Latinos were "a sleeping giant," they may now be a still-drowsy leviathan waiting to be wooed by either party's persuasive political messages and relevant issues.

Long Run Trends in Energy-Related External Costs

30 p.

Climate Change, Responsibilities, and Defeatism and Complacency

16 p.

Economic Efficiency, Environmental Effectiveness and Political Feasibility of Energy Efficiency Rebates: The Case of the Spanish Energy Efficiency 'Renove' Plan

29 p.