885 resultados para Philosophy and religion
Resumo:
Bathsheba's actions in 2 Sam. 11.2-4 identify crucial aspects of her character. Past commentators interpret these words in connection with menstrual purification, stressing the certain paternity of David's adulterine child. This article demonstrates that the participles rōheset and mitqaddesšet and the noun mittum'ātāh do not denote menstrual cleansing. Bathsheba's washing is an innocent bath. She is the only individual human to self-sanctify, placing her in the company of the Israelite deity. The syntax of the verse necessitates that her action of self-sanctifying occurs simultaneously as David lies with her. The three focal terms highlight the important legitimacy of Bathsheba before the Israelite deity, her identity as a non-Israelite, her role as queen mother of the Solomonic line, and her full participation in the narrative.
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Because of its secluded character the prison world is the object of distorted perceptions and a vivid imagery, which applies as well and probably, even to a very high degree to both gender and religion. Based on empirical data collected in two Swiss prisons, this article concentrates on two main topics: firstly, the authors describe the ways in which religiosity is expressed and practiced in prison by male and female inmates. Secondly, they comment on the social functions that inmates attribute to religion in prison. If men and women understand and practice religion in a similar manner, on the contrary, it appears that they attribute differentiated function to religion. After sketching out their methodological approach and briefly present their data, the authors connect their findings to the idea that if the institution determines to a large extent the differences in religiosity, the institution itself is organized according to a gendered logic and thereby also promotes a gendered relation to religion.
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During the last decades of the twentieth century scholars have proposed "neurotheology" as a new subdiscipline of the neurosciences. This article presents a review and discussion of different interpretations placed on neu- rotheology, and attempts to estimate the extent to which neuroscience is a challenge and/or an opportunity for theology and (for the study of) religion. On the neuroscientific side, neurotheology can be split into a reductionist and a religionist neuroscience of religion. On the theological side, it can be split into apologetic and integrative approaches. The appraisal of these differ- ent interpretations and of the relevance of neuroscience for the study of re- ligion is conducted from three points of view: philosophy and theology, cog- nitive science, psychology of religion and sciences of religions.
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La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes conceptions de la place de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Notre étude analysera les modèles constitutionnels canadien, américain et européen de liberté de religion et conscience. Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinerons les conceptions théoriques de la religion dans les sciences sociales ainsi les approches juridiques afin de mieux cerner comment la religion est conçue et de plus, comprendre les diverses influences sur sa conceptualisation. Dans un second et troisième chapitre, nous tenterons d’une part, de qualifier la relation entre la liberté de conscience et la liberté de religion au Canada en nous livrant à une analyse approfondie des deux libertés et d’autre part, d’identifier les questions qui demeurent irrésolues. Dans le chapitre final, nous observerons comment la liberté de conscience a été interprétée dans les contextes américain et dans l’Union Européenne, par le biais de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’Homme. Notre hypothèse est que l’on peut arriver à une meilleure compréhension de la relation entre les libertés de conscience et religion en clarifiant les conceptions théoriques de la religion et de la conscience en droit constitutionnel comparé.
Resumo:
Vers la fin du 19ème siècle, le moine et réformateur hindou Swami Vivekananda affirma que la science moderne convergeait vers l'Advaita Vedanta, un important courant philosophique et religieux de l'hindouisme. Au cours des décennies suivantes, suite aux apports scientifiques révolutionnaires de la théorie de la relativité d'Einstein et de la physique quantique, un nombre croissant d'auteurs soutenaient que d'importants "parallèles" pouvaient être tracés entre l'Advaita Vedanta et la physique moderne. Encore aujourd'hui, de tels rapprochements sont faits, particulièrement en relation avec la physique quantique. Cette thèse examine de manière critique ces rapprochements à travers l'étude comparative détaillée de deux concepts: le concept d'akasa dans l'Advaita Vedanta et celui de vide en physique quantique. L'énoncé examiné est celui selon lequel ces deux concepts pointeraient vers une même réalité: un substratum omniprésent et subtil duquel émergent et auquel retournent ultimement les divers constituants de l'univers. Sur la base de cette étude comparative, la thèse argumente que des comparaisons de nature conceptuelle favorisent rarement la mise en place d'un véritable dialogue entre l'Advaita Vedanta et la physique moderne. Une autre voie d'approche serait de prendre en considération les limites épistémologiques respectivement rencontrées par ces disciplines dans leur approche du "réel-en-soi" ou de la "réalité ultime." Une attention particulière sera portée sur l'épistémologie et le problème de la nature de la réalité dans l'Advaita Vedanta, ainsi que sur le réalisme scientifique et les implications philosophiques de la non-séparabilité en physique quantique.
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La purification est une métaphore désignant le moteur de la philosophie de la religion de Hegel. Elle est d’abord à l’œuvre dans la création de la Nature qui se consume pour produire la conscience de soi divine à travers l'esprit humain. En second lieu, elle s’opère dans l’objectivation des productions spirituelles de l’homme qui sont purifiées jusqu'à ce que l’Esprit soit auprès de soi dans le christianisme. La troisième purification est morale et trouve son fondement dans la Genèse, le judaïsme étant le premier à avoir identifié l'unité des natures humaine et divine. Le mythe témoignera également de la culpabilité en tant que l'homme n'exprime pas immédiatement sa divinité, mais sa finitude. La réalisation du divin impliquera donc la purification de la naturalité au profit de la substantialité. Le christianisme explicitera cette tâche par l’héroïsme de Jésus et cet héroïsme se perpétuera jusqu’à ce qu’émergent un individualisme moderne et une religion assurant la cohésion sociale : le protestantisme luthérien. Cet individualisme sera toutefois défectueux puisqu’il produira éventuellement davantage d’égoïsme que de réconciliation, ce qui donnera lieu à certaines critiques de l’analyse hégélienne du christianisme. En effet, Hegel croit toujours que la vitalité religieuse est nécessaire au fonctionnement de l’État, bien qu’elle soit dorénavant incapable de diffuser les sentiments de culpabilité et de responsabilité dans le corps social. Néanmoins, comme les valeurs du christianisme ont été épurées de leur contingence en passant dans les mœurs et dans l’État, il s’avérera que le corps social peut se passer d’une tradition religieuse vivante
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This paper aims to understand the phenomenon of Hermetism though the perspective of its process of reception and reproduction in society. It will explore the phenomenon that was the transformation of the Hermetica into a social discourse. The so-called technical and philosophical Hermetica are texts. A text is the result of a production: it is composed by men, and addressed to men. It is important to consider the intentions and values present in a text’s production, and to understand that its process of reception and reproduction in society are, in fact, complex and dynamic.
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J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employs an informal experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we subject Austin's methods to formal experimental investigation. His methods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction, drawn on the basis of his `donkey stories', that `mistake' and `accident' apply to different cases, but not for some of his other attempts to distinguish the meaning of philosophically significant terms (such as `intentionally' and `deliberately'). We critically examine the methodology of informal experiments employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and discuss the role that experimenter bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic experiments.
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In this paper I investigate how philosophy can speak for children and how children can have a voice in philosophy and speak for philosophy. I argue that we should understand children as responsible rational individuals who are involved in their own philosophical inquiries and who can be involved in our own philosophical investigations-not because of their rational abilities, but because we acknowledge them as conversational partners, acknowledge their reasons as reasons, and speak for them as well as let them speak for us and our rational community. In order to argue this I turn, first, to Gareth Matthews' philosophy of childhood and suggest a reconstruction of some of his concepts in line with the philosophy of Stanley Cavell. Second, in order to examine more closely our conceptions of rationality and our pictures of children, I consider the children's books, The Lorax and Where is My Sister? and Henrik Ibsen's play, The Wild Duck.
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The goals of this project are manifold. First, I will attempt to discover evidence in the book of Joshua that will lend support to the theory of a Josianic influence enacted in the 7th century BCE. I will do this through an analysis of the rhetoric in selected stories in Joshua using the ideas of Foucault. Second, I will address the significance of this kind of analysis as having potential for the emancipation of oppressed peoples. The first section delineates scholarly discussion on the literary and historical context of the book of Joshua. These scholarly works are foundational to this study because they situate the text within a particular period in history and within certain ideologies. Chapter 2 discusses the work of Foucault and how his ideas will be applied to particular texts of the book of Joshua. The focused analysis of these texts occurs within chapters 3 to 6. Chapter 7 presents an integration of the observations made through the analyses performed in the previous chapters and expands on the ethical significance of this study.
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My research aims to understand how and why fundamentalists justify violence against people who do not fit their profile of "righteous" or "saved" persons, such as abortion doctors and clinic workers, gays and lesbians, and Jews. The first section of this paper travels through the history of fundamentalism since its origins in the British and American apocalipticism, or belief in the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. However, my history of Protestant Fundamentalism in the United States will focus on the ways in which Fundamentalism developed in response to many changes in American social structure. I interpret Fundamentalism as an anti-modern movement seeking to reassert "traditional" Christian values.
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This article retraces the “genealogy” of the fideist perspective in philosophy as well as literature, especially within the writings of Søren Kierkegaard and the novel Don Quixote. It contends that a demythologized perspective of the fideist-humanist sort, based upon Erasmian tolerance and intellectual creativity and updated with the insights of post-analytic theory (e.g., the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard Rorty, and Jeffrey Stout), without revoking the vocabulary of transcendence, can reinforce the weathered but still valuable post-Enlightenment moral vocabulary, and can reiterate the humaneness of liberal hope without undue encumbrance from the dogmatic baggage of traditional theological jargon and metaphysics.
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This paper provides an analysis of the key term aidagara (“betweenness”) in the philosophical ethics of Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), in response to and in light of the recent movement in Japanese Buddhist studies known as “Critical Buddhism.” The Critical Buddhist call for a turn away from “topical” or intuitionist thinking and towards (properly Buddhist) “critical” thinking, while problematic in its bipolarity, raises the important issue of the place of “reason” versus “intuition” in Japanese Buddhist ethics. In this paper, a comparison of Watsuji’s “ontological quest” with that of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Watsuji’s primary Western source and foil, is followed by an evaluation of a corresponding search for an “ontology of social existence” undertaken by Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962). Ultimately, the philosophico-religious writings of Watsuji Tetsurō allow for the “return” of aesthesis as a modality of social being that is truly dimensionalized, and thus falls prey neither to the verticality of topicalism nor the limiting objectivity of criticalism.
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This paper explores the religious implications of eroticism in Western culture since the Sexual Revolution, a period at once applauded for its open and immanent view of sexuality and denounced for its shamelessness and promiscuity. After discussing the work and effects of Alfred C. Kinsey, the father of the Sexual Revolution, I focus on a critical appraisal of Kinsey written by French theorist Georges Bataille (“Kinsey, the Underworld and Work,” in L’Erotisme, 1957). Bataille situates contemporary Western sexuality within a larger historical movement towards the “desacralization” of all aspects of human life: sex, under the scientific gaze of the Kinsey team, became simply another “object” to be analyzed and classified, and “good” sex defined solely in terms of frequency and explosiveness of orgasm. For many, including Hugh Hefner, this approach to sex occasioned a refreshing awakening from the long dark night of Victorian sexual repression. However, as Bataille’s protégé Foucault has shown, the scientific approach to sexuality often masks a desire to control and delimit sexual behaviour, not “liberate” it. Moreover, Bataille makes the point that the desacralization of sexuality denudes sex of a vital component—eroticism—which is necessary for real pleasure and ecstasy. Beyond the “moral” critiques one often hears leveled against Kinsey and his work, Bataille provides a “religious” critique, one that stands, perhaps surprisingly, on the “near side” of sexuality.
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Reform is a word that, one might easily say, characterizes more than any other the history and development of Buddhism. Yet, it must also be said that reform movements in East Asian Buddhism have often taken on another goal—harmony or unification; that is, a desire not only to reconstruct a more worthy form of Buddhism, but to simultaneously bring together all existing forms under a single banner, in theory if not in practice. This paper explores some of the tensions between the desire for reform and the quest for harmony in modern Japanese Buddhism thought, by comparing two developments: the late 19th century movement towards ‘New Buddhism’ (shin Bukkyō) as exemplified by Murakami Senshō 村上専精 (1851–1929), and the late 20th century movement known as ‘Critical Buddhism’ (hihan Bukkyō), as found in the works of Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭. In all that has been written about Critical Buddhism, in both Japanese and English, very little attention has been paid to the place of the movement within the larger traditions of Japanese Buddhist reform. Here I reconsider Critical Buddhism in relation to the concerns of the previous, much larger trends towards Buddhist reform that emerged almost exactly 100 years previous—the so-called shin Bukkyō or New Buddhism of the late-Meiji era. Shin Bukkyō is a catch-all term that includes the various writings and activities of Inoue Enryō, Shaku Sōen, and Kiyozawa Manshi, as well as the so-called Daijō-hibussetsuron, a broad term used (often critically) to describe Buddhist writers who suggested that Mahāyāna Buddhism is not, in fact, the Buddhism taught by the ‘historical’ Buddha Śākyamuni. Of these, I will make a few general remarks about Daijō-hibusseturon, before turning attention more specifically to the work of Murakami Senshō, in order to flesh out some of the similarities and differences between his attempt to construct a ‘unified Buddhism’ and the work of his late-20th century avatars, the Critical Buddhists. Though a number of their aims and ideas overlap, I argue that there remain fundamental differences with respect to the ultimate purposes of Buddhist reform. This issue hinges on the implications of key terms such as ‘unity’ and ‘harmony’ as well as the way doctrinal history is categorized and understood, but it also relates to issues of ideology and the use and abuse of Buddhist doctrines in 20th-century politics.