Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Audit report on the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy for the year ended June 30, 2006

Mignardises amoureuses de l'admirée / par Jacques Tahureau,... ; publiées et annotées par Prosper Blanchemain. précédées d'une Notice inédite sur l'auteur / par Guillaume Colletet

Comprend : Notice inédite [sur Jacques Tahureau]

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy FY2007 Annual Report

FY2007 Annual Report

Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees

Large law firms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. Thispaper provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of behavior.Contingent legal fees align the interests of the attorney with those ofthe client, but not necessarily with those of the partnership. We showthat the choice of hourly fees is a solution to an agency problem withmultiple principals, where the interests of one principal (law firm)collide with the interests of the other principal (client).