U.S. subprime financial crisis contagion on BRIC and European Union stock markets

ABSTRACTThe Copula Theory was used to analyze contagion among the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and European Union stock markets with the U.S. Equity Market. The market indexes used for the period between January 01, 2005 and February 27, 2010 are: MXBRIC (BRIC), MXEU (European Union) and MXUS (United States). This article evaluated the adequacy of the main copulas found in the financial literature using log-likelihood, Akaike information and Bayesian information criteria. This article provides a groundbreaking study in the area of contagion due to the use of conditional copulas, allowing to calculate the correlation increase between indexes with non-parametric approach. The conditional Symmetrized Joe-Clayton copula was the one that fitted better to the considered pairs of returns. Results indicate evidence of contagion effect in both markets, European Union and BRIC members, with a 5% significance level. Furthermore, there is also evidence that the contagion of U.S. financial crisis was more pronounced in the European Union than in the BRIC markets, with a 5% significance level. Therefore, stock portfolios formed by equities from the BRIC countries were able to offer greater protection during the subprime crisis. The results are aligned with recent papers that present an increase in correlation between stock markets, especially in bear markets.

Iowa Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Union County, June 30, 2002

County Audit Report

Asnières, [Football] Association, 31-11-19 [i.e. 1er décembre 1919], équipe U.S.A. [Union sportive et amicale] de Clichy : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 57095

Union County, June 30, 2003

County Audit Report

Mainmise sur l'état social : mobilisation patronale et caisse de compensation en Suisse (1908-1960)

Qui sait qu'en Suisse, les associations patronales mettent en oeuvre l'Etat social ? Qui sait que associations organisent la majorité des caisses de compensation, dont la fonction principale est de collecter les cotisations et de payer les rentes de l'Assurance-vieillesse et survivants ? Qui connaît ces caisses par lesquelles transitent les milliards de l'Etat social ? L'objectif de cette thèse consiste à comprendre les raisons qui ont poussé le patronat helvétique à mettre en oeuvre les politiques de protection sociale, dont il a pourtant toujours essayé de limiter le développement. Résoudre ce paradoxe implique de se pencher sur près d'un siècle d'histoire mêlée du patronat et des politiques sociales. Ce travail retrace, sur la base d'archives privées et publiques souvent inédites, les raisons qui ont poussé les patrons à créer les premières caisses de compensation dans l'entre-deux-guerres, puis à imposer cette forme d'organisation pour l'aide aux soldats mobilisés (autour de 1940) et l'Assurance- vieillesse et survivants (autour de 1948). Il étudie également comment les associations patronales sont parvenues à défendre leurs caisses jusqu'à aujourd'hui, contre ceux qui dénonçaient l'irrationalité de l'existence d'une centaine de caisses de compensation publiques et privées concurrentes pour mettre en oeuvre un seul système d'assurances sociales. Cette recherche amène deux grands résultats. D'une part, elle propose une histoire originale des politiques sociales en Suisse. Le prisme des caisses de compensation patronales contribue en effet à interroger notre compréhension de l'histoire des politiques de protection sociale, dans laquelle on sous-estime parfois l'importance des conflits pour fixer les frontières entre formes de protection publique et privée. D'autre part, ce travail présente une histoire inédite de l'action collective des patrons dans les régulations du travail au sens large. A travers les caisses de compensation, c'est en effet à réaliser une histoire de l'Union centrale des associations patronales suisses que je me suis aussi attelé. Faute de parvenir à empêcher tout développement des politiques sociales, les patrons ont fait en sorte d'acquérir sur ces politiques une forme de mainmise. Entre histoire des politiques sociales et histoire du patronat, ce travail tente d'expliquer comment les caisses de compensation y ont contribué. Who knows that, in Switzerland, employers' associations implement the best known policies constituting the welfare state? Who knows that the equalization funds, (Caisses de compensation / Ausgleichskassen), organized by employers' associations or by the Swiss Cantons, are responsible for pooling payroll deductions and for paying benefits of the Swiss public pay-as-you-go, old-age insurance and many other branches of the welfare policies? Who knows these caisses de compensation that channel the monies dedicated to the financing of the Welfare state ? The main objective of this research is to understand the reasons why Swiss employers do implement such welfare policies that they usually reject for political reasons. In order to solve this puzzle, this research investigates half of a century of the connected histories of welfare policies and employers' collective action. It also investigates, based on public and private archive records, how employers founded the first caisses in the Interwar period, and imposed them to organize the main developments of the Welfare state during the Second World War. The research also underlines how employers defended their caisses de compensation against those questioning the rationality of this fragmented system aiming to implement one single set of public welfare through one hundred competing private and public caisses de compensation. This research highlights two main results. On the one hand, it helps to improve our understanding of the history of the welfare policies in Switzerland. Underlining the role of the caisses de compensation helps to highlight the importance of the interplay of public and private actors regarding social polices. On the other hand, this research charts a pioneering history of Swiss' employers' collective action regarding labor issues. Because they could not prevent all public welfare policy, employers achieved a form of stranglehold (mainmise) on the welfare State. Halfway between social policy and employers' associations' history, this research try to reveal how their caisses de compensation helped them in this objective.

Colombes, 28/12/19, rugby, Union sportive dacquoise : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 57346

Colombes, 28/12/19, rugby, Union sportive dacquoise : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 57345

Credit Union Division Activities, March 2004, Issue 10

Newsletter for Iowa Credit Union Division