The Human Rights Act 1998 – Future Prospects

It is now over fifteen years since the Human Rights Act was enacted in November 1998. Although in legal terms it is difficult to argue with the proposition that the Act is working in an effective manner, in political terms the Act remains one of the most highly debated pieces of legislation on the UK statute books. In recent years there have been numerous calls for the repeal of the Act, and for its replacement with a ‘UK Bill of Rights’. Such calls led to the establishment of a Commission on a Bill of Rights, which issued its final report in December 2012. Little progress has since been made on the issue. One notable occurrence however was the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill, a Private Member’s Bill which was eventually withdrawn in March 2013. This article seeks to assess the current situation regarding the bill of rights debate, and ultimately the question of the future prospects of the Human Rights Act, an issue of immense legal significance. Overall, it will be questioned whether the enactment of a UK Bill of Rights would constitute an improvement on the current position under the Human Rights Act.

The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence: Valiuliene v Lithuania

This article analyses the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the issue of domestic violence, with a particular focus on Valiuliene v Lithuania. It seems that to date the Court’s jurisprudence on this issue is somewhat inconsistent, and with Valiuliene v Lithuania the Court was given an opportunity to clarify its approach in this area. There are certainly a number of positive aspects to the Court’s judgment, however there are also difficulties with the approach of the Court in this case. Overall it is to be hoped that the judgment in Valiuliene v Lithuania will mark the beginning of a more coherent jurisprudence as regards domestic violence.

Global Production, CSR and Human Rights: The Courts of Public Opinion and the Social License to Operate

This paper takes at its starting point the responsibility placed upon corporations by the United Nations’ Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework as elaborated upon by the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to respect human rights. The overt pragmatism and knowledge of the complex business relationships that are embedded in global production led John Ruggie, the author of the Framework, to adopt a structure for the relationship between human rights and business that built on the existing practices of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). His intention was that these practices should be developed to embrace respect for human rights by exhorting corporations to move from “the era of declaratory CSR” to showing a demonstrable policy commitment to respect for human rights. The prime motivation for corporations to do this was, according to Ruggie, because the responsibility to respect was one that would be guarded and judged by the “courts of public opinion” as part of the social expectations imposed upon corporations or to put it another way as a condition of a corporation’s social license to operate.
This article sets out the background context to the Framework and examines the structures that it puts forward. In its third and final section the article looks at how the Framework requires a corporation’s social license to be assembled and how and by whom that social license will be judged. The success or failure of the Framework in persuading corporations to respect human rights is tied to whether “the courts of public opinion” can use their “naming and shaming power” effectively.

Meaningful and Effective? Considering Victims’ Interests Through Participation at the International Criminal Court

This article explores the role of victims in the criminal proceedings of the International Criminal Court and the extent to which their interests have impacted upon the ICC judges’ decision making in light of human rights law and victimological theorisation. The article begins by first outlining how victims’ interests can be considered in international criminal proceedings, before contrasting this role with the purpose of international criminal justice. The second part of the article examines victim participation within the ICC and how this has affected judicial decision making to assess its effectiveness. The contest between the rights of victims and the role of Prosecutor in determining the selection of charges and perpetrators is also examined in an effort to add to the current debate on victim participation at the ICC. The author finds that at the ICC, despite innovative victim provisions, victims’ interests have little impact on outcomes of the Court. The author argues that in order to ensure the Court is more responsive to victims understanding of justice it should give greater weight to their interests, which in turn is likely to improve their satisfaction with the ICC, as well as public confidence and legitimacy of the work of the Court.

Human rights and traditional values

A series of ‘traditional values’ resolutions, passed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2009, 2011, and 2012, were the result of a highly controversial initiative spearheaded by Russia. Do these ‘traditional values’ underpin human rights? If not, why are religious traditions or, indeed, any traditional values worth preserving at all? Why are they valuable from the point of view of adherents to that tradition? Should the larger society take into account the fact that a practice is based on tradition in deciding whether or not to override it in the name of human rights? Put more technically, in what does the normativity of tradition lie, for adherents and non-adherents of that tradition? These are the questions that this essay explores, in the context of the recent debates over the scope and meaning of human rights stimulated by the Human Rights Council Resolutions. Much of the support for the Resolutions comes from what can broadly be called the global South. In several books, particularly Human Rights, Southern Voices, and General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective William Twining has explored the question of how to reconcile human rights norms and belief systems embedded in the global South (including ‘traditional values’), and in doing so has drawn particular attention to intellectuals from that part of the world, in particular Francis Deng, Yash Ghai, Abdullahi An-Na’im, and Upendra Baxi. I suggest that those concerned to recognize the legitimate concerns that significant sections of the global South have about the human rights project, concerns reflected in the ‘traditional values’ Resolutions would do well to pay more attention to the ‘Southern voices’ on whom Twining rightly focuses attention.

Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication:The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Compared

This article examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.

Using Comparative Constitutionalism in Human Rights Discourse:Ireland’s Past and Scotland’s Future

The article considers the use of comparisons in constitutional development, specifically the use of comparative reasoning in the context of debates about human rights in newly emerging independent states, using the examples of Ireland and Scotland.

Before identity, gender and human rights

This is the beginning of an exploration of before as the thesis ‘before’ (temporally) and ‘be-fore’ (spatially) difference. Before denotes the origin and the desired destination. Before (in the double sense of ‘before’ and ‚be-in-the-fore’) opens up a space of pre-difference, of origin and of forgotten memory, as well as a space of desire, objective, illusion of teleology, unity, completion. Applied to the two domains of Human Rights and Sex/Gender, the space of ‘before’ yields two slightly different vistas: in human rights, a premodern, functionally undifferentiated society which had to invent human rights as its safeguards of functional differentiation. In Sex/Gender, 'before' brings a self-referential construction: that of ipseity, as the form of identity beyond comparison that does not play with id but with ipsum. Ipseity is inoperable but not useless. It is inoperable because it cannot be observed from anywhere without suffering rupture. It is not useless because it offers a ground for the reconceptualisation of difference, both through awe and desire.