The Lisbon Treaty and Spain: Background, Context and Impact. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue 1, August 2012

The year 2010 will be remembered in the European Union (EU) circles of governmental Spain as a crucial milestone regarding the role of the country in one of the most important alliances of world history. During the first semester, from January to June 2010, Spain had previously been scheduled to hold the rotating presidency as done since the times of the inception of the predecessor of the EU, the European Economic Community (EEC). Furthermore, on June 12, Spain would be ready to celebrate the 25th anniversary of its adhesion (along with Portugal) to the European integration experiment, by signing the treaty, effectively acceding to the European Community (EC) on January 1, 1986. While all of this was set to occur, the new Reform Treaty (“of Lisbon”) was set to be implemented as a substitute for the failed constitutional text floated during the first years of the new century. Moreover, these spectacular events unraveled in the middle of one of the worst economic crises of the world, with considerable impact on the evolution of the EU and, most especially, Spain. This paper will review the background, context and impact of particular novel aspects of the new treaty governing the EU and several milestones regarding the experience of Spain in the European process.

The role of mechanistic target of rapamycin (mTOR) pathway and synaptic protein GABAA-R in cortical GABAergic cell connectivity

Quelque 30 % de la population neuronale du cortex mammalien est composée d’une population très hétérogène d’interneurones GABAergiques. Ces interneurones diffèrent quant à leur morphologie, leur expression génique, leurs propriétés électrophysiologiques et leurs cibles subcellulaires, formant une riche diversité. Après leur naissance dans les éminences ganglioniques, ces cellules migrent vers les différentes couches corticales. Les interneurones GABAergiques corticaux exprimant la parvalbumin (PV), lesquels constituent le sous-type majeur des interneurones GABAergiques, ciblent spécifiquement le soma et les dendrites proximales des neurones principaux et des neurones PV+. Ces interneurones sont nommés cellules à panier (Basket Cells –BCs) en raison de la complexité morphologique de leur axone. La maturation de la connectivité distincte des BCs PV+, caractérisée par une augmentation de la complexité de l’axone et de la densité synaptique, se déroule graduellement chez la souris juvénile. Des travaux précédents ont commencé à élucider les mécanismes contrôlant ce processus de maturation, identifiant des facteurs génétiques, l’activité neuronale ainsi que l’expérience sensorielle. Cette augmentation marquante de la complexité axonale et de la synaptogénèse durant cette phase de maturation suggère la nécessité d’une synthèse de protéines élevée. La voie de signalisation de la cible mécanistique de la rapamycine (Mechanistic Target Of Rapamycin -mTOR) a été impliquée dans le contrôle de plusieurs aspects neurodéveloppementaux en régulant la synthèse de protéines. Des mutations des régulateurs Tsc1 et Tsc2 du complexe mTOR1 causent la sclérose tubéreuse (TSC) chez l’humain. La majorité des patients TSC développent des problèmes neurologiques incluant des crises épileptiques, des retards mentaux et l’autisme. D’études récentes ont investigué le rôle de la dérégulation de la voie de signalisation de mTOR dans les neurones corticaux excitateurs. Toutefois, son rôle dans le développement des interneurones GABAergiques corticaux et la contribution spécifique de ces interneurones GABAergiques altérés dans les manifestations de la maladie demeurent largement inconnus. Ici, nous avons investigué si et comment l’ablation du gène Tsc1 perturbe le développement de la connectivité GABAergique, autant in vitro que in vivo. Pour investiguer le rôle de l’activation de mTORC1 dans le développement d’une BC unique, nous avons délété le gène Tsc1 en transfectant CRE-GFP dirigé par un promoteur spécifique aux BCs dans des cultures organotypiques provenant de souris Tsc1lox. Le knockdown in vitro de Tsc1 a causé une augmentation précoce de la densité des boutons et des embranchements terminaux formés par les BCs mutantes, augmentation renversée par le traitement à la rapamycine. Ces données suggèrent que l’hyperactivation de la voie de signalisation de mTOR affecte le rythme de la maturation des synapses des BCs. Pour investiguer le rôle de mTORC1 dans les interneurones GABAergiques in vivo, nous avons croisé les souris Tsc1lox avec les souris Nkx2.1-Cre et PV-Cre. À P18, les souris Tg(Nkx2.1-Cre);Tsc1flox/flox ont montré une hyperactivation de mTORC1 et une hypertrophie somatique des BCs de même qu’une augmentation de l’expression de PV dans la région périsomatique des neurones pyramidaux. Au contraire, à P45 nous avons découvert une réduction de la densité des punctas périsomatiques PV-gephyrin (un marqueur post-synaptique GABAergique). L’étude de la morphologie des BCs en cultures organotypiques provenant du knock-out conditionnel Nkx2.1-Cre a confirmé l’augmentation initiale du rythme de maturation, lequel s’effondre ensuite aux étapes développementales tardives. De plus, les souris Tg(Nkx2.1Cre);Tsc1flox/flox montrent des déficits dans la mémoire de travail et le comportement social et ce d’une façon dose-dépendante. En somme, ces résultats suggèrent que l’activation contrôlée de mTOR régule le déroulement de la maturation et la maintenance des synapses des BCs. Des dysfonctions de la neurotransmission GABAergique ont été impliquées dans des maladies telles que l’épilepsie et chez certains patients, elles sont associées avec des mutations du récepteur GABAA. De quelle façon ces mutations affectent le processus de maturation des BCs demeuret toutefois inconnu. Pour adresser cette question, nous avons utilisé la stratégie Cre-lox pour déléter le gène GABRA1, codant pour la sous-unité alpha-1 du récepteur GABAA dans une unique BC en culture organotypique. La perte de GABRA1 réduit l’étendue du champ d’innervation des BCs, suggérant que des variations dans les entrées inhibitrices en raison de l’absence de la sous-unité GABAAR α1 peuvent affecter le développement des BCs. La surexpression des sous-unités GABAAR α1 contenant des mutations identifiées chez des patients épileptiques ont montré des effets similaires en termes d’étendue du champ d’innervation des BCs. Pour approfondir, nous avons investigué les effets de ces mutations identifiées chez l’humain dans le développement des épines des neurones pyramidaux, lesquelles sont l’endroit privilégié pour la formation des synapses excitatrices. Somme toute, ces données montrent pour la première fois que différentes mutations de GABRA1 associées à des syndromes épileptiques peuvent affecter les épines dendritiques et la formation des boutons GABAergiques d’une façon mutation-spécifique.

The new European framework for managing bank crises. CEPS Policy Brief No. 304, 21 November 2013

This Policy Brief describes and discusses the proposals for a European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for banks and for a Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR). The authors find that the proposals are generally well designed and present a consistent approach, yet there is room for improvement, including the streamlining of procedures for the start of resolution, which now entail much overlap in the powers attributed to the various institutions involved (the Commission, the Single Resolution Board and the European Central Bank). The paper makes a number of key recommendations to facilitate discussions for stakeholders and regulators.

EU citizenship: Citizenship and identity beyond national borders. EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 10, October 2013

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of European Union citizenship. All citizens of the 28 EU member states are also EU citizens through the very fact that their countries are members of the EU. Acquired EU citizenship gives them the right to free movement, settlement and employment across the EU, the right to vote in European elections, and also on paper the right to consular protection from other EU states' embassies when abroad. The concept of citizenship in Europe – and indeed anywhere in the world – has been evolving over the years, and continues to evolve. Against this time scale, the concept of modern citizenship as attached to the nation-state would seem ephemeral. The idea of EU citizenship therefore does not need to be regarded as a revolutionary phenomenon that is bound to mitigate against the natural inclination of European citizens towards national identities, especially in times of economic and financial crises. In fact, the idea of EU citizenship has even been criticised by some scholars as being of little substantive value in addition to whatever rights and freedoms European citizens already have. Nonetheless the ‘constitutional moment’ that the Maastricht Treaty achieved for the idea of EU citizenship has served more than just symbolic value – the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is now legally binding, for instance. The idea of EU citizenship also put pressure on the Union and its leaders to address the perceived democratic deficit that the EU is often accused of. In attempts to cement the political rights of EU citizens, the citizens’ initiative was included in Lisbon Treaty allowing citizens to directly lobby the European Commission for new policy initiatives or changes.

Russian belligerence and Europe's energy security. EPC Commentary, 19 March 2014

Recent Russian actions have unequivocally underlined that it does not play by the rules. This provides a wake-up call and should alert not only the countries of the former Soviet Union, but the EU as a whole. For the EU, this has one clear implication: it cannot continue to depend on an unreliable energy supplier, which is prone to use energy as a political tool. Luckily for the EU, summer is approaching and Europeans will need less Russian gas for heating. However, potential gas supply disruptions remind Europe of its energy vulnerabilities, and of the 2006 and 2009 winters, when Russia’s decision to stop the flow of gas to Ukraine led to supply crises in a number of EU Member States. As the EU’s heads of states and governments gather in the European Council on 20 and 21 March, the developments in Ukraine and the possible Russian illegal annexation of Crimea will undoubtedly dominate the discussions. Securing energy supply will figure on the agenda, but energy should also be seen as a means to pressure Russia. It is important that the Member States use the occasion to commit to working together on energy security. If this is addressed in a holistic way, it can also support European industry and climate policy – the other issues on the Council agenda that run the risk of being forgotten.

Better use of resources is the means to growth, prosperity and welfare - but will the EU jump on the opportunity? EPC Commentary, 25 September 2014

As the new European Commission steps in and looks for ways to promote growth and competitiveness, its success will depend on what emphasis will be given to creating a more sustainable European economy. What will determine the EU’s competitiveness and comparative advantage on a global scene is how well we will respond to the ongoing economic and ecological crises – which are intertwined and reinforce each other. The big question is what emphasis will the new Commission and the EU as a whole give to promoting sustainable and greener growth, based on good management of natural resources and biodiversity, smarter use of resources and mitigating climate change?

The twenty-first century needs a better G20 and a new G7+. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/13, 14 November 2014

During the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 was hastily elevated to ‘global economic steering committee’. In the early stages of the crisis, the G20 was an effective forum for crisis containment. As the crisis has eased, however, the G20 has lost both direction and momentum. Governments and policymakers have felt less need to act in unison and have rather refocused on their national agendas, as is their duty and primary function. However, effective global governance is needed permanently, not just in crisis times. It is desirable to have more representative and effective global governance that, among other things, is equipped to prevent crises rather than just react to them. In an environment of rapid change in global patterns of trade and wealth creation, a new revamped (but highly representative) grouping should be created within the G20, to provide leadership on key economic policy matters. Euro-area members should give up their individual seats in this G7+, allowing room for China and other large emerging economies. Without euro-area countries taking such a step, it would be impossible to reconcile effectiveness and representation in this new G7+, which would take charge of decision making on global economic imbalances, financial and monetary issues. All existing G20 countries, including individual euro-area countries, would however remain in the G20, which could potentially expand and would remain the prime forum for discussion on all remaining matters at global level.

Government failure, opposition success? Electoral performance in Portugal and Italy at the time of the crisis. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 05/2014

The costs of the crisis in Southern European countries have not been only economic but political. Economic crises tend to lead to government instability and termination while political challengers are expected to exploit this contingent window of opportunity to gain an advantage over incumbents in national elections. The current crisis seems to make no exception, looking at the results of the general elections recently held in Southern Europe. However, this did not always lead to a clear victory of the main opposition parties. In most of the elections, in fact, the incumbent parties’ loss did not coincide with the official opposition’s gain. The extreme case is represented by Italy, where both the outgoing government coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi – setting aside for the moment the technocratic phase – and its main challenger, the centre left coalition, ended up losing millions of voters and a new political force, the Five Star Movement, obtained about 25 per cent of votes. On the opposite side there is Portugal. Only in Portugal did the vote increase for the centre right PSD, in fact, exceed the incumbent socialists’ loss. The present work aims at exploring the factors which might account for this significant divergence between the two cases.

Sitting on the fence: Swedish defence policy and the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 33, April 2013

Sweden finds itself in the midst of the most heated debates about defence policy and the direction of military reforms since the end of the Cold War, as Stockholm faces the challenge of finding a new military security formula. From the Swedish point of view, the post-Cold War strategic timeout in Europe is coming to an end. The international environment is reverting to a situation in which the use of force among states is no longer an improbable scenario. Stockholm cannot rule out the emergence of crises or conflicts in Northern Europe in the future, which could directly or indirectly affect Sweden. In this context, the transformations of Sweden’s defence policy over the past twenty years have become a problem. Sweden has moved from neutrality, i.e. non-involvement on any side of an armed interstate conflict, to non-alignment, whereby it stays outside military alliances and freely shapes its policies during wartime. It has joined the European Union and co-operates closely with NATO on foreign missions. Its ability to defend its own territory, however, has diminished.

Norway and the Bear. Norwegian defence policy- lessons for the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 38, January 2014

Norway is currently the only Western European state and ‘old’ NATO member that strongly relies on the traditional dimension of NATO's collective defence. It is also the only ally in Western Europe which perceives Russia as a threat to its military security, in the so-called High North. In order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and threats in the region, Norway has been pursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence. Cooperation means improving collaboration with Russia in cross-border relations, in the petroleum sector and in the military sphere. The deterrent measures include maintaining NATO’s credibility as a collective defence alliance; increasing military cooperation with the United States; building up Norway’s own military capabilities; and developing military cooperation across Northern Europe. The primary objective of Oslo’s defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of crises and conflicts emerging in the High North which could prove too ‘big’ for Norway but too ‘small’ for NATO.

Strengthening the euro area. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22. Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014

Since 2007, a series of acute crises have threatened the very existence of the euro area. The financial crisis which spilled into the currency union in 2007 was followed by an unexpectedly strong downturn of the real economy. As of 2010, the euro area was confronted with a severe sovereign debt and banking crisis. Despite these troublesome developments, the euro area has proven to have a considerable degree of resilience. In each phase, governance weaknesses were revealed – and national governments together with the EU institutions have designed an impressive series of policy responses in crisis management and institutional innovation. The euro area today is completed by a banking union with a Single Supervisory and a Single Resolution Mechanism. National budgetary and economic policies are more closely overseen and coordinated. With the European Stability Mechanism, the euro area now has a permanent tool in place to manage sovereign liquidity crises and instabilities in the banking sector. Most importantly, the euro area's only true federal institution, the European Central Bank (ECB), has become its most effective crisis manager: with the announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, the ECB finally managed to calm the self fulfilling crisis in 2012. Meanwhile, the announcement of credit easing and quasi-quantitative easing in September 2014 is a move towards reducing financial fragmentation and countering deflation. The euro area in 2014 is hence a lot different from the one in 2007. And yet, further challenges need to be overcome. Prevailing stagnation, fragmentation and problems of legitimacy require a rethink of policies and further governance reform.

Improving decision-making in the EU. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014.

The multiple crises the European Union (EU) has experienced in recent years have fundamentally altered decision-making and, more broadly, governance in the EU. Pre-crisis systems and processes were not adequate to react to such critical and systemic challenges, but the speed of the crisis meant that new governance mechanisms have been superimposed on existing processes and structures rather than seeing a fundamental reform of decision-making. Consequently, not all changes have been fully successful. Given the institutional changes this year and the ongoing development of the EMU governance framework, now presents a good opportunity to reform EU decision-making.

Scenarios Assessment and Transitions towards a Sustainable Euro-Mediterranean in 2030. MEDPRO Policy Paper No. 9, July 2013

In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, the region has reached a turning point in its history, presenting as many opportunities as challenges. The European Union itself is facing challenging conditions following the financial and economic crises that have hit its periphery. This MEDPRO Policy Paper examines and assesses various possible scenarios that could play out in EU-Mediterranean relations over the next two decades and offers recommendations towards long-term sustainable socio-economic development in the region.

Latvia and Greece: Less is more. CEPS Hi-level Brief, 12 February 2014

Despite considerable differences, there were also many similarities in economic performance between Latvia and Greece before their respective adjustment crises. After the immediate crisis, however, economic activity rebounded sharply in Latvia but continued to contract in Greece. This paper argues that this difference was due primarily to developments in credit. In Latvia credit growth fell sharply, and the economy was deleveraging aggressively by 2009. When the pace of deleveraging started to stabilise, the rebound in the credit impulse caused domestic demand growth to recover. Real GDP has increased about 20% since reaching its trough in the third quarter of 2009.

The Euro blame game and its implications for policy and financial markets. ACES Cases No. 2012.2

The recent financial crisis in some of the eurozone member countries has received a great deal of attention by investors, policy makers and commentators alike. Often these events are interpreted as a failure of the euro and the sustainability of the eurozone is called into question. This paper shows that this analysis and its emphasis are flawed. Fiscal imbalances and financial market imperfections are at the core of the problem, and they need to be addressed directly to prevent future crises.