A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2008

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2008

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2008

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, January 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, January 2008

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2008

Iowa Individual Income Tax Statistical Report 2006

Iowa Individual Income Tax Statistical Report 2006

On the performance of small-area estimators: Fixed vs. random area parameters

Most methods for small-area estimation are based on composite estimators derived from design- or model-based methods. A composite estimator is a linear combination of a direct and an indirect estimator with weights that usually depend on unknown parameters which need to be estimated. Although model-based small-area estimators are usually based on random-effects models, the assumption of fixed effects is at face value more appropriate.Model-based estimators are justified by the assumption of random (interchangeable) area effects; in practice, however, areas are not interchangeable. In the present paper we empirically assess the quality of several small-area estimators in the setting in which the area effects are treated as fixed. We consider two settings: one that draws samples from a theoretical population, and another that draws samples from an empirical population of a labor force register maintained by the National Institute of Social Security (NISS) of Catalonia. We distinguish two types of composite estimators: a) those that use weights that involve area specific estimates of bias and variance; and, b) those that use weights that involve a common variance and a common squared bias estimate for all the areas. We assess their precision and discuss alternatives to optimizing composite estimation in applications.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2008

Education, growth and income inequality

Estimates of the e¤ect of education on GDP (the social return to education)have been hard to reconcile with micro evidence on the private return. We present a simple explanation that combines two ideas: imperfect substitution between worker types and endogenous skill biased technological progress. When types of workers are imperfect substitutes, the supply of human capital is negatively related to its return, and a higher education level compresses wage di¤erentials. We use cross-country panel data on income inequality to estimate the private return and GDP data to estimate the social return. The results show that the private return falls by 2 percentage points when the average education level increases by a year, which is consistent with Katz and Murphy's [1992] estimate of the elasticity of substitution between worker types. We find no evidence for dynamics in the private return, and certainly not for a reversal of the negative e¤ect as described in Acemoglu [2002]. The short run social return equals the private return.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2008

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2008

The poor stay poor: Non-convergence across countries and regions

We study the issue of income convergence across countries and regions witha Bayesian estimator which allows us to use information in an efficient andflexible way. We argue that the very slow convergence rates to a commonlevel of per-capita income found, e.g., by Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin,is due to a 'fixed effect bias' that their cross-sectional analysisintroduces in the results. Our approach permits the estimation of differentconvergence rates to different steady states for each cross sectional unit.When this diversity is allowed, we find that convergence of each unit to(its own) steady state income level is much faster than previously estimatedbut that cross sectional differences persist: inequalities will only bereduced by a small amount by the passage of time. The cross countrydistribution of the steady state is largely explained by the cross countrydistribution of initial conditions.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program

Income maintenance programs and multidimensional screening

This paper examines properties of optimal poverty assistance programs under different informational environments using an income maintenanceframework. To that end, we make both the income generating ability andthe disutility of labor of individuals unobservable, and compare theresulting benefit schedules with those of programs found in the UnitedStates since Welfare Reform (1996). We find that optimal programs closelyresemble a Negative Income Tax with a Benefit Reduction rate that dependson the distribution of population characteristics. A policy of workfare(unpaid public sector work) is inefficient when disutility of labor isunobservable, but minimum work requirements (for paid work) may be usedin that same environment. The distortions to work incentives and thepresence of minimum work requirements depend on the observability andrelative importance of the population's characteristics.

Social spending and demographics: The role of public policies in the intergenerational redistribution of income. Empirical evidence from Spain and Catalonia

The demographic shift underway in Southern Europe requires a revision of some of thefundamental principles of the traditional welfare state. We analyze the evolution of several aspects of welfare and social expenditure over the last two decades. We find that in the context of the present demographic changes and real estate boom current social and pension policy leads to a new distribution of benefits and burdens which is highly intergenerationally unequal. We argue for a revised definition of public policy based on Musgrave's proposition as a possible rule for an intergenerationally fair distribution.