The New EU Climate and Energy Package: Passing the test? CEPS Commentary, 6 January 2014

On 22 January 2014, the European Commission is expected to publish the proposals for the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies, which will be discussed and possibly – or maybe, partly – agreed during the 20-21 March 2014 European Council. This is the first comprehensive review of the 2007-09 Climate and Energy Package, which resulted in the so-called ‘20-20-20’ targets by 2020. The principal intention is to define the EU’s climate change and energy policy framework for the next decade and beyond to give investors an adequate amount of predictability if not certainty. This Commentary argues, however, that the ‘2030 Framework’ is not just about predictability; it is also about making the proper adjustments based on the lessons learned and also in response to new issues that have emerged in the interim. The authors ask what the main lessons are and how they should influence the 2030 Framework. Or put differently, what are the conditions that the “2030 Framework” will need to meet in order to offer a viable package for discussion?

Climate Conundrums at High Altitude. EU Diplomacy Paper 01/2014, January 2014

The European Union (EU) was the frontrunner for the establishment of the world’s first multinational emissions trading scheme (ETS). Committed to combating climate change, the EU sought to overcome the multilateral paralysis within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to mitigate aviation emissions. Unsuccessful in pushing for a global market-based measure (MBM) within the organisation, the EU was ready for take-off to include the sector in the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS). The geographical scope, however, including all flights from and to Europe in their entire trajectory, caused frictions with the international community about sovereignty issues. Ultimately, Climate Commissioner Connie Hedegaard announced a ‘stop-the-clock’ for international flights, a temporary derogation until the 2013 ICAO Assembly in order to find a global agreement. The ’stop-the-clock’ initiative provides ample opportunity to analyse EU leadership in curbing aviation emissions based on an analytical framework specifying different types of leadership. Its shows the global challenge to the EU’s claim of structural leadership on various levels in and beyond ICAO. The paper aims to analyse to what extent the EU is a global leader in mitigating aviation emissions and to identify the kind of EU leadership according to a threefold analytical framework. In addition, it will factor in the 'stop-the-clock' initiative and to what extent it altered the perception of EU leadership in the field. The paper comes to the conclusion that EU leadership in mitigating aviation emissions is not stalling. On the contrary, the EU, by pursuing the extension of the EU ETS, has put aviation emissions on everybody’s radar – and thus showed idea-based leadership. Proving the scheme’s feasibility further underlined EU leadership, in the form of directional leadership. The 'stop-the-clock' decision, however, already indicated what was later on confirmed in the 38th ICAO Assembly: Unilateral structural leadership of the EU in the field of aviation emissions is not credible at the moment.

EU actorness and effectiveness under political pressure at the Copenhagen climate change negotiations

This paper analyses the extent of European Union (EU) actorness and effectiveness at the fifteenth United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. For over a decade the European Union has been characterised as a leader in international climate policy-making and as an important actor in international climate change negotiations. The COP15 meeting in Copenhagen has overall brought about disappointing outcomes, especially from the perspective of the European Union. This casts doubts on EU leadership and begs the question of what has happened to EU actorness and effectiveness in this field. In terms of actorness we take Jupille and Caporaso (1998) as a point of departure and then specify a more parsimonious actorness framework that consists of cohesion and autonomy. Effectiveness (i.e. goal attainment) is seen as conceptually separate from actorness. Effectiveness is conceptualised as the result of actorness conditioned by the ‘opportunity structure’, i.e. the external context (of other actors, events and ideas) that enables or constrains EU actions. We hold that the EU’s actorness has been only moderate, especially given somewhat limited preference cohesion. In terms of the opportunity structure in Copenhagen we argue that the high degree of politicisation constrained the EU’s ability to negotiate and thus to attain its goals. Another external factor that had a substantial adverse impact on the EU’s effectiveness at the Copenhagen negotiations was the strong involvement of other actors with rather different positions, namely the United States (US) and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China).

Climate Change: Balancing economic and environmental concerns. CEPS Commentary, 3 October 2014

In surveying the portfolio for climate change assigned to Commissioner-designate Arias Cañete, Andrei Marcu finds in this CEPS Commentary that the approach proposed in the European Commission’s January 2014 package offers a sound basis on which to proceed overall, but he specifies that it needs to be put in a context where the causes and symptoms are correctly identified. He singles out timing and governance as other important elements and discusses their practical implications.

The 2015 Climate Agreement: What’s in it for the EU. CEPS Commentary, 17 October 2014

The European Union, together with other countries, is making a second effort to reach a comprehensive global climate change agreement in Paris in 2015, after the unsuccessful attempt to do so in Copenhagen in 2009. In a Europe still preoccupied with recovery from the economic crisis, why should the EU be tempted to offer leadership in the field of climate change and what would such an agreement bring – in short, what’s in it for the EU? Although the world has changed since the earlier attempt to reach agreement, the EU needs to continue to be a leader in the climate talks, argues the author, both for the sake of the world and for our own EU interest. Others will come and share that leadership and shape it together. It is the only way that we, the EU, can be successful in Paris.

The 2030 framework on climate and energy - Getting Europe on the right track? EPC Commentary, 30 January 2014

Climate vs competitiveness? The European Commission published its proposal on the 2030 climate and energy framework on 22 January. Reflective of the current economic climate, it was accompanied by a report on energy prices and the Commission decided not to propose regulation on shale gas but to issue recommendations on environmental standards. The same day also saw the publication of a communication “For a European Industrial Renaissance”. Climate considerations no longer drive the agenda. The enthusiasm of 2007, when the “20/20/20” climate and energy targets were set for 2020, has diminished. The new reality has brought competitiveness to the top of the EU’s priority agenda.

The European Council's strategic guidelines and immigration: can the EU be bold and innovative? EPC Commentary, 25 June 2014

The agenda of the June 2014 EU Summit will be particularly heavy. Alongside issues related to the conclusion of the European Semester, the climate and energy framework, possible debates about Ukraine, Iraq and Syria, EU leaders will have to decide on two key dossiers: the nomination of the next Commission President and the future of the area of freedom, security and justice.

The Sustainability Impact of the EU Emissions Trading System on the European Industry. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 17/2007

This BEEP explains the mechanism of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) for the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and explore into its likely sustainability impact on European industry. In doing so, it focuses on energy-intensive industries like cement, steel and aluminium production as well as on the emerging hydrogen economy. The BEEP concludes that at the moment it is still very inconsistently implemented and has a fairly narrow scope regarding greenhouse gases and involved sectors. It may also give an incentive to relocate for energy-intensive industries. In its current format, the EU ETS does not yet properly facilitate long term innovation dynamics such as the transition to a hydrogen economy. Nevertheless, the EU ETS is foremost a working system that – with some improvements – has the potential to become a pillar for effective and efficient climate change policy that also gives incentives for investment into climate friendly policies.

Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A Review of Economic and Legal Complexities. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 28/2013

Withdrawal from the EU is no more a taboo subject. However, the process by which it can happen is unclear and potentially complex. The purpose of this paper is to show that a withdrawing Member State will not only rid itself from the constraints and obligations of EU rules, but it will also have to re-invent many policies and institutions to fill the gap left by the non-application of EU rules. The paper examines closely the case of the UK and Scotland and concludes that outright exit is not the best option for a withdrawing Member State. The best, but possibly the least feasible, option is an intermediate arrangement falling between full membership and complete separation from the EU. The exact position between the two extremes can only be determined by the exit negotiations and will be influenced by the political climate that will prevail at that time. While the final destination of an acceding country is well known [full adoption of the obligations of EU membership], the exiting country will be embarking on a trip with unknown destination and full of surprises.

EU Performance in the International Climate Negotiations in 2013: Scope for Improvement. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/01/January 2014

Summary. The European Union (EU) has long been an important player and even a leader in the international cooperation on climate change. In 2013, preparations for a new global climate agreement in 2015 moved centre stage in the international negotiations. This policy brief assesses the EU’s performance in 2013 culminating in the Warsaw conference in November 2013. We find that the EU was actively engaged in the negotiations and pursued partially ambitious/progressive policy objectives, which it was partly successful in realising. The policy brief argues that international EU leadership for a 2015 agreement requires (1) building an international leadership alliance including the EU and other progressive countries and (2) serious homework by the EU to advance domestic climate mitigation efforts both by 2020 and 2030, and to enhance its position on climate finance.

Paris Climate Agreement 2015 – EU needs to ensure ‘signal’ and ‘direction’. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/08/October 2014

Summary. Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change are expected to agree on a new international climate agreement applicable to all countries from 2020 at the Paris climate summit in December 2015. This Policy Brief investigates the possible role of the European Union (EU) towards the 2015 Paris climate agreement. It argues for renewed efforts by the EU at coalition building with progressive developing countries, leadership by example and a more prominent, complementary role of individual EU member states. It also argues for a Paris agreement that provides a strong “signal” and “direction”, and discusses what this may entail.

Energy efficiency: the ever neglected priority of the European energy strategy. Egmont Paper No. 66, June 2014

Summary. Energy saving has been a stated policy objective of the EU since the 1970s. Presently, the 2020 target is a 20% reduction of EU energy consumption in comparison with current projections for 2020. This is one of the headline targets of the European Energy Strategy 2020 but efforts to achieve it remain slow and insufficient. The aim of this paper is to understand why this is happening. Firstly, this paper examines the reasons why public measures promoting energy efficiency are needed and what form these measures should optimally take (§ 1). Fortunately, over the last 20 years, much research has been done into the famous ‘energy efficiency gap’ (or ‘the energy efficiency paradox’), even if more remains to be done. Multiple explanations have been given: market failures, modelling flaws and behavioural obstacles. Each encompasses many complex aspects. Several types of instruments can be adopted to encourage energy efficiency: measures guaranteeing the correct pricing of energy are preferred, followed by taxes or tradable white certificates which in turn are preferred to standards or subsidies. Information programmes are also necessary. Secondly, the paper analyzes the evolution of the different programmes from 2000 onwards (§ 2). This reveals the extreme complexity of the subject. It deals with quite diverse topics: buildings, appliances, public sector, industry and transport. The market for energy efficiency is as diffuse as energy consumption patterns themselves. It is composed of many market actors who demand more efficient provision of energy services, and that suppliers of the necessary goods and know-how deliver this greater efficiency. Consumers in this market include individuals, businesses and governments, and market activities cover all energy-consuming sectors of the economy. Additionally, energy efficiency is the perfect example of a shared competence between the EU and the Member States. Lastly, the legal framework has steadily increased in complexity, and despite the successive energy efficiency programmes used to build this framework, it has become clear that the gap between the target and the results remains. The paper then examines whether the 2012/27/EU Directive adopted to improve the situation could bring better results. It briefly describes the content of this framework Directive, which accompanies and implements the latest energy efficiency programme (§ 3). Although the Directive is technically complex and maintains nonbinding energy efficiency targets, it certainly represents an improvement in several aspects. However, it is also saddled with a multiplicity of exemption clauses and interpretative documents (with no binding value) which weaken its provisions. Furthermore, alone, it will allow the achievement of only about 17.7% of final energy savings by 2020. The implementation process, which is essential, also remains fairly weak. The paper also gives a glimpse of the various EU instruments for financing energy efficiency projects (§ 4). Though useful, they do not indicate a strong priority. Fourthly, the paper tries to analyze the EU’s limited progress so far and gather a few suggestions for improvement. One thing seems to remain useful: targets which can be defined in various ways (§ 5). Basically, all this indicates that the EU energy efficiency strategy has so far failed to reach its targets, lacks coherence and remains ambiguous. In the new Commission’s proposals of 22 January 2014 – intended to define a new climate/energy package in the period from 2020 to 2030 – the approach to energy efficiency remains unclear. This is regrettable. Energy efficiency is the only instrument which allows the EU to reach simultaneously its three targets: sustainability, competitiveness and security. The final conclusion appears thus paradoxical. On the one hand, all existing studies indicate that the decarbonization of the EU economy will be absolutely impossible without some very serious improvements in energy efficiency. On the other hand, in reality energy efficiency has always been treated as a second zone priority. It is imperative to eliminate this contradiction.

The nuclear safety framework in the European Union after Fukushima. Egmont Paper No. 73, December 2014

Summary. On 11 March 2011, a devastating earthquake struck Japan and caused a major nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The disaster confirmed that nuclear reactors must be protected even against accidents that have been assessed as highly unlikely. It also revealed a well-known catalogue of problems: faulty design, insufficient back-up systems, human error, inadequate contingency plans, and poor communications. The catastrophe triggered the rapid launch of a major re-examination of nuclear reactor security in Europe. It also stopped in its tracks what had appeared to be a ‘nuclear renaissance’, both in Europe and globally, especially in the emerging countries. Under the accumulated pressure of rising demand and climate warming, many new nuclear projects had been proposed. Since 2011 there has been more ambivalence, especially in Europe. Some Member States have even decided to abandon the nuclear sector altogether. This Egmont Paper aims to examine the reactions of the EU regarding nuclear safety since 2011. Firstly, a general description of the nuclear sector in Europe is provided. The nuclear production of electricity currently employs around 500,000 people, including those working in the supply chain. It generates approximately €70 billion per year. It provides roughly 30% of the electricity consumed in the EU. At the end of 2013, there were 131 nuclear power reactors active in the EU, located in 14 countries. Four new reactors are under construction in France, Slovakia and Finland. Secondly, this paper will present the Euratom legal framework regarding nuclear safety. The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) Treaty was signed in 1957, and somewhat obscured by the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. It was a more classical treaty, establishing institutions with limited powers. Its development remained relatively modest until the Chernobyl catastrophe, which provoked many initiatives. The most important was the final adoption of the Nuclear Safety Directive 2009/71. Thirdly, the general symbiosis between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be explained. Fourthly, the paper analyses the initiatives taken by the EU in the wake of the Fukushima catastrophe. These initiatives are centred around the famous ‘stress tests’. Fifthly, the most important legal change brought about by this event was the revision of Directive 2009/71. Directive 2014/87 has been adopted quite rapidly, and has deepened in various ways the role of the EU in nuclear safety. It has reinforced the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities. It has enhanced transparency on nuclear safety matters. It has strengthened principles, and introduced new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire life cycle of nuclear installations, and in particular, nuclear power plants. It has extended monitoring and the exchange of experiences by establishing a European system of peer reviews. Finally, it has established a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonized nuclear safety guidelines. In spite of these various improvements, Directive 2014/87 Euratom still reflects the ambiguity of the Euratom system in general, and especially in the field of nuclear safety. The use of nuclear energy remains controversial among Member States. Some of them remain adamantly in favour, others against or ambivalent. The intervention of the EAEC institutions remains sensitive. The use of the traditional Community method remains limited. The peer review method remains a very peculiar mechanism that deserves more attention.

EU Climate and Energy Governance: There’s more to it than meets the eye. CEPS Commentary, 14 July 2015

In this new CEPS Commentary, a team of climate and energy specialists argue that a reliable system of climate and energy governance in the EU would certainly need to go beyond the issues that are identified in the 2030 framework for climate and energy and the Energy Union. In their view, such a system would consist of no less than seven complex areas, which they proceed to outline and discuss their interrelationships. To ensure that these areas are dealt with in an integrated manner, they recommend that the European Commission creates a roadmap – possibly in the form of a Communication – that would indicate the direction, interactions and a timeline for their adoption.

Towards a sustainable European economy. EPC Policy Brief, 13 October 2015

Europe is faced with interlinked economic, ecological and climate crises. As identified in the European Environment Agency's The European Environment – state and outlook 2015 report1 , Europe is increasingly affected by global trends that come with positive and negative impacts. Some of these it contributes to, some it can try to manage, while others are beyond its control. Regardless, only by anticipating these trends and making a sustainable economy the overriding policy objective, can it aim to maximise the related opportunities and minimise the threats.