Strategic planning of electricity systems: Integrating renewable energies

Tese de Doutoramento - Programa Doutoral em Engenharia Industrial e Sistemas (PDEIS)

Development of a methodology to incorporate risk and uncertainty in electricity power planning

Dissertação de mestrado em Engenharia Industrial

Desenvolvimento de um Módulo Habitacional “embrionário” “Plug-in” de habitação unifamiliar

Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Arquitectura

Análise técnica - económica da produção de energia em sistemas de abastecimento de água: caso do aproveitamento de fins múltiplos dos socorridos

Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Engenharia Civil

Behavior-based price discrimination in a multi-dimensional preferences market

NIPE WP 04/ 2016

Random walk forecast of urban water in Iran under uncertainty

There are two significant reasons for the uncertainties of water demand. On one hand, an evolving technological world is plagued with accelerated change in lifestyles and consumption patterns; and on the other hand, intensifying climate change. Therefore, with an uncertain future, what enables policymakers to define the state of water resources, which are affected by withdrawals and demands? Through a case study based on thirteen years of observation data in the Zayandeh Rud River basin in Isfahan province located in Iran, this paper forecasts a wide range of urban water demand possibilities in order to create a portfolio of plans which could be utilized by different water managers. A comparison and contrast of two existing methods are discussed, demonstrating the Random Walk Methodology, which will be referred to as the â On uncertainty pathâ , because it takes the uncertainties into account and can be recommended to managers. This On Uncertainty Path is composed of both dynamic forecasting method and system simulation. The outcomes show the advantage of such methods particularly for places that climate change will aggravate their water scarcity, such as Iran.

Analisis De Mercados De Energía Eléctrica Competitivos Con Participación De Energía Eólica. Competitive Electricity Markets Analisis with Wind Power Generation.

La utilización de energía eólica es un hecho cada vez más común en nuestro mundo como respuesta a mitigar el creciente aumento de demanda de energía, los aumentos constantes de precio, la escasez de combustibles fósiles y los impactos del cambio climático, los que son cada día más evidentes.Consecuentemente, el interés por la participación de esta nueva forma de generación de energía en sistema eléctrico de potencia ha aumentado considerablemente en los últimos años. La incorporación de generación de origen eólico en el sistema eléctrico de potencia requiere de un análisis detallado del sistema eléctrico en su conjunto, considerando la interacción entre parques y unidades de generación eólica, plantas de generación convencional y el sistema eléctrico de potencia. La integración de generación de origen renovable en el sistema eléctrico de potencia convencional presenta nuevos desafíos los que pueden ser atribuidos a características propias de este tipo de generación, por ejemplo la fluctuación de energía debido a la naturaleza variable del viento, la naturaleza distribuida de la generación eólica y las características constructivas y método de conexión de los distintos modelos de turbinas eólicas al sistema.La finalidad de este proyecto de investigación consiste en investigar el impacto sobre un mercado de sistema eléctrico competitivo causado por el agregado de generación de origen eolico. Como punto de partida se pretende realizar modelos de plantas de generacion eolica para luego incorporarlos a los modelos de sistemas eléctricos y realizar estudios de de despacho económico, flujo de cargas, análisis transitorio y estudios dinámicos del sistema.

Impact of wind power generation on the electricity supply industry

The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the effect wind energy has on the Electricity Supply Industry in Ireland. Wind power generation is a source of renewable energy that is in abundant supply in Ireland and is fast becoming a resource that Ireland is depending on as a diverse and secure of supply of energy. However, wind is an intermittent resource and coupled with a variable demand, there are integration issues with balancing demand and supply effectively. To maintain a secure supply of electricity to customers, it is necessary that wind power has an operational reserve to ensure appropriate backup for situations where there is low wind but high demand. This dissertation examines the affect of this integration by comparing wind generation to that of conventional generation in the national grid. This is done to ascertain the cost benefits of wind power generation against a scenario with no wind generation. Then, the analysis examines to see if wind power can meet the pillars of sustainability. This entails looking at wind in a practical scenario to observe how it meets these pillars under the criteria of environmental responsibility, displacement of conventional fuel, cost competitiveness and security of supply.

List of species of mammals, principally rodents, obtained by W. W. Price, S. E. Meek, G. K. Cherrie and E. S. Thompson, in the States of Iowa, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Nevada and California, with descriptions of new species, by D. E. Elliot.

v.1:no.10(1898)

Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.