Formal modelling and analysis of DNP3 secure authentication

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are one of the key foundations of smart grids. The Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) is a standard SCADA protocol designed to facilitate communications in substations and smart grid nodes. The protocol is embedded with a security mechanism called Secure Authentication (DNP3-SA). This mechanism ensures that end-to-end communication security is provided in substations. This paper presents a formal model for the behavioural analysis of DNP3-SA using Coloured Petri Nets (CPN). Our DNP3-SA CPN model is capable of testing and verifying various attack scenarios: modification, replay and spoofing, combined complex attack and mitigation strategies. Using the model has revealed a previously unidentified flaw in the DNP3-SA protocol that can be exploited by an attacker that has access to the network interconnecting DNP3 devices. An attacker can launch a successful attack on an outstation without possessing the pre-shared keys by replaying a previously authenticated command with arbitrary parameters. We propose an update to the DNP3-SA protocol that removes the flaw and prevents such attacks. The update is validated and verified using our CPN model proving the effectiveness of the model and importance of the formal protocol analysis.

A kinematic analysis of the hand function

Background The evaluation of the hand function is an essential element within the clinical practice. The usual assessments are focus on the ability to perform activities of daily life. The inclusion of instruments to measure kinematic variables provides a new approach to the assessment. Inertial sensors adapted to the hand could be used as a complementary instrument to the traditional assessment. Material: clinimetric assessment (Upper Limb Functional Index, Quick Dash), antrophometric variables (eight and weight), dynamometry (palm preasure) was taken. Functional analysis was made with Acceleglove system for the right hand and computer system. The glove has six acceleration sensor, one on each finger and another one on the reverse palm. Method Analytic, transversal approach. Ten healthy subject made six task on evaluation table (tripod pinch, lateral pinch and tip pinch, extension grip, spherical grip and power grip). Each task was made and measure three times, the second one was analyze for the results section. A Matlab script was created for the analysis of each movement and detection phase based on module vector. Results The module acceleration vector offers useful information of the hand function. The data analysis obtained during the performance of functional gestures allows to identify five different phases within the movement, three static phase and tow dynamic, each module vector was allied to one task. Conclusion Module vector variables could be used for the analysis of the different task made by the hand. Inertial sensor could be use as a complement for the traditional assessment system.

Modelling ciphersuite and version negotiation in the TLS protocol

Real-world cryptographic protocols such as the widely used Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol support many different combinations of cryptographic algorithms (called ciphersuites) and simultaneously support different versions. Recent advances in provable security have shown that most modern TLS ciphersuites are secure authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocols, but these analyses generally focus on single ciphersuites in isolation. In this paper we extend the ACCE model to cover protocols with many different sub-protocols, capturing both multiple ciphersuites and multiple versions, and define a security notion for secure negotiation of the optimal sub-protocol. We give a generic theorem that shows how secure negotiation follows, with some additional conditions, from the authentication property of secure ACCE protocols. Using this framework, we analyse the security of ciphersuite and three variants of version negotiation in TLS, including a recently proposed mechanism for detecting fallback attacks.

Post-quantum key exchange for the TLS protocol from the ring learning with errors problem

Lattice-based cryptographic primitives are believed to offer resilience against attacks by quantum computers. We demonstrate the practicality of post-quantum key exchange by constructing cipher suites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol that provide key exchange based on the ring learning with errors (R-LWE) problem, we accompany these cipher suites with a rigorous proof of security. Our approach ties lattice-based key exchange together with traditional authentication using RSA or elliptic curve digital signatures: the post-quantum key exchange provides forward secrecy against future quantum attackers, while authentication can be provided using RSA keys that are issued by today's commercial certificate authorities, smoothing the path to adoption. Our cryptographically secure implementation, aimed at the 128-bit security level, reveals that the performance price when switching from non-quantum-safe key exchange is not too high. With our R-LWE cipher suites integrated into the Open SSL library and using the Apache web server on a 2-core desktop computer, we could serve 506 RLWE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 HTTPS connections per second for a 10 KiB payload. Compared to elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, this means an 8 KiB increased handshake size and a reduction in throughput of only 21%. This demonstrates that provably secure post-quantum key-exchange can already be considered practical.

LibVM: An architecture for shared library sandboxing

Many software applications extend their functionality by dynamically loading libraries into their allocated address space. However, shared libraries are also often of unknown provenance and quality and may contain accidental bugs or, in some cases, deliberately malicious code. Most sandboxing techniques which address these issues require recompilation of the libraries using custom tool chains, require significant modifications to the libraries, do not retain the benefits of single address-space programming, do not completely isolate guest code, or incur substantial performance overheads. In this paper we present LibVM, a sandboxing architecture for isolating libraries within a host application without requiring any modifications to the shared libraries themselves, while still retaining the benefits of a single address space and also introducing a system call inter-positioning layer that allows complete arbitration over a shared library’s functionality. We show how to utilize contemporary hardware virtualization support towards this end with reasonable performance overheads and, in the absence of such hardware support, our model can also be implemented using a software-based mechanism. We ensure that our implementation conforms as closely as possible to existing shared library manipulation functions, minimizing the amount of effort needed to apply such isolation to existing programs. Our experimental results show that it is easy to gain immediate benefits in scenarios where the goal is to guard the host application against unintentional programming errors when using shared libraries, as well as in more complex scenarios, where a shared library is suspected of being actively hostile. In both cases, no changes are required to the shared libraries themselves.

Security issues for future intelligent transport systems

Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) allow in-vehicle systems, and ultimately the driver, to enhance their awareness of their surroundings by enabling communication between vehicles and road infrastructure. C-ITS are widely considered as the next major step in driving assistance systems, aiming at increasing safety, comfort and mobility for drivers. However, any communicating systems are subjected to security threats. A key component for providing secure communications at a large scale is a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Due to the safety-critical nature of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications, a C-ITS PKI has functional, performance and scalability requirements that differ from traditional non-automotive environments. This paper identifies and defines the key functional and security requirements for C-ITS PKI systems and analyses proposed C-ITS PKI standards against these requirements. In particular, the proposed US and European C-ITS PKI systems are identified as being too complex and not scalable. The paper also highlights various privacy, security and scalability concerns that should be considered for a secure C-ITS PKI solution in the Australian transport landscape.