782 resultados para E-GOVERNMENT
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March 23, 1808. Printed by order of the House of Representatives.
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13th Congress, 3d session. House. Doc. 6.
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The following thesis presents an analysis of business-government relations within a neo-Marxist framework. Specifically, the discussion encompasses how the business interest group. the Business Council on National Issues, maintains consensus and unity amongst its monopoly capital members. Furthermore. the study elaborates on the process through which the group's interests are acknowledged and legitimized by the state under the "public interest" f8fue. Most of the literature pertaining to business-government relations within the context of interactions between business interest groups and the state, and such specific branches of the state as the government and/or the civil service. emphasize a liberal-pluralist perspective. Essentially, these writings serve to reflect and legitimate the current slatus quo. Marxist discourses on the subject, while attempting to transcend the liberal-pluralist framework. nevertheless suffer from either economic determinism .. ie., stressing the state's accumulation function but not its legitimation function or historical specificity. A cogent and comprehensive neo-Marxist analysis of business-government relations must discuss both the accumulation and legitimation functions of the state. The process by which the concerns of a particular business interest group become part of the state's policy agenda and subsequently are formulated and implemented into policies which legitimate its dominance is also studied. This inquiry is significant given the liberal-pluralist assumptions of a neutral state and that all interest groups compete "on a level playing field". The author's neo-Marxist paradigm rejects both of these assumptions. Building on concepts from nea-Marxist instrumentalism. structuralism. state monopoly capitalism, and forms and functions of the state perspectives. the author proposes that policies which legitimize the interests of the monopoly capital fraction cannot. be discerned only from the state's activities. per StJ. Clearly, if the liberal-pluralist 3 contention of multiple and conflicting interest groups, including those within the capitalist class, is taken at face value, M interest group such as the Business Council on National Issues (BCND, must somehow maintain. internal consensus Md unity amongst its members. Internal consensus amongst its members ensures that the state can better acknowledge and articulate its concerns into policies that maintain hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital fraction under the "public interest" fllf.JJdq. The author contends that the BCNI focuses most of its interactions on the upper echelons of the civil service since it is this branch of the state which is most responsible for policy formulation and implementation. The author's paradigm is applied within the context of extensively analyzing newspaper coverage. BCN! publications, and other published sources, as well as a personal interview with an executive administrative member of the BeNI. The discussion focuses on how agreement and unity amongst the various interests of the monopoly capital fraction are maintained through the business organization, its policy scope, and finally its interactions with the state. The analysis suggests that while the civil service is an important player in expressing the interests of the BCNI's membership through policies which ostensibly also reflect the "public interest", it is not the only strategic target for the BCNI's interactions with the state. The author's research also highlights the importance of government officials at the Cabinet level and Cabinet Committees. Senior elected officials from the Federal government are also significant in avoiding intergovernmental or interprovincial conflict in implementing policies that legitimize hegemonic dominance of the monopoly capital fraction over other fractions and classes.
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March 23, 1808. Printed by order of the House of Representatives.
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For the past 20 years, researchers have applied the Kalman filter to the modeling and forecasting the term structure of interest rates. Despite its impressive performance in in-sample fitting yield curves, little research has focused on the out-of-sample forecast of yield curves using the Kalman filter. The goal of this thesis is to develop a unified dynamic model based on Diebold and Li (2006) and Nelson and Siegel’s (1987) three-factor model, and estimate this dynamic model using the Kalman filter. We compare both in-sample and out-of-sample performance of our dynamic methods with various other models in the literature. We find that our dynamic model dominates existing models in medium- and long-horizon yield curve predictions. However, the dynamic model should be used with caution when forecasting short maturity yields
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The programme from the Gala Performance on the occasion of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, 7 August 1973. The event took place in the Opera of the National Arts Centre in Ottawa.
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Letter (printed) from the private secretary of the Government House at York to William Woodruff, inviting him to attend a private meeting of the provincial legislature to dispatch public business, Dec. 10, 1828.
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Letter to the Welland Canal Office from Welland Woodruff, Government Director of the Welland Canal Company in which he dissents from giving an extension of time to the St. Catharines Water Power Company to extend the lease of water from this time. This is a copy of the original, March 11, 1837.
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UANL
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This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, and their joint role in the determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say d, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter d characterizes the interdependence between fiscal and monetary authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money. Empirical estimates of d are obtained for OECD countries using data on nominal consumption, monetary base, and debt. Results indicate that debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level in these economies. Estimates of d correlate well with institutional measures of central bank independence.
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