901 resultados para Constitutional Court
Resumo:
--
Resumo:
Différents points de vue pour déterminer la portée du secret des délibérations dans certains tribunaux internationaux ont débouché sur le fait que les juges aient le droit de présenter des opinions séparées; alors que d’autres n’ont pas ce droit. En tenant compte du rôle et des objectifs des missions internationales, les juges devraient avoir le droit de présenter des opinions séparées, de la même façon que dans le système de common law et dans un grand nombre de tribunaux constitutionnels.Cependant, ces analogies ont joué un rôle marginal dans les travaux préparatoires du Statut de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale en 1920. D’autant que les Etats ne trouvaient pas orrect qu’une opinión juridique d’un juge international soit condamnée a l’anonymat comme consequence du principe du secret des délibérations, ceci comme conséquenced’un «technicisme» relatif au fait que ladite opinion était contraire à la position majoritaire de la Cour au moment de voter le projet de la décision.Les règles générales de droit international public garantissent un pouvoir autonome au pouvoir judiciaire international. Selon les règles de procédure des tribunaux internationaux, les juges ont le droit de se prononcer avec une opinion séparée, même si ce droit ne se trouve pas typifié de façon expresse dans le Statut ou dans le traité constitutif de l’organisation. Cette règle est présumée à moins qu’il y ait eu une claire volonté des Etats dans le sens contraire.Le droit relatif aux opinions séparées peut être analysé sous la perspective des juges en tenant compte de leur droit à la liberté d’expression. En ce sens, un juge international peut avoir la liberté pour démontrer, de façon systématique, par le biais d’opinions séparées, les vides argumentatifs de la majorité, en évitant un style qui puissent être offensif envers ses collègues. Cette façon de s’exprimer est considéré inoffensive envers l’autorité judiciaire.Les effets positifs par l’absence, ou l’interdiction, d’opinions séparées, en relation avec l’indépendance des juges internationaux ne sont pas faciles à mettre de côté. Cependant, ce genre des mesures restrictives à la liberté d’expression n’est pas suffisamment effectif ni proportionné pour légitimer l’objectif du juge. Il y a des instruments bien plus effectifs y moins restrictifs qui mènent au même résultat (par exemple, un seul mandat, non renouvelable, des juges nternationaux).
Resumo:
The human right to water is nowadays more broadly recognised, mainly due to the essential societal function that this resource plays; likewise, because of the present water scarcity is generating conflicts between its different uses. Thus, this right aims at protecting human beings by guaranteeing access to clean water that is essential to satisfy vital human needs. Similarly, access to clean water is an important element to guarantee other rights including the right to life and health. The recognition of the right to water is mainly achieved in two ways: as a new and independent right and as a subordinate or derivative right. Concerning the latter, the right to water can emanate from civil and political rights, such as the right to life; or can be derived from economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to housing. This contribution explores the position of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding the right to water, and analyses whether the Court has recognised the right to water and, if so, in which manner.
Resumo:
This article has the purpose to prove that the Customary International Law and the Conventional International Law are sources of Constitutional Law. First, it analyses the matter of the relations between International Law and National or Domestic law according with the theories dualism and monist and international decisions. Then, it studies the reception and the hierarchy of International Customary and Conventional Law to Domestic Law including Constitution. This matter has been studied according with several Constitutions and the international doctrine. Then, it considers the constitutional regulations about international law in the Constitution of the Republic of Colombia. The general conclusion is that International Law is incorporated in domestic law according with the Constitution of each country. But every state has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of International Law, and it may not invoke provisions in its Constitutions or its Laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty. Accordingly, state practice and decided cases have established this provision, and the same rule is established in articles 27 and 46 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties of 1969.
Resumo:
Right to Audience and Right to a Lawful Judge are presumed to be two of the most important guaranties for the rule of law. Both liberties are established in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 as “fundamental rights”, and they are included as a part of a most generic right: the right to due process of law. Along this text, I will try to show its content and significance, according to the sentences of the Spanish “Tribunal Constitucional”, passed through more than 25 years.
Resumo:
This article discusses the problematic and evading development of conscientiousobjection in the context of the Colombian constitutional jurisprudence. From a historical allusion to the famous case of the “Mayflower Pilgrims” –which serve as areference to the central problems that faces the objector–, it seeks to define the scopeof conscientious objection as a fundamental right (as a fundamental justice claim)in regard to the “factual” and “legal” possibilities for its exercise, for which there willbe a brief contrast between the most representative cases decided by the ColombianConstitutional Court in such matter. The core of the article is the idea that thereis an ideological prevalence that, unjustifiably, makes it difficult and in some casesdenies the exercise of the right to object in consciousness, particularly when it comes tothe right of life in regard to the abortion case.
Resumo:
My aim in this paper is to propose a reflection on the position and the importance that the constitutional judge has in the legal systems of contemporary constitutionalism. The figure of the judge responsible of protecting the Constitution is a key institution, without which we cannot understand the laws of constitutional democracies, their current lines of development, and the guarantee of rights and freedoms that constitute the normative core of these systems. Moreover, the reflection on the exercise of the powers of the judge, its scope and its justification is an important part of contemporary legal discussion, still relevant, albeit not exclusively - in the field of legal philosophy. The object of attention of my reflection is the judge who has the power of judicial review, in a scheme of defense of the Constitution, regardless the specific ways of this defense.
Resumo:
Documento acerca de la Intervención Humanitaria de la Doctrina ex post facto y Instituciones Judiciales a la noción de responsabilidad de protección y Preventiva del papel de la Corte Penal Internacional. Lección inaugural como Presidente en Derecho Penal Internacional y Procedimiento Penal Internacional en la Universidad de Utrecht , emitida el 18 de octubre 2010
Resumo:
La Corte Constitucional colombiana, a través de la interpretación del texto de la carta política, ha hecho invaluables aportes al desarrollo del derecho en nuestro país. Sin embargo, este proceso de definir las palabras de la Constitución requiere la utilización de preferencias valorativas y esto, como es natural, implica un grave riesgo para la seguridad jurídica: ¿hasta dónde puede llegar el intérprete, ¿cuáles son los límites que debe respetar?. Este riesgo incrementa si tenemos en cuenta que buena parte de la doctrina constitucional colombiana contemporánea, llamada por algunos neoconstitucionalismo, ha creado una nueva jerga erudita impenetrable llena de metáforas sofisticadas, razonamientos abstrusos, argumentos con una gran carga emotiva y citas herméticas que, en cierta medida, le han permitido encubrir sus ideas y valoraciones y, de este modo, evitar que sean sensatamente escudriñadas. En un sistema como el colombiano, erigido sobre el principio de frenos y contrapesos entre los distintos poderes del Estado, si el poder político se ejerce a través de la justicia constitucional, en un lenguaje incomprensible y presentado como un argumento de última instancia, todo el equilibrio se viene abajo y, muy pronto, el derecho se convierte en el principal instrumento del despotismo., de Daniel Mendonca, es un libro perfectamente honesto que presenta sus ideas con absoluta claridad y ayuda a trazar los límites entre la discrecionalidad y la arbitrariedad de la interpretación constitucional.
Resumo:
Los precios de transferencia ocupan el interés de los Estados en el mundo actual al constituir uno de los retos fundamentales del Derecho Internacional Tributario. En el seno de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), creada en 1961, se discutieron y desarrollaron diversas propuestas para regular el fenómeno. Estas, se materializaron en Modelos de Convenios Tributarios e instrumentos de soft law, que hoy en día constituyen los principios internacionalmente aceptados en la materia. Las Guías de la OCDE sobre precios de transferencia para empresas multinacionales y administraciones tributarias son el cuerpo normativo de soft law que se erigen, en el Ordenamiento Internacional, como el norte de las legislaciones a nivel interno para efectos de regulación de dicha temática. Su adopción por parte de los países miembros y no miembros de la OCDE se enfrenta a problemas teóricos derivados del quebrantamiento del decantado principio de reserva de ley tributaria y el respeto por la seguridad jurídica, razón por la cual su incorporación ha variado de Estado a Estado. El presente trabajo recoge la experiencia en varios países europeos y latinoamericanos y pretende proponer una fórmula de adopción en Colombia, coherente con los principios constitucionales tributarios y con virtualidad de superar las críticas realizadas por la doctrina a la aplicación directa de las Guías.
Resumo:
This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights. To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.