L'anno che non fu? L'anno dell'Europa e la crisi nelle relazioni transatlantiche, 1973/74

The 1970s are in the limelight of a growing historiographic attention, partly due to the recent opening of new archival resources. 1973, in particular, has a special interest in the historian’s eyes, as many are the events that happened that year: to name but a few, the Chilean coup, the October War, the ensuing oil crisis, the Vietnamese peace treaty. So it is may be not entirely surprising that not much attention has been paid to the Year of Europe, a nebulous American initiative destined to sum up to nothing practical - as Kissinger himself put it, it was destined to be the Year that never Was.1 It is my opinion, however, that its failure should not conceal its historical interest. Even though transatlantic relations have sometimes been seen as an uninterrupted history of crisis,2 in 1973 they reached what could then be considered as their unprecedented nadir. I believe that a thorough analysis of the events that during that year found the US increasingly at odds with the countries of Western Europe is worth carrying out not only to cast a new light on the dynamics of transatlantic relations but also to deepen our comprehension of the internal dynamics of the actors involved, mainly the Nixon administration and a unifying Europe. The Nixon administration had not carefully planned what the initiative actually should have amounted to, and its official announcement appears to have been one of Kissinger’s coups de theatre. Yet the Year of Europe responded to the vital priority of revitalising the relations with Western Europe, crucial ally, for too long neglected. But 1973 did not end with the solemn renewal of the Atlantic Declaration that Kissinger had sought. On the contrary, it saw, for the first time, the countries of the newly enlarged EC engaged in a real, if short-lived, solidarity on foreign policy, which highlighted the Nixon administration’s contradictions regarding European integration. Those, in addition to the numerous tensions that already strained transatlantic relations, gave birth to a downward spiral of incomprehensions and misperceptions, which the unexpected deflagration of the October war seriously worsened. However, even though the tensions did not disappear, the European front soon started to disintegrate, mainly under the strains imposed by the oil crisis. Significant changes in the leadership of the main European countries helped to get the tones back to normal. During the course of 1974-5, the substantial failure of the Euro-Arab dialogue, the Gymlich compromise, frequent and serene bilateral meetings bear witness that the worst was over.

Per una reinterpretazione della fuoriuscita di Dossetti dalla DC. Nuove fonti archivistiche sulle due vicesegreterie nazionali del partito(1945-46 E 1950-51)

Commento testuale e contestuale di circa duecento fonti inedite e sconosciute alla storiografia sul ruolo di vicesegretario politico della DC di Giuseppe Dossetti, in particolare con riferimento allo scioglimento dei CLN, del referendum istituzionale, della organizzazione del partito e infine, della sua rottura politica con De Gasperi.

Archeologia e storia del Fayyum durante il Nuovo Regno

La presente ricerca prende in esame le dinamiche archeologiche e storiche della regione egiziana del Fayyum durante il Nuovo Regno (1552 – 1069 a.C.). L’elaborato è suddiviso in quattro parti: la prima analizza tutti i contesti archeologici che hanno restituito materiale databile al Bronzo Tardo, la seconda riguarda, invece, la catalogazione di tutti i documenti iscritti provenienti dalla regione e databili al medesimo periodo. La terza parte rappresenta la sintesi dei dati acquisiti nelle due precedenti sezioni e descrive il divenire storico regionale tra XVIII, XIX e XX dinastia, mentre la quarta parte, un’appendice prosopografica, chiude l’intero studio. I contesti archeologici fayyumici che hanno restituito materiale databile al Bronzo Tardo sono solamente sette: Gurob, el-Lahun, Haraga, Hawara, Medinet Madi, Shedet e Tebtynis. La distribuzione della documentazione tende a concentrarsi, dal punto di vista territoriale nell’area d’ingresso della regione, mentre dal punto di vista cronologico sono molto ben attestate la seconda metà dell’epoca thutmoside, l’età amarniana e la prima parte dell’epoca ramesside. Per quanto la documentazione regionale pertinente al Nuovo Regno sia estremamente rarefatta, soprattutto se paragonata a quella contestualizzabile cronologicamente ad altri periodi storici, un’attenta analisi delle testimonianze porta a collocare il Fayyum in una fitta trama di rapporti politici, economici e militari non solo con il resto del Paese ma anche con altre aree geografiche, esterne all’Egitto.

La Pace Calda. La nascita del movimento antinucleare negli Stati Uniti e in Gran Bretagna, 1957-1963

The aim of this proposal is to offer an alternative perspective on the study of Cold War, since insufficient attention is usually paid to those organizations that mobilized against the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The antinuclear movement began to mobilize between the 1950s and the 1960s, when it finally gained the attention of public opinion, and helped to build a sort of global conscience about nuclear bombs. This was due to the activism of a significant part of the international scientific community, which offered powerful intellectual and political legitimization to the struggle, and to the combined actions of the scientific and organized protests. This antinuclear conscience is something we usually tend to consider as a fait accompli in contemporary world, but the question is to show its roots, and the way it influenced statesmen and political choices during the period of nuclear confrontation of the early Cold War. To understand what this conscience could be and how it should be defined, we have to look at the very meaning of the nuclear weapons that has deeply modified the sense of war. Nuclear weapons seemed to be able to destroy human beings everywhere with no realistic forms of control of the damages they could set off, and they represented the last resource in the wide range of means of mass destruction. Even if we tend to consider this idea fully rational and incontrovertible, it was not immediately born with the birth of nuclear weapons themselves. Or, better, not everyone in the world did immediately share it. Due to the particular climate of Cold War confrontation, deeply influenced by the persistence of realistic paradigms in international relations, British and U.S. governments looked at nuclear weapons simply as «a bullet». From the Trinity Test to the signature of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, many things happened that helped to shift this view upon nuclear weapons. First of all, more than ten years of scientific protests provided a more concerned knowledge about consequences of nuclear tests and about the use of nuclear weapons. Many scientists devoted their social activities to inform public opinion and policy-makers about the real significance of the power of the atom and the related danger for human beings. Secondly, some public figures, as physicists, philosophers, biologists, chemists, and so on, appealed directly to the human community to «leave the folly and face reality», publicly sponsoring the antinuclear conscience. Then, several organizations leaded by political, religious or radical individuals gave to this protests a formal structure. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Great Britain, as well as the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy in the U.S., represented the voice of the masses against the attempts of governments to present nuclear arsenals as a fundamental part of the international equilibrium. Therefore, the antinuclear conscience could be defined as an opposite feeling to the development and the use of nuclear weapons, able to create a political issue oriented to the influence of military and foreign policies. Only taking into consideration the strength of this pressure, it seems possible to understand not only the beginning of nuclear negotiations, but also the reasons that permitted Cold War to remain cold.