Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Allocating ideas: Horizontal competition in tournaments

We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition intournaments with two competing firms. The sponsor cares about the qualityof the design but also about the design location. A priori not even thesponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discoveredonce he has seen the actual proposals. We show that the more efficientfirm is more likely to be conservative when choosing the design location.Also, to get some differentiation in design locations, the cost differencebetween contestants can neither be too small nor too big. Therefore, ifthe sponsor mainly cares about the design location, participation in thetournaments by the two lowest cost contestants cannot be optimal for thesponsor.

Competition amongst contests

This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players aggregate effort will award their entire prize budget to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the winner increases in the contests randomness. We also provide empirical evidence for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of differing ability.

Prediction of postnatal outcome in fetuses with pulmonary hypoplasia by fetal-MRI: Comparison between lung volumetry and pulmonary signal intensity values

Purpose: Pulmonary hypoplasia is a determinant parameter for extra-uterine life. In the last years, MRI appears as a complement to US in order to evaluate the degree of pulmonary hypoplasia in foetuses with congenital anomalies, by using different methods - fetal lung volumetry (FLV), lung-to-liver signal intensity ratio (LLSIR)-. But until now, information about the correlation between the MRI prediction and the real postnatal outcome is limited. Methods and materials: We retrospectively reviewed the fetal MRI performed at our Institution in the last 8 years and selected the cases with suspicion of fetal pulmonary hypoplasia (n = 30). The pulmonary volumetry data of these foetuses were collected and the lung-to-liver signal intensity ratio (LLSIR) measures performed. These data were compared with those obtained from a control group of 25 foetuses considered as normal at MRI. The data of the study group were also correlated with the autopsy records or the post-natal clinical information of the patients. Results: As expected, the control group showed higher FLV and LLSIR values than the problem group at all gestational ages. Higher values of FLV and LLSIR were associated with a better post-natal outcome. Sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative predictive values and accuracy for the relative LLSIR and the relative FLV showed no significant differences. Conclusion: Our data show that not only the FLV but also the relative LLSIR inform about the degree of fetal lung development. This information may help to predict the fetal outcome and to evaluate the need for neonatal intensive care.

Gall midge attack intensity and host-plant response in a Neotropical coastal ecosystem

The gall inducer Clusiamyia nitida Maia, 1996 (Diptera, Cecidomyiidae) often infests the shrub Clusia lanceolata (Camb.) (Clusiaceae) in the Neotropical vegetation of restinga of Rio de Janeiro State, Brazil. Leaves of Clusia lanceolata host up to 20 spheroid galls and show variation in their shape. We aimed to evaluate the effect of gall's intensity on leaves of Clusia lanceolata, and the extension of gall's impact on adjacent non-galled leaves. We analyzed the effect of the number of galls on leaf area, biomass, specific area and leaf appearance from 509 leaves of 14 individual plants. The results showed that differences of individual plants, pairs of leaves, and gall presence were responsible for more then 90% of variation on infested leaves. Variation on parasitic intensity level created differences in leaf response. Under moderate gall attack characterized by scattered galls on a leaf, the increase of the number of galls caused an increase of leaf biomass and area, and a decrease of specific area. The specific area was smaller also under high attack intensity, characterized by coalescent galls on a leaf. In those cases of extremely high parasitic intensity, galled leaves became deformed and the surface area was severely reduced. Leaf deformation due to gall attack led to early leaf abscission, indicated by the 90% of deformed leaves found in the youngest leaf pair of the branch. There was insufficient evidence that the impact of galls on leaf morpho-physiological parameters extended beyond the attacked leaves, because ungalled leaves did not change significantly when their opposite leaf had been galled.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

Behavioral ecology of Heteragrion consors Hagen (Odonata, Megapodagrionidae): a shade-seek Atlantic forest damselfly

Behavioral ecology of Heteragrion consors Hagen (Odonata: Megapodagrionidae): a shade-seek Atlantic forest damselfly. The intensity of the inter and intra-sexual selection can affect male behavioral traits as territorial fidelity and aggressiveness allowing the existence of different strategies. However, its differential success could be affected by environmental - as the diel variation in temperature - and physiological constrains - as the variation in thermoregulatory abilities. In this context, we present a behavioral analysis of Heteragrion consors (Zygoptera, Megapodagrionidae) trying to characterize its mating system, diel activity pattern, temporal budget, territoriality and reproductive biology. These data were obtained based on field observations using the focal individual method and mark-recapture techniques in 120 m of a shaded Atlantic Forest stream in Brazil. The males of this species were territorial, varying in its local fidelity, while the females appear sporadically. Males were perched in the majority of the time, but were also observed in cleaning movements, longitudinal abdominal flexion, wing flexion and sperm transfer during perch. The males presented a perched thermoregulatory behavior related to an exothermic regulation. Foraging and agonistic interactions were rare, but dominate the other behavioral activities. Abdominal movements associated to long lasting copula pointed to the existence of sperm competition in this species. Males performed contact post-copulatory guarding of the females. These observations pointed to a non-resource mating system for this species.