779 resultados para Cold war
Resumo:
The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the détente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnson’s office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnson’s administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnson’s grand design proved to be different from the Kennedy’s one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real détente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.
Resumo:
In Sub-Saharan Africa, non-democratic events, like civil wars and coup d'etat, destroy economic development. This study investigates both domestic and spatial effects on the likelihood of civil wars and coup d'etat. To civil wars, an increase of income growth is one of common research conclusions to stop wars. This study adds a concern on ethnic fractionalization. IV-2SLS is applied to overcome causality problem. The findings document that income growth is significant to reduce number and degree of violence in high ethnic fractionalized countries, otherwise they are trade-off. Income growth reduces amount of wars, but increases its violent level, in the countries with few large ethnic groups. Promoting growth should consider ethnic composition. This study also investigates the clustering and contagion of civil wars using spatial panel data models. Onset, incidence and end of civil conflicts spread across the network of neighboring countries while peace, the end of conflicts, diffuse only with the nearest neighbor. There is an evidence of indirect links from neighboring income growth, without too much inequality, to reduce the likelihood of civil wars. To coup d'etat, this study revisits its diffusion for both all types of coups and only successful ones. The results find an existence of both domestic and spatial determinants in different periods. Domestic income growth plays major role to reduce the likelihood of coup before cold war ends, while spatial effects do negative afterward. Results on probability to succeed coup are similar. After cold war ends, international organisations seriously promote democracy with pressure against coup d'etat, and it seems to be effective. In sum, this study indicates the role of domestic ethnic fractionalization and the spread of neighboring effects to the likelihood of non-democratic events in a country. Policy implementation should concern these factors.
Resumo:
La ricerca analizza la forma di Stato e di Governo e si focalizza nel ruolo importante del Capo dello Stato in funzione alla separazione dei poteri e consolidamento della democrazia in una Repubblica Parlamentare. Questa ricerca comparativa analizza l’evoluzione della forma di governo in Italia e Albania. La ricerca analizza nei dettagli l’evoluzione della forma di Governo, focalizzandosi all’istituzione del Capo dello Stato in Albania dall’indipendenza (1912), evidenziando il ruolo dell’Italia in quest’evoluzione. In maniera comparativa si analizza l’evoluzione dell’istituzione del Capo dello Stato in Italia fin dalla sua unita e gli altri sviluppi i quali servirono come modello per l’Albania, evidenziano l’influenza a livello internazionale che ebbe l’Italia per l’indipendenza dell’Albania, che portò al consolidamento dei loro rapporti. Questa ricerca analizza la collaborazione di questi due Stati la quale culmino con la loro Unione Personale identificandosi nello stesso Capo di Stato. La ricerca inoltre evidenzia che come questa fase sia stata superata dalla II Guerra Mondiale e la Guerra Fredda che vide questi Stati a sviluppare diverse forme di Governo. Per di più la ricerca evidenzia la trasformazione politico-istituzionale e il processo di cambiamento dell’Albania dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino che segno la fine del sistema comunista, che vide l’Albania ad adottare il modello Italiano per il Capo dello Stato.
Resumo:
La tesi analizza una parte della politica estera dell’amministrazione Johnson, e più specificamente l’avvio del dialogo con l’Urss in materia di non proliferazione e controllo degli armamenti e la revisione della China policy, inquadrando entrambe nell’adattamento della cold war strategy all’evoluzione sistema internazionale, argomentando che la distensione intesa come rilassamento delle tensioni e ricerca di terreno comune per il dialogo, fosse perlomeno uno degli strumenti politici che l’amministrazione scelse di usare. Il primo capitolo analizza i cambiamenti che interessarono il Blocco sovietico e il movimento comunista internazionale tra la fine degli anni Cinquanta e l’inizio degli anni Sessanta, soprattutto la rottura dell’alleanza sino-sovietica, e l’impatto che essi ebbero sul sistema bipolare su cui si basava la Guerra Fredda. Il capitolo secondo affronta più specificamente l’evoluzione delle relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica, il perseguimento di una politica di distensione, dopo la crisi dei missili cubani, e in che relazione si trovasse ciò con lo status della leadership sovietica a seguito dei cambiamenti che avevano avuto luogo. Soffermandosi sulla questione del controllo degli armamenti e sul percorso che portò alla firma del Trattato di Non-proliferazione, si analizza come la nuova rotta intrapresa col dialogo sulle questioni strategiche sia stato anche un cambiamento di rotta in generale nella concezione della Guerra Fredda e l’introduzione della distensione come strumento politico. Il terzo capitolo affronta la questione della modifica della politica verso Pechino e il processo tortuoso e contorto attraverso cui l’amministrazione Johnson giunse a distaccarsi dalla China policy seguita sino ad allora.
Resumo:
Die Arbeit untersucht die Zusammenhänge zwischen verschiedenen Typen autokratischer Regime sowie der relativen Wahrscheinlichkeit von Staaten, an bewaffneten Konflikten beteiligt zu sein. Es wird dabei ein weiter Begriff von bewaffneten Konflikten verwendet, der nach verschiedenen Typen bewaffneter Konflikte unterscheidet sowie in der Forschung diskutierte Veränderungen der Bedingungen des internationalen Systems in der Post-Kalte-Krieg-Ära berücksichtigt.
Resumo:
Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.
Resumo:
With the end of the Cold War, which for central and eastern Europe in many respects meant the real political end to the Second World War, Germany regained its central position in the region. The Federal Republic quickly established itself as a major political and economic partner for both the Czech Republic and Poland. More importantly, due to its support for the idea of EU and NATO enlargement. Germany also became the most active western advocate of the Czech and Polish 'return to Europe'. The question remains, however, of whether Germany's relations with Poland and the Czech Republic can mature into a close axis like that enjoyed between Paris and Bonn/Berlin, or whether they will continue to develop along the lines of 'strategic congruence' but 'emotional mistrust and reserve'. The research here looked at three aspects of this question. First it considered the idea of a link between perceptions of Germany and broader considerations of European integration in Poland and the Czech Republic and outlined the ways in which Germany has motivated Czech and Polish activities and policies on EU membership. The team then focused upon on-going Czech and Polish EU integration strategies and sought to identify the actual ways in which Germany's advocacy of EU enlargement in manifest in cooperation 'on the ground'. The group concluded by considering prospects for Czech/German and Polish/German cooperation in the context of the enlarged European Union.
Resumo:
In this critical analysis of sociological studies of the political subsystem in Yugoslavia since the fall of communism Mr. Ilic examined the work of the majority of leading researchers of politics in the country between 1990 and 1996. Where the question of continuity was important, he also looked at previous research by the writers in question. His aim was to demonstrate the overall extent of existing research and at the same time to identify its limits and the social conditions which defined it. Particular areas examined included the problems of defining basic concepts and selecting the theoretically most relevant indicators; the sources of data including the types of authentic materials exploited; problems of research work (contacts, field control, etc.); problems of analysisl and finally the problems arising from different relations with the people who commission the research. In the first stage of the research, looking at methods of defining key terms, special attention was paid to the analysis of the most frequently used terms such as democracy, totalitarianism, the political left and right, and populism. Numerous weaknesses were noted in the analytic application of these terms. In studies of the possibilities of creating a democratic political system in Serbia and its possible forms (democracy of the majority or consensual democracy), the profound social division of Serbian society was neglected. The left-right distinction tends to be identified with the government-opposition relation, in the way of practical politics. The idea of populism was used to pass responsibility for the policy of war from the manipulator to the manipulated, while the concept of totalitarianism is used in a rather old-fashioned way, with echoes of the cold war. In general, the terminology used in the majority of recent research on the political subsystem in Yugoslavia is characterised by a special ideological style and by practical political material, rather than by developed theoretical effort. The second section of analysis considered the wider theoretical background of the research and focused on studies of the processes of transformation and transition in Yugoslav society, particularly the work of Mladen Lazic and Silvano Bolcic, who he sees as representing the most important and influential contemporary Yugoslav sociologists. Here Mr. Ilic showed that the meaning of empirical data is closely connected with the stratification schemes towards which they are oriented, so that the same data can have different meanings in shown through different schemes. He went on to show the observed theoretical frames in the context of wider ideological understanding of the authors' ideas and research. Here the emphasis was on the formalistic character of such notions as command economy and command work which were used in analysing the functioning and the collapse of communist society, although Mr. Ilic passed favourable judgement on the Lazic's critique of political over-determination in its various attempts to explain the disintegration of the communist political (sub)system. The next stage of the analysis was devoted to the problem of empirical identification of the observed phenomena. Here again the notions of the political left and right were of key importance. He sees two specific problems in using these notion in talking about Yugoslavia, the first being that the process of transition in the FR Yugoslavia has hardly begun. The communist government has in effect remained in power continuously since 1945, despite the introduction of a multi-party system in 1990. The process of privatisation of public property was interrupted at a very early stage and the results of this are evident on the structural level in the continuous weakening of the social status of the middle class and on the political level because the social structure and dominant form of property direct the majority of votes towards to communists in power. This has been combined with strong chauvinist confusion associated with the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and these ideas were incorporated by all the relevant Yugoslav political parties, making it more difficult to differentiate between them empirically. In this context he quotes the situation of the stream of political scientists who emerged in the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. During the time of the one-party regime, this faculty functioned as ideological support for official communist policy and its teachers were unable to develop views which differed from the official line, but rather treated all contrasting ideas in the same way, neglecting their differences. Following the introduction of a multi-party system, these authors changed their idea of a public enemy, but still retained an undifferentiated and theoretically undeveloped approach to the issue of the identification of political ideas. The fourth section of the work looked at problems of explanation in studying the political subsystem and the attempts at an adequate causal explanation of the triumph of Slobodan Milosevic's communists at four subsequent elections was identified as the key methodological problem. The main problem Mr. Ilic isolated here was the neglect of structural factors in explaining the voters' choice. He then went on to look at the way empirical evidence is collected and studied, pointing out many mistakes in planning and determining the samples used in surveys as well as in the scientifically incorrect use of results. He found these weaknesses particularly noticeable in the works of representatives of the so-called nationalistic orientation in Yugoslav sociology of politics, and he pointed out the practical political abuses which these methodological weaknesses made possible. He also identified similar types of mistakes in research by Serbian political parties made on the basis of party documentation and using methods of content analysis. He found various none-sided applications of survey data and looked at attempts to apply other sources of data (statistics, official party documents, various research results). Mr. Ilic concluded that there are two main sets of characteristics in modern Yugoslav sociological studies of political subsystems. There are a considerable number of surveys with ambitious aspirations to explain political phenomena, but at the same time there is a clear lack of a developed sociological theory of political (sub)systems. He feels that, in the absence of such theory, most researcher are over-ready to accept the theoretical solutions found for interpretation of political phenomena in other countries. He sees a need for a stronger methodological bases for future research, either 1) in complementary usage of different sources and ways of collecting data, or 2) in including more of a historical dimension in different attempts to explain the political subsystem in Yugoslavia.
Resumo:
Since the end of the Cold War, political new beginnings have increasingly been linked to questions of transitional justice. The contributions to this collection examine a series of cases from across the African continent where peaceful ‘new beginnings’ have been declared after periods of violence and where transitional justice institutions played a role in defining justice and the new socio-political order. Three issues seem to be crucial to the understanding of transitional justice in the context of wider social debates on justice and political change: the problem of ‘new beginnings’, of finding a foundation for that which explicitly breaks with the past; the discrepancies between lofty promises and the messy realities of transitional justice in action; and the dialectic between logics of the exception and the ordinary, employed to legitimize or resist transitional justice mechanisms. These are the particular focus of this Introduction.
Resumo:
This article explores the intersection of orientalism and marginality in two regions at the former Russo-British frontier between Central and South Asia. Focussing on Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan and Gilgit-Baltistan in today’s Pakistan, an analysis of historical and contemporary orientalist projections on and in the two border regions reveals changing modes of domination through the course of the twentieth century (British, Kashmiri, Pakistani and Russian, Soviet, Tajik). In this regard, different local experiences of “ colonial ” rule, both in Gorno-Badakhshan and Gilgit-Baltistan, challenge “ classical ” periodisations of colonial/postcolonial and colonial/socialist/postsocialist. This article furthermore maintains that processes of marginalisation in both regions can be interpreted as effects of imperial and Cold War contexts that have led to the establishment of the frontier. Thus, a central argument is that neither the status of the frontier between Central and South Asia as a stable entity, nor the periodisations that have conventionally been ascribed to the two regions as linear timelines can be taken for granted.
Resumo:
Zala focuses his account on the edition of the "Documents on German Foreign Policy" - documents that the US army, at the end of the Second World War, uncovered hidden in Thuringia. They were confidential documents from the archives of the German Foreign Office that had been evacuated. After the war, the United States commenced to publish these documents. Especially the documents on German relations with the Soviet Union and the discovery of the top secret additional protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 - dividing Poland up between both states - made them an excellent tool in the Cold War. Zala shows how these documents were used politically, but also what kind of controversies went on because of them in diplomatic channels.
Resumo:
In my thesis I looked at Cold War interventionism by America. In the Post WWII period, many countries were searching for freedom from colonial rule, and many were attracted to the idea of communism or socialism. In this context of a destabilized world and power struggle between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R., revolutions often became points of interests and parts of this larger power play. Any type of revolution was a destabilization, in a system that was unstable at best, and peace between the powers rested precariously on the idea of “Mutually Assured Destruction.” I would like to look more specifically, at the Latin American Region, which seemed full of upheaval, and was an area of much intervention, especially during the Reagan Administration. This administration had varying goals and conflicts about the region. The large amount of interventionism in the 1980s was in part a response to the Vietnam War, which was seen as an American failure, since prevention of communism did not occur. Following this, American strength needed to be shown again in the international stage, especially in Latin America, due to its close proximity to America. I would like to explore the intervention in Grenada and see if it followed a pattern of intervention in the region. This will be contrasted with the case of Nicaragua, which seemed more typical of interventions in the region. The causes of intervention in the region as well as the reasons these interventions took such different courses will be explored and investigated.
Resumo:
There is an ongoing mission in Afghanistan; a mission driven by external political forces. At its core this mission hopes to establish peace, to protect the populace, and to install democracy. Each of these goals has remained just that, a goal, for the past eight years as the American and international mission in Afghanistan has enjoyed varied levels of commitment. Currently, the stagnant progress in Afghanistan has led the international community to become increasingly concerned about the viability of a future Afghan state. Most of these questions take root in the question over whether or not an Afghan state can function without the auspices of international terrorism. Inevitably, the normative question of what exactly that government should be arises from this base concern. In formulating a response to this question, the consensus of western society has been to install representative democracy. This answer has been a recurring theme in the post Cold War era as states such as Bosnia and Somalia bear witness to the ill effects of external democratic imposition. I hypothesize that the current mold of externally driven state-building is unlikely to result in what western actors seek it to establish: representative democracy. By primarily examining the current situation in Afghanistan, I claim that external installation of representative democracy is modally flawed in that its process mandates choice. Representative democracy by definition constitutes a government reflective of its people, or electorate. Thus, freedom of choice is necessary for a functional representative democracy. From this, one can deduce that because an essential function of democracy is choice, its implementation lies with the presence of choice. State-building is an imposition that eliminates that necessary ingredient. The two stand as polar opposites that cannot effectively collaborate. Security, governing capacity, and development have all been targeted as measurements of success in Afghanistan. The three factors are generally seen as mutually constitutive; so improved security is seen as improving governing capacity. Thus, the recent resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and a deteriorating security environment moving forward has demonstrated the inability of the Afghan government to govern. The primary reason for the Afghan government’s deficiencies is its lack of legitimacy among its constituency. Even the use of the term ‘constituency’ must be qualified because the Afghan government has often oscillated between serving the people within its territorial borders and the international community. The existence of the Afghan state is so dependent on foreign aid and intervention that it has lost policy-making and enforcing power. This is evident by the inability of Afghanistan to engage in basic sovereign state activities as maintaining a national budget, conducting elections, providing for its own national security, and deterring criminality. The Afghan state is nothing more than a shell of a government, and indicative of the failings that external state-building has with establishing democracy.