A formal metamodeling approach to a transformation between the UML state machine and object-z

A significant problem with currently suggested approaches for transforming between models in different languages is that the transformation is often described imprecisely, with the result that the overall transformation task may be imprecise, incomplete and inconsistent. This paper presents a formal metamodeling approach for transforming between UML and Object-Z. In the paper, the two languages are defined in terms of their formal metamodels, and a systematic transformation between the models is provided at the meta-level in terms of formal mapping functions. As a consequence, we can provide a precise, consistent and complete transformation between them.

Low-cost real-time gesture recognition

A major impediment to developing real-time computer vision systems has been the computational power and level of skill required to process video streams in real-time. This has meant that many researchers have either analysed video streams off-line or used expensive dedicated hardware acceleration techniques. Recent software and hardware developments have greatly eased the development burden of realtime image analysis leading to the development of portable systems using cheap PC hardware and software exploiting the Multimedia Extension (MMX) instruction set of the Intel Pentium chip. This paper describes the implementation of a computationally efficient computer vision system for recognizing hand gestures using efficient coding and MMX-acceleration to achieve real-time performance on low cost hardware.

A Z based approach to verifying security protocols

Security protocols preserve essential properties, such as confidentiality and authentication, of electronically transmitted data. However, such properties cannot be directly expressed or verified in contemporary formal methods. Via a detailed example, we describe the phases needed to formalise and verify the correctness of a security protocol in the state-oriented Z formalism.

Formal verification of type flaw attacks in security protocols

Security protocols are often modelled at a high level of abstraction, potentially overlooking implementation-dependent vulnerabilities. Here we use the Z specification language's rich set of data structures to formally model potentially ambiguous messages that may be exploited in a 'type flaw' attack. We then show how to formally verify whether or not such an attack is actually possible in a particular protocol using Z's schema calculus.