Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

On the stability of cooperation structures

Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of superadditive TU-games.

Reduction, Linearization and stability of relative equilibria for mechanical systems on riemannian manifolds

Consider a Riemannian manifold equipped with an infinitesimal isometry. For this setup, a unified treatment is provided, solely in the language of Riemannian geometry, of techniques in reduction, linearization, and stability of relative equilibria. In particular, for mechanical control systems, an explicit characterization is given for the manner in which reduction by an infinitesimal isometry, and linearization along a controlled trajectory "commute." As part of the development, relationships are derived between the Jacobi equation of geodesic variation and concepts from reduction theory, such as the curvature of the mechanical connection and the effective potential. As an application of our techniques, fiber and base stability of relative equilibria are studied. The paper also serves as a tutorial of Riemannian geometric methods applicable in the intersection of mechanics and control theory.

Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

Stability of periodic solutions obtained via the averaging method for nonsmooth Lipschitz system

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

On the stability of periodic orbits in Rn

We consider an autonomous differential system in Rn with a periodic orbit and we give a new method for computing the characteristic multipliers associated to it. Our method works when the periodic orbit is given by the transversal intersection of n ¡ 1 codimension one hypersurfaces and is an alternative to the use of the first order variational equations. We apply it to study the stability of the periodic orbits in several examples, including a periodic solution found by Steklov studying the rigid body dynamics.

Effects of competition over quality-adjusted price indexes: an application to the Spanish automobile market

Using a newly constructed data set, we calculate quality-adjusted price indexes after estimating hedonic price regressions from 1988 to 2004 in the Spanish automobile market. The increasing competition was favoured by the removal of trade restrictions and the special plans for the renewal of the Spanish automobile fleet. We find that the increasing degree of competition during those years led to an overall drop in automobile prices by 20 percent which implied considerable consumer gains thanks to higher market efficiency. Additionally, our results indicate that loyalty relevance and discrepancies in automobile reliability declined during those years. This is captured.

Regulation of Nedd4-2 self-ubiquitination and stability by a PY motif located within its HECT-domain.

Ubiquitin ligases play a pivotal role in substrate recognition and ubiquitin transfer, yet little is known about the regulation of their catalytic activity. Nedd4 (neural-precursor-cell-expressed, developmentally down-regulated 4)-2 is an E3 ubiquitin ligase composed of a C2 domain, four WW domains (protein-protein interaction domains containing two conserved tryptophan residues) that bind PY motifs (L/PPXY) and a ubiquitin ligase HECT (homologous with E6-associated protein C-terminus) domain. In the present paper we show that the WW domains of Nedd4-2 bind (weakly) to a PY motif (LPXY) located within its own HECT domain and inhibit auto-ubiquitination. Pulse-chase experiments demonstrated that mutation of the HECT PY-motif decreases the stability of Nedd4-2, suggesting that it is involved in stabilization of this E3 ligase. Interestingly, the HECT PY-motif mutation does not affect ubiquitination or down-regulation of a known Nedd4-2 substrate, ENaC (epithelial sodium channel). ENaC ubiquitination, in turn, appears to promote Nedd4-2 self-ubiquitination. These results support a model in which the inter- or intra-molecular WW-domain-HECT PY-motif interaction stabilizes Nedd4-2 by preventing self-ubiquitination. Substrate binding disrupts this interaction, allowing self-ubiquitination of Nedd4-2 and subsequent degradation, resulting in down-regulation of Nedd4-2 once it has ubiquitinated its target. These findings also point to a novel mechanism employed by a ubiquitin ligase to regulate itself differentially compared with substrate ubiquitination and stability.