Executive Order Number One, May 1964

Executive Orders from Governor Hughes. Code of Fair Practices

Executive Order Number One, August 1969

Executive Orders from Governor Ray. Establish the Iowa Governor's Economy Committee

Executive Order Number Fifty One, January 1983

Establish the Iowa High Technology Commission.

Executive Order Number Twenty One, April 1976

Creating and establishing the voluntrary Iowa Council for Children which will be responsible to the Governor.

Executive Order Number Thirty One, June 1978

Renew mandate of voluntary Iowa Council for Children.

Executive Order Number Forty One, July 1981

Establish the Statistical Analysis Center in the Office of Planning and Programming

Executive Order Number One, May 8, 1983

Appoint an advisory commission on corrections in Iowa.

Executive Order Number Fifty One, May 19, 1994

Establishes a Library Service Advisory Council.

Executive Order Number Twenty One, December 24, 1985

Rename Iowa Refugee Service Center as Bureau of Refugee Programs and place it administratively in the Department of Human Services.

Executive Order Number Thirty One, June 29, 1987

Establish gift reporting requirements for the Executive Department of State Government.

Executive Order Number Forty One, November 6, 1990

Empowers the Governor to accept retrocession of Federal jurisdiction if offered by appropriate federal authorities.

Executive Order Number Sixty One, 1997

Assigns responsibility to coordinate disparate information technology and to provide enterprise-wide information technology services to the exectutive branch agencies to the Information Technology Services (ITS) director appointed by the Governor.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Not one odour but two: A new model for nestmate recognition.

Recognition systems play a key role in a range of biological processes, including mate choice, immune defence and altruistic behaviour. Social insects provide an excellent model for studying recognition systems because workers need to discriminate between nestmates and non-nestmates, enabling them to direct altruistic behaviour towards closer kin and to repel potential invaders. However, the level of aggression directed towards conspecific intruders can vary enormously, even among workers within the same colony. This is usually attributed to differences in the aggression thresholds of individuals or to workers having different roles within the colony. Recent evidence from the weaver ant Oecophylla smaragdina suggests that this does not tell the whole story. Here I propose a new model for nestmate recognition based on a vector template derived from both the individual's innate odour and the shared colony odour. This model accounts for the recent findings concerning weaver ants, and also provides an alternative explanation for why the level of aggression expressed by a colony decreases as the diversity within the colony increases, even when odour is well-mixed. The model makes additional predictions that are easily tested, and represents a significant advance in our conceptualisation of recognition systems.

A One-Shot Prisoners Dilemma with Procedural Utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.