997 resultados para jeux à utilité transférable
Resumo:
Il presente lavoro di tesi affronta il problema della calibrazione dei modelli idrologici afflussi-deflussi tramite un nuovo approccio basato sull'utilizzo di funzioni di utilità. L'approccio classico nella calibrazione dei modelli idrologici prevede la definizione di una misura di discrepanza tra dato osservato e simulato (definizione della funzione obiettivo) per poi procedere ad una sua minimizzazione o massimizzazione. Tradizionalmente, questo processo viene eseguito considerando l'idrogramma nella sua globalità, senza concentrarsi su quegli intervalli dell'idrogramma più utili all'utilizzatore del modello idrologico. Ad esempio, se il modello idrologico viene impiegato in un'ottica di gestione delle risorse idriche, l'utilizzatore sarà interessato ad una “migliore” riproduzione dei deflussi medio/bassi piuttosto che una corretta riproduzione dei colmi di piena. D'altra parte, se l'obiettivo è la riproduzione dei colmi di piena, un modello con alte prestazioni nella riproduzione dei deflussi medi risulta essere di scarsa utilità all'utilizzatore. Calibrando il modello tramite la funzione di utilità più adatta al caso pratico in esame, si può pertanto consentire all'utilizzatore del modello di guidare il processo di calibrazione in modo da essere coerente con il proprio schema decisionale e con le proprie esigenze, e di migliorare le performances del modello (cioè la riproduzione delle portate osservate) negli intervalli di portata per lui di maggiore interesse.
Resumo:
La scene politique camerounaise est l'objet de nombre de contradictions, d'absurdites qui font que le motif ''irregularite'' ou celui de ''fraude'' sont toujours presents à l'issue d'echeance electorale. Parmi les causes de ces irregularites figure lecaractere deloyal des scrutins au Cameroun. Qui s'observe dans l'organisation le deroulement et le depouillement des voix. Cependant, dans ce travail, il est plus question de l'occupation spatiale des differents partis à travers les affiches de campagnes et la representation de ces partis dans l'imaginaire collectif des Camerounais. Que ce soit au niveau du dimensionnement des affiches, du temps d'antennes dans les medas chauds aloué à chaque parti, tout se dispose en sorte que le parti au pouvoir demeure.
Resumo:
How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
Resumo:
How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
Resumo:
How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
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Les jeux sur mobile sont un exemple majeur à la fois d'une application réussie sur les mobiles et du nombre croissant de plates-formes pour les médias et les industries de loisirs. Explorant cette convergence, l'article analyse les caractéristiques principales du marché des jeux sur mobile et de son écosystème industriel, ses activités et acteurs principaux. L'article se concentre sur le rôle des différentes plates-formes de logiciels et sur les défis et opportunités futures pour les développeurs de jeux sur mobile dans un nouveau scénario dominé par les plates-formes de mobile.
Resumo:
L’apparato respiratorio rappresenta il bersaglio di numerose sostanze tossiche aerodisperse che rivestono un ruolo chiave nella patogenesi della maggior parte delle patologie polmonari e pleuriche, sia benigne che maligne. Nonostante per alcune di esse siano noti specifici fattori di rischio, le sole attività di prevenzione primaria non sono sufficienti a limitarne la diffusione. Si rende quindi necessario attuare adeguate misure di prevenzione secondaria per la diagnosi di malattie potenzialmente curabili allo stadio iniziale, in modo da aumentare l’efficacia dei trattamenti terapeutici e le possibilità di guarigione. Un approccio non invasivo per lo studio dei meccanismi fisiopatologici alla base delle patologie polmonari e pleuriche potrebbe essere effettuato anche con nuove metodiche (es. naso elettronico), al fine di identificare e validare nuovi biomarcatori per un più specifico approccio diagnostico. Il lavoro scientifico ha riguardato inizialmente l’identificazione di un indicatore o di un gruppo di indicatori dotati di potere diagnostico sufficientemente elevato per poter discriminare precocemente, nell’ambito di soggetti con pregressa esposizone ad asbesto, patologie benigne, sia polmonari che pleuriche, da patologie maligne. Successivamente l’attenzione è stata rivolta alla diagnosi precoce di patologie neoplastiche a carico del solo parenchima polmonare, valutando il potere discriminante di un pattern di composti organici volatili (VOCs, tra cui pentano, 2-metilpentano, esano, etilbenzene, eptanale e trans-2-nonenale) raccolti con metodiche non invasive e dotati di potere diagnostico tale da discriminare patologie benigne da patologie maligne potenzialmente curabili in soggetti ad alto rischio di sviluppare cancro del polmone. Infine abbiamo tentato di ottimizzare i parametri di impostazione e raccolta di un nuovo strumento: il naso elettronico. Su di esso esistono alcuni lavori in letteratura in cui ne vengono descritte le potenzialità in ambito diagnostico per il riconoscimento di specifici pattern suggestivi di patologie polmonari, sia flogistiche (TBC, BPCO) che neoplastiche (mesotelioma, NSCLC). Purtroppo nessuno di questi lavori definisce le condizioni ottimali di utilizzo, i limiti dello strumento e le interferenze di fattori ambientali e soggettivi riguardo al segnale elaborato. Il lavoro si è concentrato soprattutto sull’indagine delle condizioni ottimali di utilizzo e sull’eventuale condizionamento del segnale da parte di determinate variabili ambientali (es. umidità) o individuali (es. fumo, cibo, alcol).
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Il est difficile de discuter des développements intermédiaux de Star Wars sans évoquer la vision de l'instigateur de cet univers de science-fiction en constante expansion, George Lucas, qui a su mesuer l'importance qu'allait prendre le jeu vidéo (et, plus généralement, le phénomène des produits dérivés). Au-delà des considérations purement économiques,c'est d'abord par fascination personnelle que Lucas vient au 10e art. [...]
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Cette recherche se propose de réfléchir sur la place des groupes d’intérêts dans le système politique de l’UE en partant de l’exemple de la filière lait. Dans un système généralement pluraliste, la PAC fait en effet figure de cas particulier puisqu’elle a fonctionné à partir des années 1960 sur une logique de co-gestion de la politique des marchés entre la Commission et la principale fédération agricole européenne, le Comité des Organisations Professionnelles agricoles (COPA) associé depuis 1962 au Comité Général de la Coopération agricole de l'Union européenne (COGECA). Néanmoins, du fait du processus de réforme de la PAC engagé depuis 1992, il paraît nécessaire d’analyser si la logique de co-gestion est remise en cause. Cette recherche conclue qu’il existe bien un rapport néo-corporatiste dans le secteur laitier, dans le sens où un acteur en particulier, le syndicat COPA-COGECA est parvenu à influencer de manière déterminante la procédure en obtenant de renforcer le pouvoir de négociation des producteurs sans revenir sur les réformes récentes de la PAC.
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The article "Jeux" contains descriptions of experiments with electricity (v. 2, p. 288-352); the article "Oiseaux" contains music illustrating bird songs (v. 3, p. 55-56).
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
