Incentives for Increased Graduate Enrollments: Incentive Types and Implementation Strategies

Institutions seeking to increase graduate enrollment consider incentivizing program growth. This report outlines ways that institutions allow graduate programs to keep surplus revenue, including tuition rebates, funding proportional to credit-hours, and decreased tax rates. It also examines scholarship programs created to increase admitted graduate student yield, new program offerings, and ongoing unit review.

Padronização da técnica de imunoistoquímica para identificação de Listéria monocytogenes em placentas humanas e tecido nervoso central de ruminantes.

Este projeto foi desenvolvido no Laboratório de Patologia Experimental do Hospital de Clínicas de Porto Alegre (HCPA), com a aprovação da Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa do HCPA e com apoio financeiro parcial do Fundo de Incentivo à Pesquisa e Eventos do HCPA (FIPE). O experimento 1, chamado de projeto piloto, teve como objetivo implementar a técnica de IHQ para identificar a Listeria monocytogenes (L.m.), utilizando anticorpo policlonal antilisteria monocytogenes (Biodesig ). Vários testes foram realizados para acertar a diluição (1:1000) que foi diferente da preconizada pelo fabricante. Os blocos de parafina, de dez placentas provenientes de parto prematuro ou aborto foram utilizados para os cortes histológicos e a preparação das lâminas para a coloração Hematoxilina e Eosina (HE) e imunoistoquímica (IHQ). As lâminas foram identificadas por números para resguardar a identidade das pacientes. O resultado do HE mostrou alterações inflamatórias em oito placentas e L. m. foi identificada pelo IHQ em cinco dessas placentas. O objetivo do 2º experimento foi identificar a L. m. em tecido nervoso cerebral de ruminantes, utilizando a técnica implementada no projeto piloto. O material utilizado neste trabalho foi cedido pelo Setor de Patologia Veterinária do Departamento de Patologia da Universidade Federal de Santa Maria. Os casos estudados (2 ovinos, 1 caprino e 2 bovinos) tinham suspeitas clínicas diversas e as necropsias dos animais evidenciaram aspectos sugestivos da doença. Os cinco casos foram confirmados pelo IHQ, comprovando a importância da utilização desta técnica para o diagnóstico da listeriose no SNC de ruminantes. O 3º experimento objetivou identificar a L. m. em placentas encaminhadas ao Serviço de Patologia do HCPA no ano 2000. Da mesma forma que no experimento 1, as lâminas foram identificadas por números. Após o levantamento realizado nos registros dos exames anatomopatológicos (AP) deste setor, observou-se que 714 AP eram de placentas provenientes de aborto, parto prematuro e nascimento a termo examinados naquele período. Foram sorteados 254 AP para análise através de HE, revelando que 148 desses AP apresentavam alterações inflamatórias (corioamnionite, vilite e deciduite). Os blocos destas placentas foram utilizados para fazer as lâminas e realizar IHQ. A consulta aos prontuários dos casos com alterações inflamatórias permitiu observar que um deles tinha a confirmação bacteriológica de L. m. na placenta, tornando-se este o controle positivo. O controle negativo foi selecionado entre aqueles sorteados que não apresentavam alterações inflamatórias. A presença de L. m. foi identificada em 33,78% das placentas analisadas pela técnica IHQ. Corioamnionite e vilite foram as alterações inflamatórias que mostraram diferença estatística significativa nas placentas positivas. L. m. estava presente nas placentas de 1º, 2º e 3º trimestres gestacionais. A idade das gestantes, casos de aborto e/ou parto prematuro não mostraram diferença estatística significativa com a presença ou ausência de L. m. nas placentas. Abortos habituais ocorreram em pacientes com ou sem L. m. no tecido placentário. Conclusão: a técnica de imunohistoquímica pode ser utilizada para confirmar o diagnóstico histopatológico de listeriose em placentas e tecido nervoso central de ruminantes.

Organizational design and incentive provision

We model the trade-off between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix or- ganizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. Moreover, the results show that there is always a level of bias for which matrix design can achieve the expected profit obtained by shareholders if they could directly control the firm. We also show that the main trade-off, i.e., hierarchical versus matrix structure is preserved under asymmetric levels of bias among managers and when low-level workers perceive activities with complementary efforts.

Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision

We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Contingent Edis: a new contractual framework for minimizing the risk of incentive failures

Granting economic development incentives (or “EDIs”) has become commonplace throughout the United States, but the efficiency of these mechanisms is generally unwarranted. Both the politicians granting, and the companies seeking, EDIs have incentives to overestimate the EDIs benefits. For politicians, ribbon–cutting ceremonies can be the highly desirable opportunity to please political allies and financiers, and the same time that they demonstrate to the population that they are successful in promoting economic growth – even when the population would be better off otherwise. In turn, businesses are naturally prone to seek governmental aid. This explains in part why EDIs often “fail” (i.e. don’t pay–off). To increase transparency and mitigate the risk of EDI failure, local and state governments across the country have created a number of accountability mechanisms. The general trait of these accountability mechanisms is that they apply controls to some of the sub–risks that underlie the risk of EDI failure. These sub–risks include the companies receiving EDIs not generating the expected number of jobs, not investing enough in their local facilities, not attracting the expected additional businesses investments to the jurisdiction, etc. The problem with such schemes is that they tackle the problem of EDI failure very loosely. They are too narrow and leave multiplier effects uncontrolled. I propose novel contractual framework for implementing accountability mechanisms. My suggestion is to establish controls on the risk of EDI failure itself, leaving its underlying sub–risks uncontrolled. I call this mechanism “Contingent EDIs”, because the EDIs are made contingent on the government achieving a preset target that benchmarks the risk of EDI failure. If the target is met, the EDIs will ex post kick in; if not, then the EDIs never kick in.

Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts.

Construction of facilities under asymmetric information: do constitutional constraints matter?

This paper studies construction of facilities in a federal state under asymmetric information. A country consists of two regions, each ruled by a local authority. The federal government plans to construct a facility in one of the regions. The facility generates a local value in the host region and has spillover effects in the other region. The federal government does not observe the local value because it is the local authority's private information. 80 the federal governrnent designs an incentive-compatible mechanism, specifying if the facility should be constructed and a balanced scheme of interregional transfers to finance its cost. The federal governrnent is constitutionally constrained to respect a given leveI of each region's welfare. We show that depending upon the facility's local value and the spillover effect, the governrnent faces different incentive problems. Moreover, their existence depends crucially on how stringent constitutional constraints are. Therefore, the optimal mechanism will also depend upon these three features of the model.

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

The risk-incentive trade-off in competitive search

Usando a abordagem de competitive search, modelo um mercado de trabalho com trabalhadores heterogêneos no qual há um problema de risco moral na relação entre firmas e trabalhadores. Nesse contexto, consigo prever como contratos reagem a mudanças nos parâmetros do mercado (em particular, o risco de produção), assim como a variação da probabilidade dos trabalhadores serem contratados. Minha contribuição principal é ver que, no nível individual, existe uma relação negativa entre risco e incentivos, mas efeitos de equilíbrio geral implicam que essa relação pode ser positiva no nível agregado. Esse resultado ajuda a esclarecer resultados empíricos contraditórios sobre a relação entre risco e incentivos.

Incentive-driven inattention

Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia

Combating shoulder-surfing: a hidden button gesture based scheme

This project describes an authentication technique that is shoulder-surfing resistant. Shoulder surfing is an attack in which an attacker can get access to private information by observing the user’s interaction with a terminal, or by using recording tools to record the user interaction and study the obtained data, with the objective of obtaining unauthorized access to a target user’s personal information. The technique described here relies on gestural analysis coupled with a secondary channel of authentication that uses button pressing. The thesis presents and evaluates multiple alternative algorithms for gesture analysis, and furthermore assesses the effectiveness of the technique.

Development of a quality index method (QIM) sensory scheme and study of shelf-life of ice-stored blackspot seabream (Pagellus bogaraveo)

The aim of this work was to develop a quality index method (QIM) scheme for whole ice-boxed refrigerated blackspot seabream and to perform shelf-life evaluations, using sensory analysis, GR Torrymeter measurements and bacterial counts of specific spoilage organisms (SSO) during chilled storage. A QIM scheme based on a total of 30 demerit points was developed. Sensory, physical and microbiological data were integrated and used to determine the rejection point. Results indicated that the shelf-life of blackspot seabream is around 12-13 days. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A bounded upwinding scheme for computing convection-dominated transport problems

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)