Development of a novel material flow simulation model for the integration of spatial and process relevant information

Simulation techniques are almost indispensable in the analysis of complex systems. Materials- and related information flow processes in logistics often possess such complexity. Further problem arise as the processes change over time and pose a Big Data problem as well. To cope with these issues adaptive simulations are more and more frequently used. This paper presents a few relevant advanced simulation models and intro-duces a novel model structure, which unifies modelling of geometrical relations and time processes. This way the process structure and their geometric relations can be handled in a well understandable and transparent way. Capabilities and applicability of the model is also presented via a demonstrational example.

Beyond the tree of texts: Building an empirical model of scribal variation through graph analysis of texts and stemmata

Stemmatology, or the reconstruction of the transmission history of texts, is a field that stands particularly to gain from digital methods. Many scholars already take stemmatic approaches that rely heavily on computational analysis of the collated text (e.g. Robinson and O’Hara 1996; Salemans 2000; Heikkilä 2005; Windram et al. 2008 among many others). Although there is great value in computationally assisted stemmatology, providing as it does a reproducible result and allowing access to the relevant methodological process in related fields such as evolutionary biology, computational stemmatics is not without its critics. The current state-of-the-art effectively forces scholars to choose between a preconceived judgment of the significance of textual differences (the Lachmannian or neo-Lachmannian approach, and the weighted phylogenetic approach) or to make no judgment at all (the unweighted phylogenetic approach). Some basis for judgment of the significance of variation is sorely needed for medieval text criticism in particular. By this, we mean that there is a need for a statistical empirical profile of the text-genealogical significance of the different sorts of variation in different sorts of medieval texts. The rules that apply to copies of Greek and Latin classics may not apply to copies of medieval Dutch story collections; the practices of copying authoritative texts such as the Bible will most likely have been different from the practices of copying the Lives of local saints and other commonly adapted texts. It is nevertheless imperative that we have a consistent, flexible, and analytically tractable model for capturing these phenomena of transmission. In this article, we present a computational model that captures most of the phenomena of text variation, and a method for analysis of one or more stemma hypotheses against the variation model. We apply this method to three ‘artificial traditions’ (i.e. texts copied under laboratory conditions by scholars to study the properties of text variation) and four genuine medieval traditions whose transmission history is known or deduced in varying degrees. Although our findings are necessarily limited by the small number of texts at our disposal, we demonstrate here some of the wide variety of calculations that can be made using our model. Certain of our results call sharply into question the utility of excluding ‘trivial’ variation such as orthographic and spelling changes from stemmatic analysis.

The Role of Consistency and Diversity in Building Knowledge in Family Preservation

Family preservation has been criticized for implementing programs that are not theoretically founded. One result of this circumstance is a lack of information regarding processes and outcomes of family preservation services. The knowledge base of family preservation is thus rather limited at present and will remain limited unless theory is consistently integrated within individual programs. A model for conceptualizing how theoretical consistency may be implemented within programs is presented and applied to family preservation. It is also necessary for programs to establish theoretical consistency before theoretical diversity, both within individual and across multiple programs, in order to advance the field in meaningful ways. A developmental cycle of knowledge generation is presented and applied to family preservation.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

A Mathematical Model for Simplifying Representations of Objects in a Geographic Information System

The study of operations on representations of objects is well documented in the realm of spatial engineering. However, the mathematical structure and formal proof of these operational phenomena are not thoroughly explored. Other works have often focused on query-based models that seek to order classes and instances of objects in the form of semantic hierarchies or graphs. In some models, nodes of graphs represent objects and are connected by edges that represent different types of coarsening operators. This work, however, studies how the coarsening operator "simplification" can manipulate partitions of finite sets, independent from objects and their attributes. Partitions that are "simplified first have a collection of elements filtered (removed), and then the remaining partition is amalgamated (some sub-collections are unified). Simplification has many interesting mathematical properties. A finite composition of simplifications can also be accomplished with some single simplification. Also, if one partition is a simplification of the other, the simplified partition is defined to be less than the other partition according to the simp relation. This relation is shown to be a partial-order relation based on simplification. Collections of partitions can not only be proven to have a partial- order structure, but also have a lattice structure and are complete. In regard to a geographic information system (GIs), partitions related to subsets of attribute domains for objects are called views. Objects belong to different views based whether or not their attribute values lie in the underlying view domain. Given a particular view, objects with their attribute n-tuple codings contained in the view are part of the actualization set on views, and objects are labeled according to the particular subset of the view in which their coding lies. Though the scope of the work does not mainly focus on queries related directly to geographic objects, it provides verification for the existence of particular views in a system with this underlying structure. Given a finite attribute domain, one can say with mathematical certainty that different views of objects are partially ordered by simplification, and every collection of views has a greatest lower bound and least upper bound, which provides the validity for exploring queries in this regard.

A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities

Credit-rationing model similar to Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] is combined with the information externality model of Lang and Nakamura [1993] to examine the properties of mortgage markets characterized by both adverse selection and information externalities. In a credit-rationing model, additional information increases lenders ability to distinguish risks, which leads to increased supply of credit. According to Lang and Nakamura, larger supply of credit leads to additional market activities and therefore, greater information. The combination of these two propositions leads to a general equilibrium model. This paper describes properties of this general equilibrium model. The paper provides another sufficient condition in which credit rationing falls with information. In that, external information improves the accuracy of equity-risk assessments of properties, which reduces credit rationing. Contrary to intuition, this increased accuracy raises the mortgage interest rate. This allows clarifying the trade offs associated with reduced credit rationing and the quality of applicant pool.