Risk sensitivity in a motor task with speed-accuracy trade-off.

When a racing driver steers a car around a sharp bend, there is a trade-off between speed and accuracy, in that high speed can lead to a skid whereas a low speed increases lap time, both of which can adversely affect the driver's payoff function. While speed-accuracy trade-offs have been studied extensively, their susceptibility to risk sensitivity is much less understood, since most theories of motor control are risk neutral with respect to payoff, i.e., they only consider mean payoffs and ignore payoff variability. Here we investigate how individual risk attitudes impact a motor task that involves such a speed-accuracy trade-off. We designed an experiment where a target had to be hit and the reward (given in points) increased as a function of both subjects' endpoint accuracy and endpoint velocity. As faster movements lead to poorer endpoint accuracy, the variance of the reward increased for higher velocities. We tested subjects on two reward conditions that had the same mean reward but differed in the variance of the reward. A risk-neutral account predicts that subjects should only maximize the mean reward and hence perform identically in the two conditions. In contrast, we found that some (risk-averse) subjects chose to move with lower velocities and other (risk-seeking) subjects with higher velocities in the condition with higher reward variance (risk). This behavior is suboptimal with regard to maximizing the mean number of points but is in accordance with a risk-sensitive account of movement selection. Our study suggests that individual risk sensitivity is an important factor in motor tasks with speed-accuracy trade-offs.

Trade secrets: a ten year overview of the illegal import of sea turtle products into the United States

For more than 25 years all sea turtle products have been prohibited from international commerce by the 170-member nations of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Sea turtles continue to be threatened by direct take (including poaching) and illegal trade despite multi-national protection efforts. Although take may contribute significantly to sea turtle decline, illegal take is difficult to measure since there are few quantified records associated with legal fisheries and fewer still for illegal take (poaching). We can, however, quantify one portion of the illegal sea turtle trade by determining how many illegal products were seized at United States ports of entry over a recent 10-year period. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) oversees the import and export of wildlife and wildlife products, ensuring that wildlife trade complies with United States laws and international treaties. Additionally, the USFWS has legal authority to target suspected illegal wildlife activity through undercover and field investigations. In an effort to assess the scale of illegal sea turtle take and trade, we have conducted a 10-year (1994 – 2003) review of the law enforcement database maintained by the USFWS. This database tracks the number and type of wildlife cases, the quantity of seized products, and the penalties assessed against violators. These data are minimum estimates of the sea turtle products passing through the United States borders, as smuggled wildlife is oftentimes not detected.