Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, July 2010

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, March 2011

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, August 2010

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Tax Exempt Property Report, 2008

Iowa law requires each assessor in the state to value tax exempt property within his or her jurisdiction, and report such values to the Director of Revenue each year. The following report lists the 2009 actual valuations of tax exempt property for the following types of property: religious institutions, literary societies and educational institutions, low rent housing, associations of war veterans, charitable and benevolent societies, libraries and art galleries, dwelling unit property, homes for soldiers, and racetracks. Also presented in this report are comparative 2008 exempt property values.

Tax Exempt Property Report, 2009

Iowa law requires each assessor in the state to value tax exempt property within his or her jurisdiction, and report such values to the Director of Revenue each year. The following report lists the 2009 actual valuations of tax exempt property for the following types of property: religious institutions, literary societies and educational institutions, low rent housing, associations of war veterans, charitable and benevolent societies, libraries and art galleries, dwelling unit property, homes for soldiers, and racetracks. Also presented in this report are comparative 2008 exempt property values.

Tax Exempt Property Report, 2010

Iowa law requires each assessor in the state to value tax exempt property within his or her jurisdiction, and report such values to the Director of Revenue each year. The following report lists the 2009 actual valuations of tax exempt property for the following types of property: religious institutions, literary societies and educational institutions, low rent housing, associations of war veterans, charitable and benevolent societies, libraries and art galleries, dwelling unit property, homes for soldiers, and racetracks. Also presented in this report are comparative 2008 exempt property values.

Cigarette Tax October, 2010

This is a report for the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance about the receipts on cigarettes and tobacco for each month of the year. This receipt is the tax of each sale of cigarettes and tobacco.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Tax Refund Loans: High Costs for Quick Cash, January 2011

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Tax Refund Loans: High Costs for Quick Cash

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, for the year ended June 30, 2010

Effects of differential taxation on factor accumulation and growth

In this paper we try to analyze the role of fiscal policy in fostering a higher participation of the different production factors in the human capital production sector in the long-run. Introducing a tax on physical capital and differentiating both a tax on raw labor wage and a tax on skills or human capital we also attempt to present a way to influence inequality as measured by the skill premium, thus trying to relate the increase in human capital with the decrease in income inequality. We will do that in the context of a non-scale growth model.The model here is capable to alter the shares of private factors devoted to each of the two production sectors, final output and human capital, and affect inequality in a different way according to the different tax changes. The simulation results derived in the paper show how a human capital (skills) tax cut, which could be interpreted as a reduction in progressivity, ends up increasing both the shares of labor and physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and decreasing inequality. Moreover, a raw labor wage tax decrease, which could also be interpreted as an increase in the progressivity of the system, increases the share of labor devoted to the production of final output and increases inequality. Finally, a physical capital tax decrease reduces the share of physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and allows for a lower inequality value. Nevertheless, none of the various types of taxes ends up changing the share of human capital in the knowledge production, which will deserve our future attention

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidende from gasoline and cigarettes

[cat] Besley i Rosen -1998- van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període analitzat.

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm location

This paper analyses empirically how differences in local taxes affect the intraregional location of new manufacturing plants. These effects are examined within the random profit maximization framework while accounting for the presence of different types of agglomeration economies (localization/ urbanization/ Jacobs¿ economies) at the municipal level. We look at the location decision of more than 10,000 establishments locating between 1996 and 2003 across more than 400 municipalities in Catalonia, a Spanish region. It is necessary to restrict the choice set to the local labor market and, above all, to control for agglomeration economies so as to identify the effects of taxes on the location of new establishments.