Drosophilidae (Diptera) associated to fungi: differential use of resources in anthropic and Atlantic Rain Forest areas

This study investigates the Drosophilidae species associated to fruiting bodies of fungi in forested and anthropized environments of the Atlantic Rain Forest Biome, in south and southeastern Brazil. We collected samples of imagoes flying over and emerging from fruiting bodies of species of five fungi families, in six collection sites. We obtained 18 samples, from which emerged 910 drosophilids of 31 species from the genera Drosophila Fallen, 1823, Hirtodrosophila Duda, 1923, Leucophenga Mik, 1886, Mycodrosophila Oldenberg, 1914, Scaptomyza Hardy, 1849, Zaprionus Coquillett, 1901 and Zygothrica Wiedemann, 1830. The Drosophila species collected on fungi, as well as Zaprionus indianus Gupta, 1970, had previously been recorded colonizing fruits, demonstrating their versatility in resource use. Most of these species belong to the immigrans-tripunctata radiation of Drosophila. Our records expands the mycophagous habit (feeding or breeding on fungi) to almost all species groups of this radiation in the Neotropical region, even those supposed to be exclusively frugivorous. Assemblages associated to fungi of forested areas were more heterogeneous in terms of species composition, while those associated to fungi of anthropized areas were more homogeneous. The drosophilids from anthropized areas were also more versatile in resource use.

Endangered Species Act biennial report, status of recovery program / prepared by U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, Office of Protected Resources.

1994-1996

A cooperative appproach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.