890 resultados para Profit and Penalty
Resumo:
Comunicação apresentada na "Second Biennial Conference of the Standing Group on Regulation and Governance do ECPR Regulation & Governance, com o tema: (Re)Regulation in the Wake of Neoliberalism’ Consequences of Three Decades of Privatization and Market Liberalization, realizada na Universidade de Utrecht, the Netherlands, de 5 a 7 de Junho de 2008.
Resumo:
The integrity of multi-component structures is usually determined by their unions. Adhesive-bonding is often used over traditional methods because of the reduction of stress concentrations, reduced weight penalty, and easy manufacturing. Commercial adhesives range from strong and brittle (e.g., Araldite® AV138) to less strong and ductile (e.g., Araldite® 2015). A new family of polyurethane adhesives combines high strength and ductility (e.g., Sikaforce® 7888). In this work, the performance of the three above-mentioned adhesives was tested in single lap joints with varying values of overlap length (LO). The experimental work carried out is accompanied by a detailed numerical analysis by finite elements, either based on cohesive zone models (CZM) or the extended finite element method (XFEM). This procedure enabled detailing the performance of these predictive techniques applied to bonded joints. Moreover, it was possible to evaluate which family of adhesives is more suited for each joint geometry. CZM revealed to be highly accurate, except for largely ductile adhesives, although this could be circumvented with a different cohesive law. XFEM is not the most suited technique for mixed-mode damage growth, but a rough prediction was achieved.
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: Few randomised studies have compared antiandrogen intermittent hormonal therapy (IHT) with continuous maximal androgen blockade (MAB) therapy for advanced prostate cancer (PCa). OBJECTIVE: To determine whether overall survival (OS) on IHT (cyproterone acetate; CPA) is noninferior to OS on continuous MAB. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: This phase 3 randomised trial compared IHT and continuous MAB in patients with locally advanced or metastatic PCa. INTERVENTION: During induction, patients received CPA 200 mg/d for 2 wk and then monthly depot injections of a luteinising hormone-releasing hormone (LHRH; triptoreline 11.25 mg) analogue plus CPA 200 mg/d. Patients whose prostate-specific antigen (PSA) was <4 ng/ml after 3 mo of induction treatment were randomised to the IHT arm (stopped treatment and restarted on CPA 300 mg/d monotherapy if PSA rose to ≥20 ng/ml or they were symptomatic) or the continuous arm (CPA 200 mg/d plus monthly LHRH analogue). OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: Primary outcome measurement was OS. Secondary outcomes included cause-specific survival, time to subjective or objective progression, and quality of life. Time off therapy in the intermittent arm was recorded. RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS: We recruited 1045 patients, of which 918 responded to induction therapy and were randomised (462 to IHT and 456 to continuous MAB). OS was similar between groups (p=0.25), and noninferiority of IHT was demonstrated (hazard ratio [HR]: 0.90; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.76-1.07). There was a trend for an interaction between PSA and treatment (p=0.05), favouring IHT over continuous therapy in patients with PSA ≤1 ng/ml (HR: 0.79; 95% CI, 0.61-1.02). Men treated with IHT reported better sexual function. Among the 462 patients on IHT, 50% and 28% of patients were off therapy for ≥2.5 yr or >5 yr, respectively, after randomisation. The main limitation is that the length of time for the trial to mature means that other therapies are now available. A second limitation is that T3 patients may now profit from watchful waiting instead of androgen-deprivation therapy. CONCLUSIONS: Noninferiority of IHT in terms of survival and its association with better sexual activity than continuous therapy suggest that IHT should be considered for use in routine clinical practice.
Resumo:
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
Resumo:
Pascoa and Seghir (2009) noticed that when collateralized promises become subject to utility penalties on default, Ponzi schemes may occur. However, equilibrium exists in some interesting cases. Under low penalties, equilibrium exists if the collateral does not yield utility (for example, when it is a productive asset or a security). Equilibrium exists also under more severe penalties and collateral utility gains, when the promise or the collateral are nominal assets and the margin requirements are endogenous: relative inflation rates and margin coefficients can make the income effects dominate the penalty effects. An equilibrium refinement avoids no-trade equilibria with unduly repayment beliefs. Our refinement differs from the one used by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) as it does not eliminate no trade equilibria whose low delivery rates are consistent with the propensity to default of agents that are on the verge of selling.
Resumo:
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
Resumo:
I study the influence of not-for-profit entities in companies, through shareholders proposals in the U.S. largest companies. This paper analyzes the not-for-profit entities involved, the issues addressed by the proposals and the financial characteristics of target companies, as well as market reactions and voting outcomes. Results indicate that not-for-profit entities tend to target companies with higher profitability and value more frequently than general investors. Furthermore, the voting outcome is influenced by insider ownership and types of proposals. Finally, market reactions change with profitability, leverage, ownership structure and types of proposals.
Resumo:
This project is based on the theme of capacity-building in social organisations to improve their impact readiness, which is the predictability of delivering intended outcomes. All organisations which have a social mission, non-profit or for-profit, will be considered to fall within the social sector for the purpose of this work. The thesis will look at (i) what is impact readiness and what are the considerations for building impact readiness in social organisations, (ii) what is the international benchmark in measuring and building impact readiness, (iii) understand the impact readiness of Portuguese social organisations and the supply of capacity building for social impact in Portugal currently, and (iv) provide recommendations on the design of a framework for capacity building for impact readiness adapted to the Portuguese context. This work is of particular relevance to the Social Investment Laboratory, which is a sponsor of this project, in its policy work as part of the Portuguese Social Investment Taskforce (the “Taskforce”). This in turn will inform its contribution to the set-up of Portugal Inovação Social, a wholesaler catalyst entity of social innovation and social investment in the country, launched in early 2015. Whilst the output of this work will be set a recommendations for wider application for capacity-building programmes in Portugal, Portugal Inovação Social will also clearly have a role in coordinating the efforts of market players – foundations, corporations, public sector and social organisations – in implementing these recommendations. In addition, the findings of this report could have relevance to other countries seeking to design capacity building frameworks in their local markets and to any impact-driven organisations with an interest in enhancing the delivery of impact within their work.
Resumo:
Firefly Algorithm is a recent swarm intelligence method, inspired by the social behavior of fireflies, based on their flashing and attraction characteristics [1, 2]. In this paper, we analyze the implementation of a dynamic penalty approach combined with the Firefly algorithm for solving constrained global optimization problems. In order to assess the applicability and performance of the proposed method, some benchmark problems from engineering design optimization are considered.
Resumo:
We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in one case is just the reverse in time than the one for the other case. We use a box-design demand function so that there are no issues of finding and co-ordinating on the collusive price. Contrary to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it grows. We conjecture that the prospect of rapidly declining profit opportunities exerts a disciplining effect on firms that facilitates collusion and discourages deviation.
Resumo:
The paper provides a description and analysis of the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value and the general law section of the first version of Volume III of Capital. It then considers Part III of Volume III, the evolution of Marx's thought and various interpretations of his theory in the light of this analysis. It is suggested that Marx thought that the rate of profit must fall and even in the 1870s hoped to be able to provide a demonstration of this. However the main conclusions are: 1. Marx's major attempt to show that the rate of profit must fall occurred in the general law section. 2. Part III does not contain a demonstration that the rate of profit must fall. 3. Marx was never able to demonstrate that the rate of profit must fall and he was aware of this.
Resumo:
This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.
Resumo:
The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of "the historical tendencies": a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin's method, to prove the result.
Resumo:
The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of ?the historical tendencies?: a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin?s method, to prove the result.
Resumo:
In this paper we check whether generator's bid behavior at the Spanish whosale electricity market is consistent with the hypothesis of profit maximization on their residual demands. Using OMEL data, we find the arc-elacticity of the residual demand around the system marginal price. The results suggest thet the larger firms are not actually profit-msximization. We argue how the regulatory environment may drive these results. Finally, we repeat the analysis for the first session of the intra-day market where presumably firms may not have the same incentives as in the day-ahead market.