James Anderson's Political Economy--His Influence on Smith and Malthus

James Anderson's powerful critique of Adam Smith's position on the corn export bounty was published in 1777. It focuse d on Smith's proposition that the bounty could not lead to increased corn production because it could not increase corn's real price. Smit h's response to the critique is traced in later editions of Wealth of Nations. While Anderson's critique of Smith influenced Thomas Malthu s's writings from 1803 onwards, his theory of differential rent did n ot influence Malthus at this stage. An examination of the evolution o f Malthus's ideas on rent between 1803 and 1815, however, indicates t hat Malthus knew and used Anderson's work on rent.

Restraing Regulatory Capture? Anglo America, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance

A growing number of respected commentators now argue that regulatory capture of public agencies and public policy by leading banks was one of the main causal factors behind the financial crisis of 2007–2009, resulting in a permissive regulatory environment. This regulatory environment placed a faith in banks own internal risk models, contributed to pro-cyclical behaviour and turned a blind eye to excessive risk taking. The article argues that a form of ‘multi-level regulatory capture’ characterized the global financial architecture prior to the crisis. Simultaneously, regulatory capture fed off, but also nourished the financial boom, in a fashion that mirrored the life cycle of the boom itself. Minimizing future financial booms and crises will require continuous, conscious and explicit efforts to restrain financial regulatory capture now and into the future. The article assesses the extent to which this has been achieved in current global financial governance reform efforts and highlights some of the persistent difficulties that will continue to hamper efforts to restrain regulatory capture. The evidence concerning the extent to which regulatory capture is being effectively restrained is somewhat mixed, and where it is happening it is largely unintentional and accidental. Recent reforms have overlooked the political causes of the crisis and have failed to focus explicitly or systematically on regulatory capture.