The impact of a minimum pension on old age poverty and its budgetary cost. Evidence from Latin America

This paper examines the impact on old age poverty and the fiscal cost of universal minimum oldage pensions in Latin America using recent household survey data for 18 countries. Alleviatingold age poverty requires different approach from other age groups and a minimum pension islikely to be the only alternative available. First we measure old age poverty rates for all countries.Second we discuss the design of minimum pensions schemes, means-tested or not, as wellas the disincentive effects that they are expected to have on the economic and social behavior ofhouseholds including labor supply, saving and family solidarity. Third we use the household surveysto simulate the fiscal cost and the impact on poverty rates of alternative minimum pensionschemes in the 18 countries. We show that a universal minimum pension would substantiallyreduce poverty among the elderly except in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay where minimumpension systems already exist and poverty rates are low. Such schemes have much tobe commended in terms of incentives, spillover effects and administrative simplicity but have ahigh fiscal cost. The latter is a function of the age at which benefits are awarded, the prevailinglongevity, the generosity of benefits, the efficacy of means testing, and naturally the fiscal capacityof the country.

European deposit insurance: financing the transition. CEPS Commentary, 6 September 2012

Arguing that the planned move to put the ECB in charge of banking supervision would be incomplete without a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA), Daniel Gros and Dirk Schoenmaker spell out in a new CEPS Commentary some underlying principles to guide a gradual transition under which only future risks would be shared while past losses would remain at the national level. They show that ultimately such a new institution would serve as a genuine source of confidence in the European banking system.

A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update. CEPS Policy Brief No. 283, 11 September 2012

Cross-border banking is currently not stable in Europe. Cross-border banks need a European safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European level banking system may help to break the diabolical loop between the solvency of the domestic banking system and the fiscal standing of the national sovereign. This policy paper first sketches the building blocks of a banking union. Importantly, a new European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA) should start simultaneously with the ECB assuming supervisory powers. A combination of European supervision and local resolution cannot work because it is not ‘incentive compatible’. Next, this paper proposes a transition period to gradually phase in the European deposit insurance coverage. Finally, we calculate that a European Deposit Insurance Fund would amount to about €30-50 billion for the 75 euro area banks that were subject to the EBA stress tests. This Fund could be created over a period of time through risk-based deposit insurance premiums levied on these banks. Once up and running, the Fund would then turn into a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund to also deal with the resolution of one or more of these European banks.