Plano de Gestão dos Recursos da Pesca

Cabo Verde é um arquipélago de origem vulcânica constituído por dez ilhas, com uma população residente em 2000 de 434.624 habitantes e uma área total de 4.033 km2. A sua localização na zona saheliana e os efeitos acumulados, desde há várias décadas, de secas cíclicas, provocam um défice de produção agrícola que vem sendo compensado pela ajuda externa, que cobre cerca de 40% das importações alimentares. Esta situação contribui fortemente para a existência de uma balança comercial deficitária, na qual o valor das exportações apenas cobre 4% do das importações. Em 2000, o PIB per capita de Cabo Verde foi estimado em 1.281 USD, superior à média dos PMA, apesar de desemprego ser de 17% e a pobreza afectar 29% da população. O país enfrenta ainda fraquezas estruturais próprias de uma economia muito dependente da ajuda externa e das remessas dos seus emigrantes, os quais atingiram em 2000, 12% e 12-14% do PIB, respectivamente.

Growing at the production frontier. European aggregate growth, 1870-1914

The view of a 1870-1913 expanding European economy providing increasing welfare to everybody has been challenged by many, then and now. We focus on the amazing growth that was experienced, its diffusion and its sources, in the context of the permanent competition among European nation states. During 1870-193 the globalized European economy reached a silver age . GDP growth was quite rapid (2.15% per annum) and diffused all over Europe. Even discounting the high rates of population growth (1.06%), per capita growth was left at a respectable 1.08%. Income per capita was rising in every country, and the rates of improvement were quite similar. This was a major achievement after two generations of highly localized growth, both geographically and socially. Growth was based on the increased use of labour and capital, but a good part of growth (73 per cent for the weighted average of the best documented European countries) came out of total factor productivity efficiency gains resulting from not well specified ultimate sources of growth. This proportion suggests that the European economy was growing at full capacity at its production frontier. It would have been very difficult to improve its performance. Within Europe, convergence was limited, and it only was in motion after 1900. What happened was more the end of the era of big divergence rather than an era of convergence.

The impact of "early" nineteenth-century globalization on foreign trade in the Southern Cone: A study of British trade statistics

This paper deals with the impact of "early" nineteenth-century globalization (c.1815-1860) on foreign trade in the Southern Cone (SC). Most of the evidence is drawn from bilateral trades between Britain and the SC, at a time when Britain was the main commercial partner of the new republics. The main conclusion drawn is that early globalization had a positive impact on foreign trade in the SC, and this was due to: improvements in the SC's terms of trade during this period; the SC's per capita consumption of textiles (the main manufacture traded on world markets at that time) increased substantially during this period, at a time when clothing was one of the main items of SC household budgets; British merchants brought with them capital, shipping, insurance, and also facilitated the formation of vast global networks, which further promoted the SC's exports to a wider range of outlets.

Banks and development: Jewish communities in the Italian Renaissance and current economic performance

Are differences in local banking development long-lasting? Do they affect long-term economic performance?I answer these questions by relying on an historical development that occurred in Italian cities during the 15thcentury. A sudden change in the Catholic doctrine had driven the Jews toward money lending. Cities thatwere hosting Jewish communities developed complex banking institutions for two reasons: first, the Jews werethe only people in Italy who were allowed to lend for a profit and, second, the Franciscan reaction to Jewishusury led to the creation of charity lending institutions, the Monti di Pietà, that have survived until today andhave become the basis of the Italian banking system. Using Jewish demography in 1500 as an instrument, Iprovide evidence of (1) an extraordinary persistence in the level of banking development across Italian cities (2)large effects of current local banking development on per-capita income. Additional firm-level analyses suggestthat well-functioning local banks exert large effects on aggregate productivity by reallocating resources towardmore efficient firms. I exploit the expulsion of the Jews from the Spanish territories in Italy in 1541 to arguethat my results are not driven by omitted institutional, cultural and geographical characteristics. In particular,I show that, in Central Italy, the difference in current income between cities that hosted Jewish communitiesand cities that did not exists only in those regions that were not Spanish territories in the 16th century.

Productivity and the welfare of nations

We show that the welfare of a representative consumer can be related to observable aggregatedata. To a first order, the change in welfare is summarized by (the present value of) the Solowproductivity residual and by the growth rate of the capital stock per capita. We also show thatproductivity and the capital stock suffice to calculate differences in welfare across countries, withboth variables computed as log level deviations from a reference country. These results hold forarbitrary production technology, regardless of the degree of product market competition, and applyto open economies as well if TFP is constructed using absorption rather than GDP as the measureof output. They require that TFP be constructed using prices and quantities as perceived byconsumers. Thus, factor shares need to be calculated using after-tax wages and rental rates, andwill typically sum to less than one. We apply these results to calculate welfare gaps and growthrates in a sample of developed countries for which high-quality TFP and capital data are available.We find that under realistic scenarios the United Kingdom and Spain had the highest growth ratesof welfare over our sample period of 1985-2005, but the United States had the highest level ofwelfare.

Oil price shocks, income and democracy

We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.

Testing I(1) against I(d) alternatives in the presence of deteministic components

This paper discusses the role of deterministic components in the DGP and in the auxiliaryregression model which underlies the implementation of the Fractional Dickey-Fuller (FDF) test for I(1) against I(d) processes with d [0, 1). This is an important test in many economic applications because I(d) processess with d < 1 are mean-reverting although, when 0.5 = d < 1, like I(1) processes, they are nonstationary. We show how simple is the implementation of the FDF in these situations, and argue that it has better properties than LM tests. A simple testing strategy entailing only asymptotically normally distributedtests is also proposed. Finally, an empirical application is provided where the FDF test allowing for deterministic components is used to test for long-memory in the per capita GDP of several OECD countries, an issue that has important consequences to discriminate between growth theories, and on which there is some controversy.

Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

The macroeconomic effects of German unification: Real adjustments and the welfare state

We study the effects of German unification in a model with capital accumulation, skill differences and a welfare state. We argue that this event is similar to a mass migration of low-skilled agents holding no capital into a foreign country. Absent a welfare state, we observe an investment boom, depressed output and employment conditions. Capital owners and high-skilled agents are willing to give up to 4% of per-capita consumption to favor unification. When a welfare state exists the investment boom disappears and the recession is prolonged. Now, with unification, capital owners and high-skilled agents lose 4% of per-capita consumption.

O Comércio Intra-sectorial entre Portugal e os Países da União Europeia

A presente investigação tem como objectivo analisar a evolução do comércio intra-sectorial nas relações bilaterais entre Portugal e os países da União Europeia durante o período de 1995-2008 para os sectores: 31 e 34 e o impacto sobre das principais variáveis explicativas: diferença do rendimento per capita, diferença das dotações relativas, valor mínimo do rendimento per capita, valor máximo do rendimento per capita, BORDER (adjacência/fronteira), distância geográfica e dimensão do mercado (das economias) sobre o comércio intra-sectorial. A intensidade e a contribuição do comércio intra-sectorial é medida em termos absolutos e relativos através do índice proposto por Grubel e Lloyd (1975); a desagregação do comércio intra-sectorial horizontal e vertical é efectuada utilizando o critério de Abd-EL-Rahman (1991) e Grenaway et al. (1994) aplicado ao índice de Grubel e Lloyd. Os resultados obtidos mostraram que o comércio intra-sectorial vertical representa maior peso no total do comércio intra-sectorial nas relações bilaterais entre Portugal e a União Europeia, para ambos os sectores tanto em termos absolutos como em termos relativos. Em termos dos resultados econométricos verificou-se que a variável, proxy diferença do consumo eléctrico per capita utilizada para medir as dotações relativas possui um efeito negativo sobre o comércio intra-sectorial. As variáveis dimensão do mercado e valor mínimo do rendimento per capita apresentam um impacto positivo sobre o comércio intra-sectorial.

Social security and democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

It's still 2%: evidence on convergence from 116 years of the US States panel data

A new debate over the speed of convergence in per capita income across economies is going on. Cross sectional estimates support the idea of slow convergence of about two percent per year. Panel data estimates support the idea of fast convergence of five, ten or even twenty percent per year. This paper shows that, if you ``do it right'', even the panel data estimation method yields the result of slow convergence of about two percent per year.

Further evidence on the statistical properties of real GNP

The well-known lack of power of unit root tests has often been attributed to the shortlength of macroeconomic variables and also to DGP s that depart from the I(1)-I(0)alternatives. This paper shows that by using long spans of annual real GNP and GNPper capita (133 years) high power can be achieved, leading to the rejection of both theunit root and the trend-stationary hypothesis. This suggests that possibly neither modelprovides a good characterization of these data. Next, more flexible representations areconsidered, namely, processes containing structural breaks (SB) and fractional ordersof integration (FI). Economic justification for the presence of these features in GNP isprovided. It is shown that the latter models (FI and SB) are in general preferred to theARIMA (I(1) or I(0)) ones. As a novelty in this literature, new techniques are appliedto discriminate between FI and SB models. It turns out that the FI specification ispreferred, implying that GNP and GNP per capita are non-stationary, highly persistentbut mean-reverting series. Finally, it is shown that the results are robust when breaksin the deterministic component are allowed for in the FI model. Some macroeconomicimplications of these findings are also discussed.

Government spending and re-election: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazilian municipalities

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent politicalparties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our researchdesign exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around severalpopulation cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We show that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentagepoints in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. In the context of an agency modelof electoral accountability, as well as existing results indicating that the revenue jumps studiedhere had positive impacts on education outcomes and earnings, these results suggest that expectedelectoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways that were valued byvoters.