Revue de métaphysique et de morale.

Some issues have also distinctive titles.

Humanism; philosophical essays,

The ethical basis of metaphysics.--'Useless' knowledge.--Truth.--Lotze's monism.--Non-Euclidean geometry and the Kantian a priori.--The metaphysics ofthe time-process.--Reality and 'idealism.'--Darwinism and design.--The place of pessimism in philosophy.--Concerning Mephistopheles.--On preserving appearances.--Activity and substance.--Humism and humanism.--Solipsism.--Infallibility and toleration.--Freedom and responsibility.--The desire for immortality.--The ethical significance of immortality.--Philosophy and the scientific investigation of a future life.

Kant und seine vorgänger.

Mode of access: Internet.

Lotze's system of Philosophy /

Each volume also has special title page.

Contributions to the Edinburgh review.

v.1 General literature and literary biography. History and historical memoirs.- v.2 History and historical memoirs (Continued). Poetry.- v.3 Poetry (Continued). Philosophy of the mind, metaphysics, and jurisprudence. Novels, tales, and prose works of fiction.- v.4 General politics. Miscellaneous.

Studies in the Cartesian philosophy

The problem of Descartes -- The method of Descartes -- The metaphysics of Descartes -- The Cartesian principles in Spinoza and Leibniz -- The Cartesian principles in Locke -- Hume's criticism of the Cartesian principles -- The transition to Kant.

From radical to banal evil: Hannah Arendt against the justification of the unjustifiable

Two central strands in Arendt's thought are the reflection on the evil of Auschwitz and the rethinking in terms of politics of Heidegger's critique of metaphysics. Given Heidegger's taciturnity regarding Auschwitz and Arendt's own taciturnity regarding the philosophical implications of Heidegget's political engagement in 1933, to set out how these strands interrelate is to examine the coherence of Arendt's thought and its potential for a critique of Heidegger. By refusing to countenance a theological conception of the evil of Auschwitz, Arendt consolidates the break with theology that Heidegger attempts through his analysis of the essential finitude of Dasein. In the light of Arendt's account of evil, it is possible to see the theological vestiges in Heidegger's ontology. Heidegger's resumption of the question concerning the categorical interconnections of the ways of Being entails an abandonment of finitude: he accommodates and tacitly justifies that which can have no human justification.

Blocking the path from vagueness to four dimensionalism

There is a general form of an argument which I call the 'argument from vagueness' which attempts to show that objects persist by perduring, via the claim that vagueness is never ontological in nature and thus that composition is unrestricted. I argue that even if we grant that vagueness is always the result of semantic indeterminacy rather than ontological vagueness, and thus also grant that composition is unrestricted, it does not follow that objects persist by perduring. Unrestricted mereological composition lacks the power to ensure that there exist instantaneous objects that wholly overlap persisting objects at times, and thus lacks the power to ensure that there exists anything that could be called a temporal part. Even if we grant that such instantaneous objects exist, however, I argue that it does not follow that objects perdure. To show this I briefly outline a coherent version of three dimensionalism that grants just such an assumption. Thus considerations pertaining to the nature of vagueness need not lead us inevitably to accept perdurantism.

The metaphysical equivalence of three and four dimensionalism

I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are inter-translatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special relativity lead me to conclude that the two theories are equally explanatory, and thus finally that they are metaphysically equivalent.

Non-mereological universalism

In this paper I develop a version of universalism that is non-mereological. Broadly speaking, non-mereological universalism is the thesis that for any arbitrary set of objects and times, there is a persisting object which, at each of those times, will be constituted by those of the objects that exist at that time. I consider two general versions of non-mereological universalism, one which takes basic simples to be enduring objects, and the other which takes simples to be instantaneous objects. This yields three versions of endurantism, of which I ultimately defend the version I call universalist endurantism. Universalist endurantism is the thesis that (i) for any arbitrary set S of instantaneous simples that exist at the same instant, there exists a fusion of the members of S, and (ii) for any arbitrary set S* of instantaneous fusions each of which exist at a different instant, there exists an enduring object O that is constituted by those fusions at those instants. Universalist endurantism is ‘non-mereological’ in that the relation that holds between instantaneous fusions and persisting objects is not the part/whole relation, but rather, is the relation of constitution, thus allowing that the persisting objects are three rather than four dimensional. I argue that universalist endurantism not only has the various benefits of mereological universalism in allowing vagueness to be explicated as semantic indeterminacy, but in addition allows the endurantist to hold that some properties are genuinely intrinsic and are exemplified simpliciter.

Is economic philosophy a subject worth teaching?

Economic philosophy is anything but a part of the mainstream diet in the course of an economics education. Yet there are those – including occasional Nobel prizewinners – who argue that an understanding of economic philosophy is absolutely fundamental to an understanding of economics, of why economists disagree and of why “economic rationalists” are often derided by those from other professional backgrounds. The argument put in this paper is that many social science debates hinge more on the values or social philosophy implicitly involved than on technical matters of economic 'science', and that a nuanced understanding of economics requires that each school of thought be traced back to its foundations in terms of its implicit economic philosophy a prioris.

Teaching economic philosophy: Economics, ethics and the search for the right maximand

Economic philosophy is not often taught, and is not necessarily easily taught. It involves enquiry into implicit assumptions within orthodox economics and within alternatives to it. It seeks to highlight why it is that some critics object that neoclassical economics is too atomistic, hedonistic, and rationalistic, or why others lament that there is much hidden metaphysics in Friedman and his Chicago School colleagues. It addresses the issue of whether - in a reversal of the view that economics is the imperialistic social science - significant philosophical assumptions have been silently but inescapably imported into orthodox economics. This paper seeks to facilitate the presentation of such material with illustrations selected from social economics, development economics, and critiques of utilitarianism.