Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

Stabilization versus insurance: Welfare effects of procyclical taxation under incomplete markets

We construct and calibrate a general equilibrium business cycle model with unemployment and precautionary saving. We compute the cost of business cycles and locate the optimum in a set of simple cyclical fiscal policies. Our economy exhibits productivity shocks, giving firms an incentive to hire more when productivity is high. However, business cycles make workers' income riskier, both by increasing the unconditional probability of unusuallylong unemployment spells, and by making wages more variable, and therefore they decrease social welfare by around one-fourth or one-third of 1% of consumption. Optimal fiscal policy offsets the cycle, holding unemployment benefits constant but varying the tax rate procyclically to smooth hiring. By running a deficit of 4% to 5% of output in recessions, the government eliminates half the variation in the unemployment rate, most of the variation in workers'aggregate consumption, and most of the welfare cost of business cycles.

Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.

The economic tragedy of the XXth Century: Growth in Africa

The dismal growth performance of Africa is the worst economic tragedy ofthe XXth century. We document the evolution of per capita GDP for thecontinent as a whole and for subset of countries south of the Saharadesert. We document the worsening of various income inequality indexesand we estimate poverty rates and headcounts. We then analyze some ofthe central robust determinants of economic growth reported bySala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2003) and project the annual growthrates Africa would have enjoyed if these key determinants had taken OECDrather than African values. Expensive investment goods, low levels ofeducation, poor health, adverse geography, closed economies, too muchpublic expenditure and too many military conflicts are seen as keyexplanations of the economic tragedy.

Why do emerging economies borrow short term?

We argue that one reason why emerging economies borrow short term is that it is cheaperthan borrowing long term. This is especially the case during crises, as in these episodes therelative cost of long-term borrowing increases. We construct a unique database of sovereignbond prices, returns, and issuances at di¤erent maturities for 11 emerging economies from 1990to 2009 and present a set of new stylized facts. On average, these countries pay a higher riskpremium on long-term than on short-term bonds. During crises, the di¤erence between the tworisk premia increases and issuance shifts towards shorter maturities. To illustrate our argument,we present a simple model in which the maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharingproblem between an emerging economy subject to rollover crises and risk averse internationalinvestors.

Endogenous constitutions

We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. We also obtain that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by center-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian constitutions. The implications for the relationship between inequality and redistribution are discussed. Historical evidence and a cross-sectional analysis support our results.

Agglomeration-effects in Europe

The paper estimates agglomeration-effects for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. Estimation takes into account endogeneity of the spatial distribution ofemployment and spatial fixed-effects. Empirical resultssuggest that agglomeration-effects in these Europeancountries are only slightly smaller than agglomeration-effects in the US: the estimated elasticity of average-labor-productivity with respect to employment-density is 4.5 percent compared to 5 percent in the US.

What explains the Great Moderation in the US? A structural analysis

This paper investigates what has caused output and inflation volatility to fall in the USusing a small scale structural model using Bayesian techniques and rolling samples. Thereare instabilities in the posterior of the parameters describing the private sector, the policyrule and the standard deviation of the shocks. Results are robust to the specification ofthe policy rule. Changes in the parameters describing the private sector are the largest,but those of the policy rule and the covariance matrix of the shocks explain the changes most.

Health investment complementarities under competing risks

Applying the competing--risks model to multi--cause mortality,this paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the positive complementarities that occur between disease--specific policy interventions. We argue that since an individual cannot die twice, competing risks imply that individuals will not waste resources on causes that are not the most immediate, but will make health investments so as to equalize cause--specific mortality. However, equal mortality risk from a variety of diseases does not imply that disease--specific public health interventions are a waste. Rather, a cause--specific intervention produces spillovers to other disease risks, so that the overall reduction in mortality will generally be larger than the direct effect measured on the targeted disease. The assumption that mortality from non--targeted diseases remains the same after a cause--specific intervention under--estimates the true effect of such programs, since the background mortality is also altered as a result of intervention. Analyzing data from one of the most important public health programs ever introduced, the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) of the United Nations, we find evidence for the existence of such complementarities, involving causes that are not biomedically, but behaviorally, linked.

The intra-generational redistributive effects of social security

This paper provides a quantitative evaluation of the intra--cohortredistributive elements of the United States social security system in thecontext of a computable general equilibrium model. I determine how thewell--being of individuals that differ across {\sl gender, race} and {\sl education}is affected by government social security policy. I find that females, whitesand non--college graduates stand less to gain (lose) from reductions(increases) in the size of social security than males, non--whites andcollege graduates, respectively. Differences in mortality risk and laborproductivity translate into differences in the magnitudes of capitalaccumulation and labor supply distortions, that are responsible for theobserved welfare difference between types. Results imply that the currentprogram is lifetime progressive across gender and education, yet lifetimeregressive across race.

Does it cost to be virtuous? The macroeconomic effects of fiscal constraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features of macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the typical transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting is responsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

On Rothschild-Stiglitz as competitive pooling

Dubey and Geanakoplos [2002] have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they find that a separating equilibrium always exists and is unique.We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of their definition of refined equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.

The transmission of US shocks to Latin America

I study whether and how US shocks are transmitted to eight Latin American countries. US shocks are identified using sign restrictions and treated as exogenous with respect to Latin American economies. Posterior estimates for individual and average effects are constructed. US monetary shocks produce significant fluctuations in Latin America, but real demand and supply shocks do not. Floaters and currency boarders display similar output but different inflation and interest rate responses. The financial channel plays a crucial role in the transmission. US disturbances explain important portions of the variability of LatinAmerican macrovariables, producing continental cyclical fluctuations and, in two episodes, destabilizing nominal exchange rate effects. Policy implications are discussed.

Equilibrium unemployment insurance

In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insuranceinto a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictionsand on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populatedby identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distributionof human capital across agents, may choose very different unemploymentinsurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interactionbetween the political decision about the level of the unemployment insuranceand the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to aself-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-stateequilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with highunemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist withan American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnoverand low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model featurestwo distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and durationrates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.