The Catholic Identity of Malta after Ten Years of Membership in the European Union: Challenges and Prospects. Occasional Paper 2/2014

Introduction. Ten years have elapsed since Malta’s accession in the European Union. One can still recall vividly the intense and acrimonious campaign prior to the membership referendum and the ensuing electoral victory that confirmed the Nationalist Party (PN) in power under the leadership of Edward Fenech Adami in 2003. In both cases the Maltese voted in favour of entry into the EU. During both exercises in democracy the Maltese were exposed to the rhetoric of both prophets of doom and prophets of plenty. For the former accession meant a loss of national and territorial independence, for the latter it meant the beginning of opportunity for all and, in some cases, the answer to all of Malta’s woes. Now, ten years later, a further appraisal of Malta’s membership and place in the European Union is called for. The purpose of this paper, however, is to reflect upon how this membership has affected the Roman Catholic Church in Malta and what prospects lie ahead for the Catholic community within Maltese society that remains in a state of constant flux on both the social and the religious level. It traces the major events that have accelerated the transformation of Malta into a secular society. The paper describes how these events, together with pressures that are being brought to bear by secular movements upon Maltese society, are profoundly affecting its Catholic identity and redrawing its moral landscape. It also discusses ways and means by which the Catholic Church in Malta can address these challenges and contribute towards the construction of a more humane Maltese society. In order to achieve this, it must first and foremost remain a coherent witness of a faith that is forever alive, dynamic and relevant.

Helpless and lonely: Turkey's attitude towards the war in Syria. OSW Commentary No. 136, 09.05.2014

The conflict in Syria, which has lasted since 2011, has become the most significant test of the efficiency of Turkey’s foreign policy and the biggest challenge to Turkey’s security in recent decades. The lack of a clear prospect of an end to the war does not allow us to come to a final conclusion regarding the Syrian civil war’s importance for Turkey. However, it can be said today that with the exception of the initial phase of the conflict, Ankara’s influence over the course of events in Syria has been limited, and the war itself is evolving in a direction that is unfavourable for Turkey: the hostile regime of Bashar al-Assad is still in power, the opposition has proved to be an unreliable or even a dangerous ally, and in northern Syria militant jihadist groups and Kurds are gaining importance. It is also quite unlikely that the West will take any greater responsibility for stabilising the situation in the region. In response to such an unfortunate situation, and out of fear of risking deeper involvement in the conflict, during the past year Turkey’s policy towards Syria has been restrained, reactive and focused mainly on defending Turkey’s territory. However, this policy offers no security guarantees and does not prevent the country’s regional position from weakening, especially in the context of the reinforcement of the jihadist militants and the Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The arguments for Turkey continuing its defensive policy are strong: the country fears the possible results of an open confrontation with Assad’s forces; most probably it could not count on support for such actions from within its own society or its Western allies. It also does not have enough acceptance within the anti-Assad opposition circles. On the other hand, though, the risk of uncontrolled development of events is still present; the risk of confrontations with armed jihadist militants is growing; and the potential operation of Turkish forces, either against the jihadists or against Assad’s army, could be considered as a method of diverting attention from the political problems with which the AKP government has been struggling at home.

The crisis in Iraq and the twists and turns of Turkish Middle East policy. OSW Commentary No. 142, 29.07.2014

The spectacular offensive by Islamic radicals in Iraq this June has led the country to the verge of collapse, and is another scene of the deep crisis in the Middle East, in which Turkey is entangled. The immediate consequence of this is a severe crisis of prestige after the kidnapping by terrorists of Turkish diplomats and Ankara’s inability to resolve the situation; in the long term consequences include escalation of the Kurdish problem, and a further increase in threats to the security of Turkey itself as well as the fundamental principles of its foreign policy. Both Ankara’s options and its political will to actively respond to the crisis are extremely limited. Yet again in recent years, the current crisis, the broader situation in the Middle East, and finally the position of Turkey in the region elude unambiguous assessments and forecasts – these are prevented by the scale and growth of the reappraisals and tensions in the region. The only undoubted fact is that Turkey is strategically and irreversibly entangled in the Middle East’s problems, which are an important factor affecting the transformation of the state which the ruling AKP is implementing; and in the near future, this state of affairs will only deepen.

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church's stance on the revolution and war. OSW Commentary No. 151, 27.10.2014

Volodymyr (secular name Viktor Sabodan), the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All-Ukraine, the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which recognises the honorary primacy of the Moscow Patriarchate, died on 5 July 2014 at the age of 79. He was replaced by Metropolitan Onufry (secular name Orest Berezovsky), aged 70. The fact that this representative of the moderate trend, far from politics, was elected signifies that the UOC’s previous policy will be continued in the coming years: strengthening the Church’s independence without questioning its canonical bonds with Moscow. Metropolitan Onufry’s task is to wait out the hard times, rather than to embark upon an active policy. The political developments this year have significantly weakened pro-Russian views and sentiments among the Ukrainian public, including members of the UOC. On the other hand, they have also contributed to the radicalisation of views within firmly pro-Russian circles. The hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have distanced themselves from these developments. The reasons for this included a lack of unity among them as regards this issue, as well as the leadership crisis linked to Metropolitan Volodymyr’sillness. The main problems the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is facing today are as follows: meeting the expectations of those of its members who hold patriotic views (mainly the younger generation) without at the same time antagonising its numerous members who are pro-Russian; and also continuing to disregard the Kyiv Patriarchate and maintaining bonds with the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore, we may expect the UOC to continue avoiding taking a clear stance on the present conflict, instead focusing on charity.

2014-A Centenary and a Discovery. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 59 December 2014

It is almost as if engaging in war is easier than thinking about war. In the year of the commemoration of the First World War, Europe is facing several wars on its borders, and European forces are actively engaged in Iraq and Mali. But is anyone thinking about the strategic objectives?

Turkey and the Kurdish problem; new approaches in the face of the Middle East crises. Point of View No. 30, February 2013

From the Introduction. For almost a hundred years (since World War I and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire) stability – or rather, the permanent threat to stability – has been a key challenge for the Middle East. One of the central elements of this threat has been the so-called Kurdish problem, that is, the issues that continually arise between the states of the region and the Kurdish minority living in the area, as well as the tensions among the individual states caused by a range of issues related to local Kurds. The country most affected by the Kurdish problem is Turkey.

THE NEW WALLS AND FENCES: CONSEQUENCES FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE. CEPS Middle East Working Paper No. 9, June 2003

Good fences make good neighbours’ wrote the poet Robert Frost. Israel and Palestine are certainly not good neighbours and the question that arises is will a fence between Israel and Palestine turn them into ‘good neighbours’. This paper deals with the Israeli decision to construct a fence that will divide Israel and the West Bank. Almost all public debate of the wall in Israel has been limited to the security aspects. In light of the success enjoyed so far by the wall or fence around the Gaza Strip in preventing suicide bombers from getting through, the defence for needing a similar wall around the West Bank seems like an easy task. One of the main proponents of the wall concept in Israel is Dan Scheuftan, whose book on the subject has served as a guide for policy-makers. The paper provides a critique of Scheuftan’s book. The paper addresses various aspects of the wall and focuses on the different consequences of building a barrier between the two entities. Significant attention is paid to the economic consequences of the wall. The paper also looks at other issues such as the impact the wall will have on future attempts of peace-making. The paper attempts to show that the prevention of Palestinian access to Israel – the main goal of the wall – may not really have the hoped for effect of enhancing Israel’s security

The UN General Assembly Vote: Upgrading the Status of Palestine and Its Implications for a Possible Role of the ICC. IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/06 • June 2013

On 29 November 2012, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) voted overwhelmingly to accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in the UN. In the first part of this Policy Brief, the implications of upgrading the status of Palestine with regard to the possible role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will be assessed. In April 2012, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC declined to accept jurisdiction for acts committed on the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002, justifying its decision based on the fact that Palestine had, at the time, only the status of an ‘Observer Entity’ at the UN. Subsequently, it will be analysed if the Palestinian pursuit of its cause before the ICC can be considered as an effective lawfare strategy or rather as a poisoned chalice.

The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

The National Constituent Assembly of Tunisia and Civil Society Dynamics. EUSpring Working Paper No. 2, 8 July 2015

The Tunisian constitution of 27 January 2014 was deemed essentially compatible with international human rights principles and standards. These were adopted at the outcome of a dual process, which was underway both inside the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and outside it, between the NCA and civil society stakeholders. Three successive drafts fell considerably short of expectations (6 August 2012, 14 December 2012 and 22 April 2013). The fourth draft (1 June 2013) was still fraught with 20 or so fundamental divergences. These were resolved, thanks to the National Dialogue in cooperation with the ad hoc “consensus commission” (lajnet tawafuqat) within the NCA, which is chaired by Mustapha Ben Jaafar (President of the NCA). The final text was overwhelmingly adopted on 26 January 2014 by 200 votes, with 12 against and four abstentions. It was promulgated on 10 February.

spotlight europe #2015/02—July 2015: A Gulf CSC Could Bring Peace and Greater Security to the Middle East

Wars continue to ravage in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Refugees are wandering around aimlessly in the Middle East with many fleeing to Europe. Saudi Arabia and Iran are adding fuel to the flames. They are vying for supremacy while remaining highly suspicious of each other. A Conference for Security and Cooperation could help to ease existing tensions. Many years ago the CSCE was a resounding success. It could thus serve as a blueprint with the nuclear agreement with Iran as a starting point of such a venture.

Morocco’s illiberal regime and fragmented political society. Arab Citizenship Review No. 10, October 2015

The post-Arab Spring period in Morocco has undergone different stages of changing state-society relations with regard to democracy, citizenship and human rights. The first stage, between February 2011 and the summer of 2013, was characterised by popular protests demanding democracy and freedom. People criticised public policies related to civil, political and social rights (employment, health, education, the status of women, and the issue of Amazigh). This outburst put the state in an awkward, defensive position. If we compare Morocco with the other Arab Spring countries, the Moroccan state’s reaction was moderate in its use of violence and repression, and it was positive, in that it resulted in the implicit, yet official acceptance of the demands for democracy, citizenship and battling corruption. In his speech on 9 March 2011, the king pledged to modify the Constitution and democratise the institutions.

Arab views on democratic citizenship – and on EU support. Arab Citizenship Review No. 11

Arab views on democratic citizenship – and on EU support Much has been said about the EU’s general response to the Arab spring. And much has been written about regimes’ resistance to the far-reaching reform demanded by protestors across the Arab world. We have been engaged in a project (www.euspring.com) exploring one very specific dimension of these political trends and social debates: the question of how citizens in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) understand the concept of democratic citizenship. Within our project, our local affiliated research organizations ran throughout 2014 a series of focus groups in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia with a range of civic stakeholders. The aim of these meetings was to explore how citizens in the three countries understand democratic citizenship and how they view EU efforts to support political reform.

The European Union as a Mediator in Israel-Palestine: Operations Cast Lead and Protective Edge. EU Diplomacy Paper 01/2016

The European Union (EU) has played an important, yet inconsistent role in the Israel-Palestine conflict since the1980 Venice Declaration. This paper analyses how the EU’s role as a mediator has changed more recently in the Israel-Gaza conflict. Specifically, it examines how the ‘Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities’ adopted in 2009 and the creation of the European External Action Service and the High Representative by the Lisbon Treaty have changed the EU’s resources and strategies as a mediator as well as how these developments improved cooperation and coordination with other mediators. This analysis is done through a comparison of the EU’s role in the Israeli Operation Cast Lead in 2008/2009 and Operation Protective Edge in 2014. It is argued that the aforementioned changes made the EU a more capable mediator and facilitated internal coordination. However, these changes did not create more resources for the EU as a mediator, rather they changed how the EU used its resources.

Great hatred, little room Northern Ireland and the European Union: Attitudes, perspectives and the role of religion. Bruges Political Research Papers 48/2015.

Little academic attention has been given to the study of Northern Irish Euroscepticism despite the fact that it is a unique and interesting example of citizens’ relationships with the EU. Northern Irish Euroscepticism is defined by the divergence in attitudes towards European integration between Catholics and Protestants. This is a divide that is rooted in historical and religious interpretations of the project, as well as the widespread belief that membership of the EU will somehow lead to a united Ireland. Membership in the EU has not had a significant political impact on Northern Ireland, with citizens’ attitudes being largely characterised by a clear lack of interest in the project. Participation at the European level provided limited opportunity for cooperation by both sides while it may be argued that European elections contributed to the sectarian divide.