La política exterior argentina durante la guerra fría : Interpretaciones y debates

El artículo se propone ver cuáles han sido los usos del pasado en los trabajos de política exterior desde las distintas perspectivas teóricas. Para hacerlo, presentaremos un brevísimo racconto del desarrollo disciplinar y señalaremos cuales son sus principales enfoques sobre el periodo, tanto en términos generales, como específicos, cuando terminó esta fase, para finalmente realizar una conclusión sobre la misma.

"Sino el espanto" : Temas, prácticas y alianzas de los anticomunismos de derecha en Argentina entre 1955 y 1966

Este artículo se concentra en la vida política de algunas organizaciones anticomunistas de derecha en Argentina entre 1955 y 1966: se intenta poner de manifiesto la pluralidad de tradiciones anticomunistas presentes en el país, así como algunas de las diferentes vinculaciones internacionales de las que participaban. A partir de la consulta a fuentes periodísticas, oficiales y de la inteligencia policial, se reunió información para reconstruir las posturas ideológicas, las lecturas sobre los problemas sociales y culturales argentinos y algunas de las actividades políticas lideradas (o acompañadas) por diversos actores anticomunistas. Este período se caracteriza por una súbita coronación del anticomunismo en los discursos políticos, al punto de desplazar o subsumir una preocupación sobre el peronismo, originariamente más relevante. El anticomunismo terminó convirtiéndose en una pieza clave en la articulación entre las distintas familias de derecha.

Intelectuales y Guerra Fría : El Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura en Argentina y Chile, 1950-1964

El artículo compara la trayectoria de las filiales argentina y chilena del Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura - un producto de Estados Unidos en la Guerra Fría cultural creado en 1950-entre 1950 y 1964. Basado en numerosas fuentes primarias y secundarias, contribuye a de-centrar los estudios sobre la Guerra Fría cultural, mostrando la manera en que desarrollos históricos internacionales fueron procesados a nivel local y revelando similitudes y diferencias entre las dos filiales relacionadas con el contexto político, ideológico y cultural específico de cada país.

La política exterior argentina durante la guerra fría : Interpretaciones y debates

El artículo se propone ver cuáles han sido los usos del pasado en los trabajos de política exterior desde las distintas perspectivas teóricas. Para hacerlo, presentaremos un brevísimo racconto del desarrollo disciplinar y señalaremos cuales son sus principales enfoques sobre el periodo, tanto en términos generales, como específicos, cuando terminó esta fase, para finalmente realizar una conclusión sobre la misma.

The Evolution of the "One China" Concept in the Process of Taiwan's Democratization

This paper investigates how Taiwan's "one China" concept evolved during the democratization process that occurred under the leadership of former President Lee Teng-hui. The author argues that there was a crucial evolution of the "one China" concept and that the transformation of the concept resulted from changes in Taiwan's internal political circumstances. The evolution of the concept creates a real possibility that the "status quo" sought by the ROC in the Taiwan Strait both during and after the Cold War might be destroyed. In addition, any further evolution of the "one China" concept will surely make the "status quo" of Taiwan untenable, in that it would induce Taiwan to seek de jure instead of de facto independence, possibly initiating a conflict between the PRC and the ROC. To prevent such a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the international community must persuade the ROC not to go beyond the "status quo" and to stay within the framework of de facto independence. At the same time, both the PRC and the ROC should be urged to maintain an open conduit of communication for productive talks on the reunification of China.

Myanmar and Japan: How Close Friends Become Estranged

Independent Myanmar and Japan had long held the strongest ties among Asian countries, and they were often known as having "special relations" or a "historically friendly relationship." Such relations were guaranteed by the sentiments and experiences of the leaders of both countries. Among others, Ne Win, former strongman throughout the socialist period (1962-1988), was educated and trained by the Japanese army officers of the Minami Kikan, leading to the birth of the Burma Independence Army (BIA). Huge official development assistance provided by the Japanese government also cemented this special relationship. However, the birth of the present military government (SLORC/SPDC) in 1988 drastically changed this favorable relationship between the two countries. When the military seized power in a coup, Japan was believed to be the only country that possessed sufficient meaningful influence on Myanmar to encourage a move toward national reconciliation between the junta and the opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi. In reality, Japan failed to exert such an influence due to its sour relations with the military government and reduced influence in the new international and regional political landscape. What is worse, Japan seems to be losing its say on Myanmar issues in the international political arena, as it has been wavering in limbo between the sanctionist forces, such as the United States and the European Union, and engagement forces, such as China and ASEAN.

Decentralization in Nation State Building of Indonesia

Introduction：Today, many countries, regardless of developed or developing, are trying to promote decentralization. According to Manor, as his quoting of Nickson’s argument, decentralization stems from the necessity to strengthen local governments as proxy of civil society to fill the yawning gap between the state and civil society (Manor [1999]: 30). With the end to the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union rendering the cause of the “leadership of the central government to counter communism” meaningless, Manor points out, it has become increasingly difficult to respond flexibly to changes in society under the centralized system. Then, what benefits can be expected from the effectuation of decentralization? Litvack-Ahmad-Bird cited the four points: attainment of allocative efficiency in the face of different local preferences for local public goods; improvement to government competitiveness; realization of good governance; and enhancement of the legitimacy and sustainability of heterogeneous national states (Litvack, Ahmad & Bird [1998]: 5). They all contribute to reducing the economic and social costs of a central government unable to respond to changes in society and enhancing the efficiency of state administration through the delegation of authority to local governments. Why did Indonesia have a go at decentralization? As Maryanov recognizes, reasons for the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia have never been explicitly presented (Maryanov [1958]: 17). But there was strong momentum toward building a democratic state in Indonesia at the time of independence, and as indicated by provisions of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, there was the tendency in Indonesia from the beginning to debate decentralization in association with democratization. That said debate about democratization was fairly abstract and the main points are to ease the tensions, quiet the complaints, satisfy the political forces and thus stabilize the process of government (Maryanov [1958]: 26-27). 　　　What triggered decentralization in Indonesia in earnest, of course, was the collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The Soeharto regime, regarded as the epitome of the centralization of power, became incapable of effectively dealing with problems in administration of the state and development administration. Besides, the post-Soeharto era of “reform (reformasi)” demanded the complete wipeout of the Soeharto image. In contraposition to the centralization of power was decentralization. The Soeharto regime that ruled Indonesia for 32 years was established in 1966 under the banner of “anti-communism.” The end of the Cold War structure in the late 1980s undermined the legitimate reason the centralization of power to counter communism claimed by the Soeharto regime. The factor for decentralization cited by Manor is applicable here. 　　　Decentralization can be interpreted to mean not only the reversal of the centralized system of government due to its inability to respond to changes in society, as Manor points out, but also the participation of local governments in the process of the nation state building through the more positive transfer of power (democratic decentralization) and in the coordinated pursuit with the central government for a new shape of the state. However, it is also true that a variety of problems are gushing out in the process of implementing decentralization in Indonesia. 　　　This paper discusses the relationship between decentralization and the formation of the nation state with the awareness of the problems and issues described above. Section 1 retraces the history of decentralization by examining laws and regulations for local administration and how they were actually implemented or not. Section 2 focuses on the relationships among the central government, local governments, foreign companies and other actors in the play over the distribution of profits from exploitation of natural resources, and examines the process of the ulterior motives of these actors and the amplification of mistrust spawning intense conflicts that, in extreme cases, grew into separation and independence movements. Section 3 considers the merits and demerits at this stage of decentralization implemented since 2001 and shed light on the significance of decentralization in terms of the nation state building. Finally, Section 4 attempts to review decentralization as the “opportunity to learn by doing” for the central and local governments in the process of the nation state building. 　　　In the context of decentralization in Indonesia, deconcentration (dekonsentrasi), decentralization (desentralisasi) and support assignments (tugas pembantuan; medebewind, a Dutch word, was used previously) are defined as follows. Dekonsentrasi means that when the central government puts a local office of its own, or an outpost agency, in charge of implementing its service without delegating the administrative authority over this particular service. The outpost agency carries out the services as instructed by the central government. A head of a local government, when acting for the central government, gets involved in the process of dekonsentrasi. Desentralisasi, meanwhile, occurs when the central government cedes the administrative authority over a particular service to local governments. Under desentralisasi, local governments can undertake the particular service at their own discretion, and the central government, after the delegation of authority, cannot interfere with how local governments handle that service. Tugas pembantuan occur when the central government makes local governments or villages, or local governments make villages, undertake a particular service. In this case, the central government, or local governments, provides funding, equipment and materials necessary, and officials of local governments and villages undertake the service under the supervision and guidance of the central or local governments. Tugas pembantuan are maintained until local governments and villages become capable of undertaking that particular service on their own.

La Revista El Arquitecto Peruano: reseña de la Cultura Arquitectónica del Perú 1937/1977

La tesis se centra en el análisis de 356 números de la revista El Arquitecto Peruano publicados entre 1937 y 1977. La revista fue fundada en agosto de 1937 por Fernando Belaúnde Terry, arquitecto graduado en la University of Texas at Austin en 1935 quien la dirigió por 25 años hasta marzo de 1963. Desde abril de 1963 la dirige Miguel Cruchaga Belaunde. Durante esta última etapa la revista deja de ser regular, publicándose intermitentemente con varios años sin editarse, hasta desaparecer finalmente en 1977. La revista es la publicación periódica de arquitectura más importante del siglo XX en el Perú. La investigación ubica a la revista en el contexto nacional donde se desarrolló vinculando además los diversos eventos de la arquitectura y el urbanismo del panorama internacional sucedidos durante las tres décadas de estudio. El trabajo empieza por establecer una secuencia de periodos. Esta se basa en la identificación de una estructura fija existente en la revista conformada por las secciones permanentes. Una paulatina inserción de secciones temporales fue complementando y detallando nuevas temáticas y contenidos generando variantes de la estructura fija a lo largo del tiempo. Como resultado de este proceso se reconocen 5 periodos vinculados a una serie de temas vertebrales durante la dirección de Fernando Belaunde: Periodo 1 (Agosto de 1937 a marzo de 1942). Vivienda Unifamiliar. Periodo 2 (Abril de 1942 a mayo de 1944). Urbanismo moderno. Periodo 3 (Junio de 1944 a diciembre de 1949). Vivienda Colectiva. Periodo 4 (Enero-febrero de 1950 a enero-febrero de 1956). Proyectos y obras. Periodo 5 (Marzo-abril de 1956 a enero-febrero-marzo de 1963). Territorio. Los años finales bajo la dirección de Miguel Cruchaga conforman el último Periodo. En la década de los treinta, durante el primer periodo se analiza el rol que un grupo de revistas de arquitectura europeas y norteamericanas tuvieron en la construcción formal y temática de El Arquitecto Peruano. En sus inicios existen influencias de The Architectural Forum, The American Architect, Architecture, California Arts and Architecture y Architectural Digest . Y junto a estas, las revistas alemanas Moderne Bauformen e Innen Dekoration. A raíz de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, las referencias a las revistas alemanas desaparecen y las relaciones con Estados Unidos se intensifican por la posición del Perú dentro del área de influencia norteamericana. El canal de las revistas no fue el único medio de influencia, durante los años cuarenta hubo un marco de apertura hacia Latinoamérica que incluyó viajes de cooperación de arquitectos norteamericanos por el sur del continente. Como parte de estos vínculos, en 1945 Paul Lester Wiener de Town Planning Associates y Richard Neutra, - ambos miembros del CIAM y el segundo Presidente del CIAM USA- prestaron asistencia a la iniciativa más importante promovida por la revista peruana, un proyecto de vivienda popular para obreros y empleados llamado el Plan Peruano. La revista tuvo siempre una fuerte actitud de cambio de la realidad existente en el medio peruano. Para modelar su nueva versión de la realidad instrumentó una serie de campañas de prensa. En la más importante utilizó las ideas del urbanismo moderno que circulaban durante la guerra nacidas en los CIAM de entreguerras. El Arquitecto Peruano aprovecha la coyuntura de los primeros años de la posguerra para canalizar sus iniciativas, tomando como modelo de su propuesta la idea de la Neighborhood Unit, convirtiéndolo en proyecto y finalmente construyendo la Unidad Vecinal N°3, el proyecto de mayor escala asociado con la revista. A esta perspectiva favorable para las ideas vertidas por la publicación se une el hecho de que su Director, es elegido Diputado por Lima y es un miembro muy cercano al gobierno de turno que dio la cobertura legal y de gestión para cristalizar los proyectos desde 1945 hasta 1948. Durante este periodo se producen las propuestas de mayor alcance promovidas por Fernando Belaunde y difundidas por la revista, como el propio Plan Peruano de Vivienda, los Centros Climáticos de Invierno, el Plan Piloto de Lima y los Concursos de Vivienda popular. Existe un trabajo anterior sobre la revista, restringido al campo del urbanismo realizado en 1992 por el historiador Antonio Zapata y titulado El joven Belaunde: Historia de la revista El Arquitecto Peruano en donde se inclina el peso de la revista hacia la Vivienda Social y se señala a Walter Gropius como el arquitecto más influyente en la publicación. La presente tesis plantea que el Plan Peruano es la punta del iceberg, pero que todos estos proyectos relacionados con la revista, conforman un conjunto indisoluble y que el paquete completo tiene una directa influencia de proyectos, ideas y labor editorial de José Luis Sert desarrollada desde finales de los años veinte hasta los años cincuenta. Sus libros Can Our Cities Survive? , The Heart of the City y la revista del GATEPAC AC Documentos de Actividad Contemporánea tienen improntas claras en la revista peruana que atraviesan tres de los periodos propuestos. Durante la década de los cuarenta cuando Sert junto a Wiener fueron socios en Town Plannning Associates y tuvieron contacto directo con el director de la revista así como con los principales colaboradores, y durante la década posterior. A la luz de las evidencias analizadas, la figura de José Luis Sert emerge como la del arquitecto más influyente para la revista El Arquitecto Peruano a lo largo de todo su recorrido. ABSTRACT The thesis focuses on the analysis of 356 issues of the magazine El Arquitecto Peruano published between 1937 and 1977. The magazine was founded in august 1937 by Fernando Belaunde Terry, graduated from the University of Texas at Austin in 1935 who leaded it 25 years until March 1963. Since April 1963 was leaded by Miguel Cruchaga Belaunde. During this last stage the magazine ceases to be published on regular times, being published intermittently, unreleased several years, and finally disappear in 1977. El Arquitecto Peruano is the most important magazine of architecture of the twentieth century in Peru. The research located the magazine in the national context where was developed further by linking the various events of architecture and urbanism of the international scene occurred during the three decades of study. The research begins to establish a sequence of periods. This identification is based on a fixed structure existing in the journal formed by the permanent sections. A gradual insertion of temporary sections was complementing and detailing new themes and contents generating variants of the fixed structure over time. As a result of this process we recognize five periods linked to a series of central themes developed under the lead of Fernando Belaunde: Period 1 (September 1937 to March 1942): The Small House. Period 2 (April 1942 to May 1944). Modern urbanism. Period 3 (June 1944 to December 1949). Housing. Period 4 (January-February 1950 January-February 1956). Projects and Buildings. Period 5 (March-April 1956 January-February-March 1963). Territory. The final years under the direction of Miguel Cruchaga make the last Period. In the thirties, during the first period, is analyzed the role that a group of European and American magazines in architecture had in formal construction and thematic of the magazine. In the beginning there are influences of The Architectural Forum, The American Architect, Architecture, California Arts and Architecture and Architectural Digest. And along with these, the german magazine Moderne Bauformen and Innen Dekoration. Following World War II, the references to german magazines disappear and US relations are intensified by the position of Peru in the area of US influence. The magazines was not the only ways of influence, during the forties there was an open framework with Latin America that included cooperation trips of american architects on the south of the continent. As part of these links, in 1945 Paul Lester Wiener of Town Planning Associates and Richard Neutra, -both members of CIAM and the second President of the CIAM USAassisted the most important initiative promoted by the peruvian magazine, a popular housing project for workers and employees called El Plan Peruano. The magazine always has a strong attitude of change of the reality in the peruvian scene. To model the new version of reality created a series of media campaigns. In the biggest it used the ideas of modern urbanism that circulated during the war born in the CIAM of twenties and thirties. El Arquitecto Peruano take advantage of the situation of the early postwar years to direct their initiatives, modeled his proposal with the idea of Neighborhood Unit, making project and finally building the Unidad Vecinal N° 3, the larger scale project linked with the magazine. This favorable outlook for the ideas expressed by the publication joins the fact that its Director is elected deputy for Lima and is very close member to the current government who gave legal instruments and management to crystallize projects from 1945 to 1948. During this period of far-reaching proposals promoted by Fernando Belaunde and diffused by the magazine, as El Plan Peruano itself, the Centros Climaticos de Invierno, the Plan Piloto for Lima and the Concusos de Vivienda Popular. There is an earlier work on the magazine, restricted to the field of urbanism in 1992 by historian Antonio Zapata, entitled El Joven Belaunde: Historia de la revista El Arquitecto Peruano where the weight of the magazine leans Social Housing and notes Walter Gropius as the most influential architect in the publication. This thesis suggests that El Plan Peruano is the end of the iceberg, but these related projects to the magazine, form an inseparable whole and that the whole package has a direct influence of projects, ideas and editorial work of José Luis Sert developed from late twenties to the fifties. His book Can Our Cities Survive? , The Heart of the City and the magazine of GATEPAC AC Documentos de Actividad Contemporanea have clear signs in the peruvian magazine cross three of the proposed periods. During the forties when Sert and Wiener were partners in Town Plannning Associates and had direct contact with the director of the magazine as well as with key colaborators, and during the following decade. In light of the evidence examined, the shape of José Luis Sert emerges as the most influential architect to the peruvian magazine along its entire route.

Role Expectations and State Socialization: Germany's Rediscovery of the Use of Force 1990-1995

This dissertation engages the question of why German political elites accepted the use of force during the 1990s and started to commit the country's armed forces to multilateral peacekeeping missions. Previous governments of the Federal Republic had opposed foreign deployment of the military and Germany was characterized by a unique strategic culture in which the efficacy of military force was widely regarded as negative. The rediscovery of the use of force constituted a significant reorientation of German security policy with potentially profound implications for international relations. I use social role theory to explain Germany's security policy reorientation. I argue that political elites shared a national role conception of their country as a dependable and reliable ally. Role expectations of the international security environment changed as a result of a general shift to multilateral intervention as means to address emerging security problems after the Cold War. Germany's resistance to the use of force was viewed as inappropriate conduct for a power possessing the economic and military wherewithal of the Federal Republic. Elites from allied countries exerted social pressure to have Germany contribute commensurate with capabilities. German political elites adapted role behavior in response to external expectations in an effort to preserve the national role conception of a dependable and reliable ally. Security policy reorientation to maintain Germany's national role conception was pursued by conservative elites who acted as 'role entrepreneurs'. CDU/CSU politicians initiated a process of role adaptation to include the use of force for non-defensive missions. They persuaded Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green party politicians that the maintenance of the country's role conception necessitated a reorientation in security policy to accommodate the changes in the security environment.

Dialogue with the Eurasian Union on Ukraine – an opportunity or a trap? OSW COMMENTARY No. 154, 2014-12-01

The Eurasian Union (or, to give it its full name, the Eurasian Economic Union, EEU) is Russia's flagship project, by use of which it aims to institutionally subordinate the post-Soviet states to itself using political ties and the projected common economic space. The Kremlin has so far managed to persuade Belarus and Kazakhstan, and tentatively also Armenia, to join this integration project, which on the surface looks like a multilateral initiative but in reality conceals a network of bilateral relations centred on Russia. However, in order for Russia to reconstruct its influence in its neighbourhood permanently and without change, it is of key importance that Ukraine is incorporated into the EEU. That still seemed feasible even in 2013, but the Maidan and the Russian-Ukrainian war have undone this possibility. However, they also opened up an alternative scenario for Russia, one in which the Western states recognise the Eurasian Union as a legitimate partner in discussions about a new order in Europe with a view to restoring peace in Ukraine. It is worth taking into account the strategic consequences of that scenario. We need to consider if the idea which Moscow has been lobbying for – and which has found some supporters in Brussels and Berlin – threatens to take us back to the Cold War system of geopolitical blocs and implies recognition of Russia's dominance over Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership countries?

The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

The Central European Predicament. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 9, May 2014

From Introduction. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has experienced a very deep economic and political transformation since the beginning of the nineties. The early years of transition were characterized by big hopes for a quick and successful development. The international community, including the EU and the USA showed interest in the transformation of the region for a number of reasons. From a geopolitical perspective, the transformation was of tremendous importance as it confirmed the end of the cold war and the bipolar global system was replaced first by a unipolar superpower system and later gave way to a multipolar or a new bipolar system. This also signaled the weakness of the Soviet Union (and later Russia), as it was not able to prevent this transformation and was soon mired in a serious and long lasting economic and political crisis that undermined its international position. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union during the nineties Russia remained very weak, both economically and politically. The power vacuum and the transformation in Central Europe made the establishment of a new international economic and security structure possible. The new economic and political pattern that started to develop within the region was based on the liberal market economy model, with the objective of opening up markets and integrating the region into the world economy and the North Atlantic security structure.

Germany's European Policy: A Constructivist Perspective. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.1, 1998

This paper sets out a constructivist analytical framework and applies it to post-reunification German policy towards the European Union. Although the structural constraints facing Germany shifted dramatically with the end of the Cold War and reunification, the direction of its European policy did not. The more powerful Federal Republic continued to press for deeper economic and political integration, eschewing a more independent or assertive foreign policy course. Neorealism, neoliberalism, and liberalism cannot adequately explain this continuity in the face of structural change; a constructivist account centered around state identity can. During and after reunification, German leaders across the political spectrum identified the Federal Republic as part of an emergent supranational community. This European identity, with roots in the postwar decades, drove Germany's unflagging support for deeper integration across the 1989-90 divide.

Structure as Process: The Regularized Intergovernmentalism of Franco-German Bilateralism, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No.02.3, 2002

This article systematically scrutinizes the intergovernmental and administrative aspects of Franco- German relations with the 1963 Elysée Treaty at their core. This treaty, together with its various additions and extensions, has defined the basic processes of bilateral interaction between the French and German states. Recurrent tension in Franco-German relations notwithstanding, many observers and participants have viewed France and Germany to be connected particularly closely since the 1960s. This article explores key elements of what it is that links France and Germany. Thereby it clarifies the concept of regularized intergovernmentalism, suggests viewing this specific set of international practices from a social-structural perspective, and evaluates the effects and limits of such regularized procedures. Its findings suggest that bilateral structures have complemented and undergirded a broadly multilateral post-World War II world and are likely to continue to do.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service