How Does the Unemployment Insurance System Shape the Time Profile of Jobless Duration?

This paper updates a sparse literature on the effects of unemployment benefits (UB) on the time profile of escape rates from unemployment. These effects, as well as those of other regressors, are found to vary profoundly over the course of unemployment.

Unemployment Duration: Competing and Defective Risks

This paper examines the determinants of unemployment duration in a competing risks framework with two destination states: inactivity and employment. The innovation is the recognition of defective risks. A polynomial hazard function is used to differentiate between two possible sources of infinite durations. The first is produced by a random process of unlucky draws, the second by workers rejecting a destination state. The evidence favors the mover-stayer model over the search model. Refinement of the former approach, using a more flexible baseline hazard function, produces a robust and more convincing explanation for positive and zero transition rates out of unemployment.

Job Search Methods and Outcomes

Using Portuguese data, this paper investigates the effects of job search methods on escape rates from unemployment and of job-finding methods on earnings. The effectiveness of the job search process is also evaluated in terms of the periodicity of the resulting job match. Emphasis is accorded the role of the public employment service. Despite its frequency as a search vehicle, the state employment agency is shown to have a low hit rate, and to lead to lower-paying, shorter-lasting jobs.

Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation

We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent and study the differences induced by two levels of individual rationality. Perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when players are assumed to behave as finite automata of limited complexity. We provide structural properties of the sequences of networks which are likely to form in Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the repeated game. For instance, players can form totally different connected networks at each period or the sequence of networks can exhibit a total order relationship.

Willingness to Pay for Rural Landscape Improvements: Combining Mixed Logit and Random-Effects Models

This paper reports the findings from a discrete-choice experiment designed to estimate the economic benefits associated with rural landscape improvements in Ireland. Using a mixed logit model, the panel nature of the dataset is exploited to retrieve willingness-to-pay values for every individual in the sample. This departs from customary approaches in which the willingness-to-pay estimates are normally expressed as measures of central tendency of an a priori distribution. Random-effects models for panel data are subsequently used to identify the determinants of the individual-specific willingness-to-pay estimates. In comparison with the standard methods used to incorporate individual-specific variables into the analysis of discrete-choice experiments, the analytical approach outlined in this paper is shown to add considerable explanatory power to the welfare estimates.