The IT outsourcing market-place: vendors and their selection

This paper focuses on outsourcing vendors, their characteristics and the vendor selection process. It draws on current research and two research studies, one specifi- cally examining outsourcing vendors and the other examining vendor-client issues. We first outline the development of the market for the outsourcing of information technology/information systems services and activities, then detail the characteristics of different types of vendor companies and their competitive positions, before providing a client perspective to the issue of vendor selection.

The determinants of a cross market arbitrage opportunity: theory and evidence for the European bond market

This paper examines the determinants of cross-platform arbitrage profits. We develop a structural model that enables us to decompose the likelihood of an arbitrage opportunity into three distinct factors: the fixed cost to trade the opportunity, the level at which one of the platforms delays a price update and the impact of the order flow on the quoted prices (inventory and asymmetric information effects). We then investigate the predictions from the theoretical model for the European Bond market with the estimation of a probit model. Our main finding is that the results found in the empirical part corroborate strongly the predictions from the structural model. The event of a cross market arbitrage opportunity has a certain degree of predictability where an optimal ex ante scenario is represented by a low level of spreads on both platforms, a time of the day close to the end of trading hours and a high volume of trade.

Training and the commitment of outsourced information technologies' workers: psychological contract fulfillment as a mediator

Outsourced workers in information technologies (IT) generally have high skills and a high value on the job market. Their IT outsourcing organizations are likely to provide them with training, in the first place for skill development, but perhaps also as a way to bind the workers to them. This can be understood along the role of the psychological contract. Outsourced IT workers may see training as a fulfillment of their psychological contract. Accordingly, we hypothesize that psychological contract fulfillment mediates the relationship between training and affective commitment to the IT outsourcer. This was tested in a sample of 158 Portuguese outsourced IT workers. The results showed that employees who considered that they were receiving good training opportunities felt a greater affective commitment to their IT outsourcers. This relationship was mediated by the fulfillment of the relational psychological contract.

Contractual restrictions on lawful use of information: sole-source databases protected by the back door?

This article is concerned with the risks associated with the monopolisation of information that is available from a single source only. Although there is a longstanding consensus that sole-source databases should not receive protection under the EU Database Directive, and there are legislative provisions to ensure that lawful users have access to a database’s contents, Ryanair v PR Aviation challenges this assumption by affirming that the use of non-protected databases can be restricted by contract. Owners of non-protected databases can contractually exclude lawful users from taking the benefit of statutorily permitted uses, because such databases are not covered from the legislation that declares this kind of contract null and void. We argue that this judgment is not consistent with the legislative history and can have a profound impact on the functioning of the digital single market, where new information services, such as meta-search engines or price-comparison websites, base their operation on the systematic extraction and re-utilisation of materials available from online sources. This is an issue that the Commission should address in a forthcoming evaluation of the Database Directive.

Mobile phones and radios: effects on transactions costs and market participation for households in Northern Ghana

The literature on agricultural markets suggests that transactions costs are the main obstacles preventing households from participating in agricultural markets. We examine the impact of the recent massive penetration of information communication technologies (ICTs), particularly mobile phones and radios, in developing countries to investigate the role of information in economic transactions and participation in food crop markets. To fully capture market participation behaviours, the current theoretical framework on market participation and transactions costs is extended to include those households that sell and buy in the same time period. We correct for endogeneity and selectivity throughout our models. We used a novel dataset of 393 households in northern Ghana with detailed information on market transactions and ICTs usage. Results show that receiving market information via mobile phones has a positive and significant impact on market participation, with a greater impact for households with a surplus of food crops. We find that radios have a larger impact on the quantity traded. This may reflect the nature of mobile phones in reducing searching costs, whereas radios provide an updated and regular flow of information which affects the pattern of crops consumed and sold. We also emphasise that the most significant factor is how ICTs are used, rather than their ownership.

Bank market concentration, relationship banking and small business liquidity

This paper examines two contrasting interpretations of how bank market concentration (Market Power Hypothesis) and banking relationships (Information Hypothesis) affect three sources of small firm liquidity (cash, lines of credit and trade credit). Supportive of a market power interpretation, we find that in a highly concentrated banking market, small firms hold less cash, have less access to lines of credit, and are more likely to be financially constrained, use greater amounts of more expensive trade credit and face higher penalties for trade credit late payment. We also find support for the information hypothesis: relationship banking improves small business liquidity, particularly in a concentrated banking market, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of bank market concentration derived from market power. Our results are robust to different cash, lines of credit and trade credit measures and to alternative empirical approaches.

The option market reaction to bank loan announcements

In this study, we examine the options market reaction to bank loan announcements for the population of US firms with traded options and loan announcements during 1996-2010. We get evidence on a significant options market reaction to bank loan announcements in terms of levels and changes in short-term implied volatility and its term structure, and observe significant decreases in short-term implied volatility, and significant increases in the slope of its term structure as a result of loan announcements. Our findings appear to be more pronounced for firms with more information asymmetry, lower credit ratings and loans with longer maturities and higher spreads. Evidence is consistent with loan announcements providing reassurance for investors in the short-term, however, over longer time horizons, the increase in the TSIV slope indicates that investors become increasingly unsure over the potential risks of loan repayment or uses of the proceeds.

High-School Students´ Summer Jobs and their Ensuing Labor Market Achievement : the Long Term Effect

In part because of high and persistent youth unemployment, adolescent students’ transition from school to work is an important policy and research topic. Many countries have implemented public programs offering summer jobs or work while in high-school as measures to smooth the transition. While the immediate effect of the programs on school attendance, school grades, and disposable income is well documented, their effect on the transition to the labor market remains an open question. Observational studies have shown strong positive effects of summer jobs, but also that the estimated effect is highly vulnerable to selection bias. In this paper, some 3700 high-school students applying for summer jobs in the period 1995-2003,via a program, are followed to 30 years of age. A quarter of the applicants were randomly offered a summer job each year. Among the remaining students, 50% had a (non-program related) summer job while in high-school. We find the income, post high-school, for the offered and non-offered groups to be similar and conclude that the effect of summer jobs on the transition to the labor market is inconsequential.

Large economies with differential information but without free disposal

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without freedisposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Informational spillovers in the pre-1914 London sovereign debt market

We document a novel type of international financial contagion whose driving force is shared financial intermediation. In the London peripheral sovereign debt market during pre-1914 period financial intermediation played a major informational role to investors, most likely because of the absence of international monitoring agencies and the substantial agency costs. Using two events of financial distress – the Brazilian Funding Loan of 1898 and the Greek Funding Loan of 1893 – as quasi-natural experiments, we document that, following the crises, the bond prices of countries with no meaningful economic links to the distressed countries, but shared the same financial intermediary, suffered a reduction relative to the rest of the market. This result is true for the mean, median and the whole distribution of bond prices, and robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis. We interpret it as evidence that the identity of the financial intermediary was informative, i.e, investors extracted information about the soundness of a debtor based on the existence of financial relationships. This spillover, informational in essence, arises as the flip-side of the relational lending coin: contagion arises for the same reason why relational finance, in this case, underwriting, helps alleviate informational and incentive problems.

Macroeconomic announcements, price discovery, and order flow efects in the stock market: evidence from incomplete data and multiple financial markets

This paper investigates heterogeneity in the market assessment of public macro- economic announcements by exploring (jointly) two main mechanisms through which macroeconomic news might enter stock prices: instantaneous fundamental news im- pacts consistent with the asset pricing view of symmetric information, and permanent order ow e¤ects consistent with a microstructure view of asymmetric information related to heterogeneous interpretation of public news. Theoretical motivation and empirical evidence for the operation of both mechanisms are presented. Signi cant in- stantaneous news impacts are detected for news related to real activity (including em- ployment), investment, in ation, and monetary policy; however, signi cant order ow e¤ects are also observed on employment announcement days. A multi-market analysis suggests that these asymmetric information e¤ects come from uncertainty about long term interest rates due to heterogeneous assessments of future Fed responses to em- ployment shocks.

Why designate market makers? affirmative obligations and market quality

We study why most financiaI markets designate one or more agents who precommit to provide more liquidity than they would endogenously choose, and identify two reasons that such affirmative obligations can improve welfare. The first relies on the insight that the informational component of the competi tive bid-ask spread represents a transfer across traders, not a social cost to completing trades. As such, this trading cost dissuades efficient trading, while a restriction on spread widths encourages efficient trading. Secondly, a restriction on spread widths encourages traders to become informed, which speeds the rate at which market prices move toward true asset values in the wake of information events. We consider the setting where competition ensures that affirmative obligations impose net trading losses on designated market makers that must be compensated by side payments, as observed on the Euronext limit order market, and also the setting where the designated market maker is allowed some advantages relative to limit order traders so that profits can be eamed during tranquil periods to offset losses incurred when affirmative obligations are binding, as observed on the NYSE.

Stage level measurement of information and communication technology in organizations

Na moderna Economia do Conhecimento, na Era do Big Data, entender corretamente o uso e a gestão da Tecnologia de Informação e Comunicação (TIC) tendo como base o campo acadêmico de estudos de Sistemas de Informação (SI), torna-se cada vez mais relevante e estratégico para as organizações que pretendem: permanecer em atividade, estar aptas para atender novas demandas (internas e externas) e enfrentar as complexas mudanças na competição de mercado. Esta pesquisa utiliza a teoria dos estágios de crescimento, fundamentada pelos estudos de Richard L. Nolan nos anos 70. A literatura acadêmica relacionada com modelos de estágios de crescimento e o contexto do campo de estudo de SI, fornecem as bases conceituais deste estudo. A pesquisa identifica um modelo com seus construtos relacionados aos estágios de crescimento das iniciativas da TIC/SI organizacional, partindo das variáveis de benchmark de segundo nível de Nolan, e propõe sua operacionalização com a criação e desenvolvimento de uma escala. De caráter exploratório e descritivo, a pesquisa traz contribuição teórica ao paradigma da teoria dos estágios de crescimento, adicionando um novo processo de crescimento em sua estrutura conceitual. Como resultado, é disponibilizado além de um instrumento de escala bilíngue (português e inglês), recomendações e regras para aplicação de um instrumento de pesquisa do tipo survey, na continuidade deste estudo. Como implicação geral desta pesquisa, é esperado que seu uso e aplicação ao mensurar a avaliação do nível de estágio da TIC/SI em organizações, possam auxiliar dois perfis de indivíduos: acadêmicos que estudam essa temática, assim como, profissionais que buscam respostas de suas ações práticas nas organizações onde trabalham.